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INTRODLCTION

Following decades of attempts to overhaul the federal system of poor relief,
President Clinton signed a bill in 1996 that dramatically reformed "welfare as
we know it" by repealing the New Deal program of Aid for Families vvith
Dependent Children (AFDC) and replacing it with T emporary As s istance for
Needy Families (TANF). Although the revi sed statute left some wel Care~
programs untouched, it transformed poor relief for most families by
incorporating strict time limits and manclatury work requirements.
The
iife tirne limit on cash assistance for families is now fixed at sixty months.
Recipients must engage in part-time work and move toward full-time
em ployme nt to remain qualified for benefits.' In the wake of these reform s.
many beneficiaries have left the welfare rolls altogether, while many others
receive some public assistance to supplement their (often meager) earmngs at
low-wage jobs.
1

The enactment of TANF represents the triumph of the familiar distinction
between the "deserving" and "undeserving" poor. That distinction rests on the
·vvidespread and popular view that the able-bodied should work and that public
assistance should be available only to those who cannot work or who cannot
support themselves by working. Although the historical absence of poor relief
for able-bodied men shows that this paradigm has always held sway in the
United States, TANF extends its hold by imposing work requirements on
care takers of children-most importantly single mothers. The categories of
''deserving" and "undeserving" are now applied regardless of sex.

1
See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996. Pub. L. No. 10-1-193.
liO Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. § !305 (20001) (leaving in place some means-tested. in-kind

programs (ivledicaid and food stamps) and maintaining the basic clements of the federal program for the poor,
disabled, and elderly (SSI)).
2

See HELEN I-IERSHKOcF & STEPHEN LOFFREDO, THE RIGHTS OF THE POOR 32-5-1 ( 1997) (providing a
broaJ analysis of rights and restrictions unJer TANF); DAN BLOOM. AFIER AFDC. WELF.·\Rlo-TO- WORK
CHOICES AND CHALLENGES FOR STATES 74-77, amilul1le or http://www.mdrc.org/Repoi1s/AfterAFDC/
.'\ftcr'k 20AFDC.htm (last visited Feb. 8. 2003) (documenting state increases in earned-income disregards and
consequences for '"work plus welfare'· combinations).

Revisions to the 1996 Welfare Reform Act arc now

under consideration in Congress (though temporarily stalled in the Senate). and President Bush has
recommended strengthening the statute"s work requirements. See Mike Allen, Bush Pushes Bigger Workload

fen Wefj(u·e Recipients. WASH. POST, May 14, 2002, at AS; Robert Pear. House Pmses a Welfclre Bill 1vitli
Srricta Rules on Work. N.Y. TIMES. May 17, 2002. at A I: Shawn Frcmstacl et a!., Sulll!ii{IIT CoinJWrison
TANF Reaurlwri~ation Pu>~'isions: Bills Passed bv Senmc Finuncc Collunirree ond the House
Rerresenwrin:s, and Relared Pmrosols. at http://www.cbpp.org/7-2-02tanf.pclf (last updated on August
2002): see also Robert Pear. House Endorses Srricler \Vork Rulesfi1r rile Poor, N.Y. T!M[S, Feb. I-I, 2003,
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SOMETHI NG FOR NOTHI NG

As argued previou sly ,' the various reform s introd uced by the enactme nt of
T ANF represent a converge nce towards a consensus model of "condition al
rec iprocity" under w hi ch individuals are expected to co ntribute to their ow n
s upport through paid e mpl oy me nt if they are ab le, with the government ow in g
nothing to those who could co ntribute but do not. This model allows
indi v idual s to establi sh themse lves as " dese rvin g·' of pub li c ass istance by
makin g a reasonabl e contrib uti o n to th e ir own eco no mi c s upport, but obligates
the gove rnm e nt to ·' m:1 ke up the difference' ' if comp lete self-s ufficiency ca nn ot
be atta ined throu gh rcason::tb !e , good fa ith efforts ."
Fe w outside th e academy ope nly qu es ti on the reigning tenet that the
government should he lp o nl y those w ho help th e mse lves . Politically th ere is
w idespread acceptan ce of the idea that the ··quid pro quo" for public assi stance
is the w illingness to pe rfo rm so me kind of ga inful act ivity . Objectio ns to
we lfare reform are rare ly couched as a full fro nt:.tl assa ult on the idea that
governme nt should require work as a co nditi o n of we lfa re,' and unqualified
argume nts that public ass istan ce s hould be m ade ava il ab le to the poor-o r to
everyo ne-regardless of work effort s are rare ly vo iced in the United States
6
today.
See Amy Wax. A ReciJn ocol \Veljirre Progru111. 8 VA. J. Soc. PoL · Y & L. 477 (2001) [h erein after.
Wax. A Reciprocal We/jim· Progru111 l; Amy Wax. Rerhinking Wclfirre Rigl11s: Reciprocitr Norms, Reocril'e
Arrirudes. and rile Polilical EuJ/IOIIrY oj' Weljirre Rej(mn . 63 L\ IV & (Ot\TE\11'. PROBS. 7.57 (2000) [hereinafter.
Wax. Rerlrinking Welfare Riglrrs].
4
Th e principal federal cash transl'er progra m. TANF. is struc tured to supplement earn in gs throu gh wo rk .
Another large federal poor relie f program. th e Earn ed Income Tax Cred il. provides a refundab le tax cred it fo r
workers onl y. States have also created myriad "work- support" and "workfa re" programs to suppl ement and
encourage emp loyment in th e paid ec,>nomy. See, e.g .. State Policy Document ation Project. \Vod
Req11iren rorrs: Ad11lt Basic Ed11cmio11 (AIJE). ell http://www.spdp.org/tanflabe_cs l.pdf (last moditied Ocl.
!999).
5 Although thi s di stincti on betwee n th e deserv ing and undeserving is virtually unchalleng ed in th e
politi ca l arena, a lively politi ca l deba te co ntinues about who actuall y fall s into the se categories. Most critics of
welfare refom1 question the appli cati on of wo rk requirement s to mothers or so le caretakers of young chil dren
o n the grounds that th ere arc too few jobs for the unskilled. that work requiremen ts harm chi ldren, or that
mothers should be regarded as "working already ... See disc uss ion inji-a pp. 33 -34.
6 An exception is BRUCE i\CKERMAI'\ & A"il'E ALSTOTT. THE STAKl HOLDER SOC IETY 4 ( 1999)
(pro posing an $80,000 grant to all 21-yea r-olds). See also Forum , Deli1-ering a Basic lnco111e. BOSTON RE V..
Oct. -Nov. 2000, at 4 (vari ous co mment ators), reprinred in PHI LI PE V,\N P.-\R I.I S, WHAT'S WRONG WITH A FREE
LUNC H·? (2000): Mic hae l Kinsley. Tire Ulrinwre Block Gmnr, NEW YORKER. i'vlay 29. 1995 . at 36. 37
(advocat ing a guaranteed income adminis tered as part of the income tax system).
Although champi oned by Milton Fried man, see C..\P ITALIS"I AND FREEDOM ( !962). and James Tobin (in
the form of a refundable negative income tax) and brietly tl oa ted by the Nixon ad ministration in a meanstested form under the rubric of th e f'am il y Ass istance Plan. see DAN IEl. P. l'vl OYl\IHAN. THE POLITI CS OF A
GUARANTEE D IN CO'VIE: TH E NIXON i\ Di\·II NISTR.'ITIOI' AND TH E FA~II LY ASS ISTA NCE PLAN ( 1973), guaranteed
in come programs have nev er played a prominent or sustained role in th e i\me1·ican we lfare debate. The case
for an uncond itional bas ic income (or "demogrant" ) and its means-tes ted variants has been aired more
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Thi s Article examines the nonnative noti on that is ce ntral to welfare
refo rm: that individu als must work if the y are able in ord er to receive public
fina ncial support. The goa l of the Arti cle is to analyze the politi ca ll y
influ ential conviction that we lfare with out work is " unfa ir'' or " unju st" in light
o f ideas about just societies deve loped by liberal ega litarian th eorists. Can the
pop ular rejection of welfare without work be squa red with more sophisticated
th eori es th at seek to set forth a bluep rint for j ust societies'? Is it possible to say.
on first pri nciples, what is wron g w ith "something for nothing"'7
in exa mining thi s qu es tion, this Article relics on a critical clistincticll1
betwee n an unconditi onaL or guaranteed. basic income (UB I), and public
fi nanc ial assistance conditioned on work. Althou gh :;ocieties confront a
nuanced range of option s for designing public welfare programs, th e cho ices
considered here represent con ve ni ent polar opposites for the purpose of
analysis. Uni versa l wo rk requirements are the flip side of unc onditio nal
assistance. A soc iety committed to pro viding a basic minimum standard of
li ving to everyo ne regardl ess of "clese rvingness" will abandon wo rk
7
requirements as a qu alificat ion for receivin g public aid In contrast, a society
com mitted to helping on ly th e "deserving" as defined by principles of
ex tensively in Europe. Sec e.g .. SA MUEL BRITI"c\N & STEVE N WEil fl, BEYO:'o! D THE WELFARE STATE: AI'
EXA \·II NATI O:'oi OF BASIC !'\COME II' A i'vl c\RKET l::CO:'o!Oi\IY ( 1990 ) ( m ~kin g th e case for basic incomes); TO:'o!Y
FITZPATRI CK. FREEDOM .-\ND SECURITY: Ai' ii"TROD UCTION TO THE BAS IC INCOME DEBATE. ( 1999 ):
HICR\110\,'E PARKER. INSTEAD Of' TH I: DOLE: AN ENQL'IRY I:-.iTO THE INTEGRAT IO:'oi OF Til E T AX AN D BENE FIT
SYSTE[\ 1 ( 1939): PHILIPPE VA\,' P.-\IWS. RE.-\1. FIHT D0\1 FOR AL L: WHXr (If' AN YTHI NG) CAN J USTIFY
CA PITALISM 32-35 , 112 ( 1995 ) Jhc rcin a i'tc: r. V. \N P.-\R IJ S. REA L FREED0\·1 FOR ALLJ (arg uin g fo r a basic
inco me sys te m with additi onal inco me prov id ed tu workers to co mport with the '· no ti o n th at workers sho ul u be
adequ ately rewarded' ' ): TONY W.·\ LTER , BAS IC h OAIE: FREED0 \ 1 FROM POVERTY, FREED0.\1 TO WORf.:
( 1989) : Philippe Van Parijs, CmllJielill g .lit sli(icuriolls o( !iosic In come. ill ARGU ING FOR BASIC 1.:-.iCOME:
[T HI C \L FOL;NDATIONS FOR A RADICA L REFOR\1 (Va n Parij s eel .. Verso 1992 ) (sum marizin g the va tying
justifi catio ns set fot1h by proponent s o f~ bas ic in co me and prov idin g examp les of ac tual implementations) .
Alth ough th e idea of a uni versa l minimum has greate r currency in Europe, no Europea n country has adopted
an ac ross -the-board guaranteed in co me po li cy. Sec. e.g ., Robert E. Goodin, Wo rk ond Weljitre: Tmmrd a
Posr-Prnducr ivi.11 We/f(rre Reg i111e, 3 1 BKIT. .1. POL. Sc i. 1:<, 38 (:'00 1) (notin g lh at th e Netherlands, although
com ing closes t, has incrcasin gi y moved to wards a system where " [eJve•yo ne is being pressed to do some
wo rk. ') . Many European co un tries provi de cash subs idi es of varying ge ne ros it y 10 fam ili es with childre n, th e
une mpl oyed. and the di sabled through progra ms that wo uld he considered Ia:-- by Ame rican standa rds.
Disabi lity c riteria, for exampl e, arc app li ed loosel y and une mpl oy ment bene tits are often granted with out
ca reful scrutin y of the reasons for jobl ess ness. !d. at 37 Iremark ing th at di sabi li ty benefits were e ve n used to
" bu y out" surplus labor in the Nethe rlands).
7
A program that guarantees bas ic inc ome without work require ments- in contrast to one that requires
work - can be ei ther means-tested or no n-means -tcsled. In th e latter case, everyone would rece iv e a basic
de mugranl, regardless of leve l of earn ed in co me. In the former case , on ly the poo r wo uld receive aid, bu t
ass i s t ~m ce would be offered reg ardl ess of th e reason for pove rty. "n1osc poo r through misfortune or by ch oice
woul d be trcalcd the same. Th e un eclu ca ted sin gle mother. th e di sabled fo rm er steelworke r, 1he educated
bohe mian performance artist. and th e footl oose drifter. would all qualify fo r a check fro m the go vernme nt.
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conditional reciproc ity will reject the opti o n o f es tabli sh ing a minimum level
of cash assistance for all and will require the able-bodied to work fo r their
benefits .
This di sc uss ion s hows th at ano th e r way to ask w het he r liberal soc iet ies
should adopt polici es that condition public ass istanc e on work is to ana lyze
whether an unc onditional basic incom e is more consistent than work
require me nts with fundame ntal principles for governing just soc iet ies .
Obj ection s commonly vo iced against unco nditional ass is tance ge nera ll y a nd
in come g uarantees in particular arc that th ey "exploit" workers, li cense "free
riding ," unfairly favor idle free loaders ove r upstanding , industrious citizens.
run co ntrary to so und noti o ns of " desert." and violate basic principles of soc ial
reciprocity. Draw ing on th e work of libe ral egalitarian political the orists s uch
as John Rawl s, Ronald Dworkin . Philippe Van Parij s, E li zabet h Anderson, and
othe rs, this Article investigates whether sense can be made of these objections
within the analyti c framework s established by standard liberal th eo ries of
ju stice, with an e mphasi s on co ntractari an approaches so dominant in this
arena. Should an uncondition a l income be a central feature of a truly just
society, or would basic te nets common to such soc ieties rule o ut this
arrangement? Alternatively, should a guara nteed, universal basic income be
regarded as one option amon g many that comport with basic principles of
justice and that a fair society mig ht choose to adopt? If so, unde r w hat
conditions?
The Article does not attempt an exhaustive ex ploration of issues bearing on
the design of fair system s of res ource all ocation or of ju st social wel fare
policies. Although it draw s o n m o re general analyses of allocational iss ues as
well as on specific di sc ussion s of the fairn ess of guaranteed benefits and work
requirements, its focus is on a choice betwee n starkly contrasting options for
public welfare policy that confro nts western liberal societi es today. The goal is
to bring together and sy nth es ize theoretical approaches with the ai m of
determining whether common intuitions are vindicated by, or are consistent
with , the basic commitments that inform conceptions of just societies within
the liberal theoretic al framework .
The Article concludes that, al though the work of liberal theori sts offers
valuable perspecti ves on the no rmative question of w hether ju st societies
should guarantee everyone minimal financial support, a definitive answer
remains elusive. Any notion th at transferring earnings from workers to ablebodied nonworkers is " unfair ,'' " unjust,'' or exploitative, is difficult to de ri ve
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from the fundamental building blocks for liberal fo rmulati ons of j ust soc ie ti es.
Libera l egalitarians start from a baseline of equal initial shares of res o urces,
skepticism about desert, and an obligation to hold persons harml ess fo r
unlucky outco mes an d endowme nts (includin g bad upbrin gi ng , lack of ta lent,
ancl even unprod uct ive temperam ent) th at does no t clearl y y ie ld a bed rock
ob li gati on to work for a living . Rather. argume nts about the fairn ess or
unfairn es~ of placing co ndition s on the redi st ribution of reso urces te nd to
smu ggle in under ivecl . fo undat ional, morali sti c as sumpti o ns that rest on th e ir
ow n int rin s ic appeal. If these comm itme nts are indeed sui generis . they rnu st
e ithe r comm~mc! o ur as se nt or fail on the ir o w n te rm s.
The Art ic le conc ludes by drawing on an e volutionary a naly sis that
spec ul ates o n the ori gins of th e politicall y prevailing view that gran ting
benefits regard less of work lice nses unfai r '·free riding.' ' T he thes is, set fort h
in prev ious w ork, is that th e widespread te nde ncy to exp ress m o ra listic
disappro va l of the "undeserving"-defined as th ose who draw o n group assets
w ithout making reaso nable efforts to contribute to th e ir ow n self-suppo rtmay have originated in the adaptive advantages enjoyed by cultures that
5
cliscouragecl free riding o n collective resources . T he A rticle examines the
implicat io ns of thi s conjecture for theories of ju stice and most especially fo r
the develop ment of contractarian approaches that dominate liberal po litical
thou g ht. It speculates that the te nsion betwee n the stance di c tated by liberal
theories a nd ordinary persons ' no tion s of fairn ess may be due to th e fai lure of
contractarian hypotheticals to capture the condi tions that gave rise to the basic
structu re of our moral sentiments . Hostility to freeloadin g may have eme rge d
as a feature of hum an psychology or culture from a competitive process that
p itted indiv idual s or groups with different behavioral strateg ies against o ne
another in round after round of co mpe tition. These processes are best captured
by dynamic, iterative models. The logic of e volutionary development is

3 Sec Wax,;\ Reciprocal Welfare Program , supra note 3. at 483: Wax. Rethinking Welfare Rig hts. supm
note 3. at ~66-67 . Recent e mp iri cal data confirms that the tend ency to pun ish free ridin g, norm vio lat ions. and
so me l·un ns of selfish and nonreciprocal be hav ior, even at great perso nal cost, is a wides pread and rob ust
feature uf hum an psycholo gy. See, e.g .. Ern st Fch r & Simon Gaclne r. Alt ruistic Punis!tmenr in Hun wns, 4 15
NxruRE U7. 137 (2002) [hereinaft er, Fehr & Gac hter, Altruistic Pun ish men t in Humansj (showin g th at
coope rati on ··nourishes if altru isti c puni shment is poss ibl e'' ): Ernst Fehr & Simon Gac ht~r . Cooperation ond
Punishment i11 PuiJ/ic Goods Erperiments , 90 AM. ECOI' . REV. 980, 993 (2000) (prov id ing ev ide nce that
pu ni ,; hm cn t occu rs, despite perso nal costs, and intensifies the "more an indi vidual nega ti vely de viat es fro m the
contributi ons of the other group members
."); Karl Si g mu nd et al.. Th e ECO II O!Ilics of Fair PluY,
SC IENT IFI C A, I.. Jan. 2002. at 83 . 87 (explainin g human altruism as a function of "ach ie ving biologica l success
in co mplex soc ial networks" ): see olso PAUL RUB IN, DARWtN IAC< POLIT ICS : THE EVOLUTIO NA RY ORIGINS OF
FREEDm J40 . 67-72 (2002).
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fund amentally at odds wi th the static. one-shot thought experiments that liberal
theorists favor. Th e Arti c le spt.::culatcs on the implications of this explanati on
for the diverge nc e betwee n principles derived fro m rati o nal analysis and the
rea liti es o f po liti ca l psychology .

l.

HOvV T OT! !ii'-:K f\ i·10UT WOR K R EQ UIREM ENT S AN D GUA RA NTEED lNCOi\ ll E

Argumc·ms for o r aga inst the o pposed possibiliti es of universal guaran teed
in co me for ;dl ur wo rk require ments for the abl e-bodi ed can be divi ded into
th ose g rounded in co nsequ en ti a list or pragmatic co ncern s and those based on
judgme nts thcJ\ itn~ norm ative, mo ra listic , or presc rip ti ve in fo rm. The first set
of object ion::; iooks to the eco nomi c, perso na l, and soc ial consequ e nces of
doling out p ubii c ass ista nce with no st rings attached . T he secon d set of
objec tion s, ·.vh i! e no t heedl ess of practical economic and soc ial consequ e nces,
trea ts tho se L1ctors as info rming ultimate judgments about fairness. Moralisti c
and pragmatic approach es often proceed from the starting point of a marketbased economy. A lth oug h egalitarian liberal theory is centrally concerned
with critiquing the marke t and its outcomes, most liberal theorists accept
markets as a basic instituti o n of economic life and assi g n them a central rol e in
reg ulating exchange . ge nerating resources , and di stributing wealth.
T he
re iuc tanc e to jetti son thi s institution means that most di scussions of
redi stribution ass ume pub li c we lfare programs w ill operate in conjuncti on w ith
some kind of market-b nsed sys tem of allocation.
The arguments that th e re is something fundam e ntally wrong with
unconditional basic income prog rams are often couched in terms that are
mora listic, prescriptive , and universalizable: they ass ume or assert basic norms
of conduct ap plicabl e to all. Pragmatic and consequentialist arguments, in
co ntrast, em phasize outco mes that are linked to largel y uncontested social
goal s, such as max imi zation of wealth or well-be ing, efficiency, human selfdevelopment, sociall y cons tru ctive behaviors, or soc ial harmony. A princi pal
focus on the conseq uentiali st side is the size of the pie : the key issues are the
effec t of a tax and trans fe r system on economic efficiency and the overall
amount of resourc es available for distribution within society. This type of
an alysis speculate s on the in ce ntives created by di sturbing market allocation s
and on how behavior res po nds to those changes. Obviously, money to fund a
mass ive redistributive undertaking like an unconditional basic income mu st
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come from somewhe re. Propone nts generally ass ume it will come mainly
from tax es on workers' income, and it will flow out either to th e poor (if th e
program is means-tes ted) or to eve ryo ne (if it is not). Th e an a lys is mu st tak e
into account indi vidual s' beha vio ra l reaction s as membe rs o f two (vari ab ly
o verlapping) groups: those who re linquish wealth o r e arning s (by paying taxes)
and th ose who receiv e resou rce s (by getting bene fits). Th e co nsequentiali st' s
job is to predict and canvass tho se res po nses, indi vidually and in the aggregate,
and to assess their effec ts on th e func ti o ning of th e econom y. o n th e we ll -be in g
o f indi vidual s and famili es, and o n cultural a nd soci a l life.
Th e critical beh avioral question s concern work and productivity: will th e
taxes and the benefits cau se pe o ple to work Je ss?~ Which pe ople and how
much less? How hi g h will th e marg inal tax rate c limb? Will th e res uitant rate
structure e nd up disco uraging w ork o n the part of the most prociucti ve pe rsons
with the greatest earning power. or will it have more impact low er down on the
income scale? And what effect will the promi sed benefits have on peopl e 's
work effort? Common sense su gges ts that a bas ic in come is most likely to
induce persons with lower earning power to cut back o r quit work altogethe r.
But common sense may deceive. A non-means-tested guaranteed basic income
may allow persons with meager earning potenti al to "price themselves into a
10
job," by relieving them of having to rely on inadequate earnings alone. But
how many of the lowest paid or idle wi ll actua ll y respond in thi s way, and to
what extent?
In working throu gh these issu es, the devil is in the details, and a ll questions
are ultimately empirica l. Everything depend s on specifics , including th e
design of the benefits program , the structure and vitality of the economy, and
the vagaries of human labor market and capital investment be havior. The
actual mix of effects will depend on whether the guarantee is m eans-tes ted or
not (since means-tested programs tend to increase effec tive marginal tax rates
for low earners), and on whether th e amount of the demogrant is more or less
than enough for a minimally decent standard of living . It will turn on highl y
contingent details of the structure of e xisting labor markets, including how

9 See. e.g., ARTH UR 0K UN, EQUA l.ITY AND EFFICIENCY: T i lE BI G TR ADEOF F 96-98 ( !975 ) (n ol ing the
d i!Ti cu lty of assess ing such cos ts) . For a desc ripti o n o f an attempt to answer thi s question empiri cal ly, see
MARTIN A NDERSON, WELFAR E: Til E POLITICAL. ECONO/\IY OF W ELFARE REFORM IN Til E UNITED STATES 102-

27 ( 1978) (desc ribing and summing up the maj or resul ts and meth odolog ical probl ems of basic inco me
ex perim ent s run by the Department of Health and H uman Serv ices in th e 1970s).
10

Bri an Ba1Ty , Su1Ye.'" Art ide. Real Freedo111 and Basic In come, 4 J. POL . P1111.. 2-12 , 243 ( 1996) (.. Basic

i ncome puts a noor under a!l earn ings. thu s nu kin g j obs payi ng less th an a li vi ng wage viab le.··).
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much those on the lowe st rung of the job market can expect to earn, how many
people occupy that position and others arrayed above it, the size of the gap
between what most jobs pay and the guaranteed income amount, and how hard
it is to climb the job Ltclcier and exceed the basic income amount. It will also
turn on idiosyncratic re.~ponses to material incentives, which vary greatly as
between inclividuals-rr;sponses economists denominate as income and
substitution effects. Eve n people with similar earning power and economic
prospects have very different tclStcs for leisure, work, and what money can buy.
This means that paniculctr individuals will vary widely in their behavioral
response to the chcmgcs in the costs of leisure that unearned cash grants create,
or to shifts in effecti v1: marginal tax rates that redistributive programs generate
11
both at the low and high end of the income scale. \Vhile guaranteed income
may cause low-earners to work more or less , the large tax burden necessary to
sustain such a massive program will hit hardest at the top of the income scale.
This could have variable effects on persons with the greatest earning power,
but may cause many of them to work, spend, save, or invest less than they
would under a more modest redistributive regime, resulting in a reduction in
1
social wealth overall. '
More broadly, a guaranteed income policy could have myriad far-reaching
and interesting effects on our social, cultural, and economic life.
The
availability of a ''free lunch'' large enough to enable people to quit the paid
labor force without starving will likely roil low-wage labor markets, with
potential repercussions for producers and consumers. Some individuals may
experience a substantial positive income effect, which will raise their effective
reservation wage for a range of jobs. Hamburger t1ippers and other low-wage
and low-skill service workers may become harder to find at prevailing wage

11

Robert H. FroPlk explain"
As every basic economics textbook makes clear. ... a fall in the after-tax wage rate simply does
not lead to an unambiguous prcdictiun about the quantity of effort supplied. Thus, whereas a
lower real wage constitutes a reductiun in the reward for effort and hence an incentive to work
less. it also exerts an opposing efkct: By making the individual poorer than before. it provides an
incentive to work more to reco up his loss. Economic thcury is completely silent on the question of
which of these t11u opposing effects will dominate. The case for [any particular outcome] must
therefore be made on empirical grounds.

ROBERT H. FRANK. LUXL'RY FEV ER: WI tY i'v!OI'EY FAILS TO SATISFY IN AN ERA OF EXCESS 228-29 ( \999). See
o/so FR.\"'CINE BL!IU ET AL .. THE ECOI'O\IICS Or iVI!'X WOMEI'. AND WORK I 01-02, 120 (3d ed. \998)
(ckscribing the opposing behavioral tendencies ot· substitutiun e ffects-which cause work effort to decrease as
wage rates ancl effective returns from work decline-and income effects- which cause work effort to increase

1'

Sec in/iu note 16 anJ accompanying discussion.
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rate s. an d emp loyers may find themselves paying more. Thi s cou ld make li fe
h ~uckr for vvodc ing famili es employing domestic help. or drive some employe rs
of !0\.v -wage workers out of bu siness. Con sumers of serv ices or products
provi ckd by !ow-wage wo rkers (a group that inc ludes many low-wage vvorkers
t ht~cn:-: c l ve :.;) may end up paying more. On the other hand, part- time options
in;\y b,;c()me mor'~ attractive and financially feas ible for a gre<lte r number of
indi\·id ua!s. as workers will be less concerned with finding jobs that pay
enou gh to support an individual or family . i\ greater willingness to work parttime n;ight a pancl the effectiv e labor pooL thus potenti ;dl y driv ing clown
,; e; c::.·: i::~m p loye rs fl exible enough to emplo y c:e,·e ral part-time workers in lieu
uf ~! full -ti1ne worker might benefit from that shi ft in worker be havior. Two
pa rt -t im ~: nannies, effective ly subsid ized by a basic income , might be will ing to
\vo rl-; ft) r les:' money overall than one full-tim e caretaker. although the leve l of
t~txation necessary to sustain the incom e subsidy might make it harder for welloft fztn1 i!ies to afford help. It is impossible to say before the fac t whi ch of
these effects will dominate.
Also to be considered are the costs and draw backs of alternati ve poor relief
policies a guaranteed income might supplant. Programs that condition benefits
on "true need" carry irreducible administrative costs associated with sorting
would-be recipients into those who are unable to make a living despite best
efforts and those who fal l outside that categoryL' Conditi ona l benefits create
perverse ince ntives for workers to qualify as deserving . A uni versal work
requ irement may also force the government to take on the cumbersome role of
11
~.: mplo yer of last resort by creating workfare pos itions.
The value of lost
le isure entailed by the enforcemen t of work among the un willin g and the costs

1
:;

Se c ,:-\ nne L. AistotL ~Vork \'S. Freedom: A /)h era/ Clwllt!nge to Employm ent Suhsidics, lOS Y ALE L.J.
')6 7. 972 . I0.\3-42 ( 1999) (contrasti ng unconditi onal cas h grant· s case o f adm ini stration with the co mp lexit ies
of qu ;diticd prog rams ): 8 ;11Ty. Sllflrtl note 10, at 245-46 (discussi ng cl ra wb;1cks of programs based on
contribut ions or other q uali ficati ons): T. Bes lcy & Stephen Coa te. The Des ign of" ln co111e Moin tenanci'
Pmgu11n1nes . 62 REV . ECON. STUD. 187 ( 1995 ) [hereinafter Bcsl y & Co nte, lncolll e Muintcnwzcc Prog ran1s i:
T. 3csky & Stephen Coate, Wo rkjizre Versus Wc!fizre: lncentil·e ;\rg unz ellfs/(n \Vurk Requirc111 cnts in Pm·ertY
:\1/ct·iarion Prog rwm, 82 ;\,\1. [ CON. REV. 249, 250 ( 1992) (notin g the clifticulty in determining wheth er
pcrsu ns :'<:ek in g aiel ha ve deliberatel y reduced hours or chose n not to wo rk altogethe r): Craig Brett, \·VIw
Should be on \Vorkj(Jre" , 50 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 607 ( 1998): Akx is DeTocqu cv ill e, Mem oirs o n
i'ouf' cri.\111 . reprin ted in Pull. INTEREST. Winter 1983 . at I 02. Il l (la ment in g th at ea rl y English cond itional
hcn ci'its pmgrams failed because "[n]othing is so dirticult to di stin guish as th e nu ances which sepa rate
unmerited mi sfortune from an adversity produced by vice s").
1
~ !\·latih ew Diller. Workin g \Virlwur a Job: Tile Social Messoges of rile Nnr \Vorkfczre. 9 STAN. L. &
Po!. 'Y RE V. 19. 27 ( 199 3) (d iscuss ing the potentia l creati on of a " wo rkfare caste" unde rm ining traditi onal
cmpluyn1e1H ).
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o f em ploy ing perso ns w ith ve ry low ab ility and poor work hab its'' mu st also be
taken in to accoun t. Finally, the effects of a lte rnative poor re lief progra ms on
those at the top of the income scale mu st be compared . As alre ad y no ted, the
tax inc rease that a basic income prog ram w ill al most certainly e nta il cou ld
cau se h ig h-earners to wo rk and in vest less, whic h may reduce the total size of
the pic. T hese behav io ral e ffects are by no me ans inev itable , how ever.
1

(·

That th e freedom to work less co ul d also have profo und co nsequences for
personali ty , characte r, a nd commun ity li fe g ives ri se to bo th fear and hope.
Many persons, tem pted by id leness and dep ri ve d of th e disc ipl ine of paid
work, may fall into di sorder, m ischief, vice, or an o mi .-:: . A pessimistic
elaboratio n of the result ing dire socia l conseq uences un derwrites th e
paremalistic case fo r programs that prornote. e ncourage, and reward work.' '
O n the o ther hand, so me peop le might fi nd the ir lives enric hed by the
poss ibilities fo r unin terrupted leisure an d previo usly unimaginable freedo m .
More poor women can leave hu sbands who ab use (or mere ly annoy) the m ,
more mo thers (and fat hers) can choose to dedicate themse lves to th eir children
(or to the mselves), more people ca n walk away from oppress ive " dead-end"
j obs, aspiring nove lists (good, bad, or indiffe ren t) can sec ure long-drea med- of
time to write, and anticonsumeris t beachcombers can spend their day s surfing
off Malibu . The view that guaranteed income opens des irable and humane
possibi li ties proceeds from an A ri stoteli an visio n that exalts creati ve leisure
and disparages a perfec tioni st work ethic that sees eco no mi call y exigen t labor
as bes t realizing hu man pote n tia l. ~ But whet her the A ri stote lian vi sion or the
1

15
Besley & Coate. Income t'v!ointenonce Pwgmlils . supm no te 13. at 189 (""Poverty see ms uni ve rsall y to
be measured withou t trying to gauge the va lue ol· any lei sure enjoyed by the poor. Nor does one hear that a

benetit o f many systems of poo r support i s t h ~1t the recipi ent s enjoy so mu ch leisure ''' ). See olso Kins ley.
supm note 6, at 36 (s ugges tin g th at work requ irements will actually make w cl l.are JllOre expensi ve).
l o See supra discu ss i on pp. I 0- 11: see also . e.g .. Liam Mu•·phy & Thomas Nagel , T HE IV! YTH OF
O WN ERSHIP 135 -39 (2002) (d iscussing emp ir ical ~v i dence for responses to taxa tion) : Joel Slemrod , DoEs
ATLAS SHRUG "' (2000) (di scuss ing ev idence for and ag ain st pred icted reducti ons in high-earn<:!rs· effort.
sav ing s. and investmen t in res ponse to tax es on wealth and income).
li

See, e.g .. E D" IUI\D PHELPS , RE WARD ING WORK: How TO RESTORE PA RTICIPAT ION AND SELF-SUPPO RT

IN FREE ENTERPRI SE 36-48 ( 1997) (out lin ing the dam age clon e to familie s. nei ghborhoods. and soc iety by
seri ous eco nomic disadvant age and unemploy ment).
18 For a cultural and hi stori ca l discuss ion o f attitudes towa rds wo rk, see JOANI\E B . CIULLA. T HE

WORKING LIFE: T HE PROM ISE AN D B ETR,\ Y.·\L OF MODERN W OR K (200 1) (d raw i ng on hi story, my thology . pop
culture, manage ment th eo ry. and practical experience): H.·\NN,\ H ARENDT. TH E Hu;vtA N C ONDITION 71- 1 17
( 1959) (disc ussing labor ): ANDREW L EV INE, RET HIC.: KING L JJ3ER .A L EQUALITY: FROM A ""UTOPI AN'" POINT OF
VI EW 13-32 ( 199 8) (defending a ri ght not to wo rk based on differing co ncejJtio ns of th e good life that
emph as i ze wo rk or lei sure); V AN PAR IJ S. REAL FREEDOM FOR AI.L. supm not e 6, at 92-130 (co nfront ing the
oppos ing valu es of devoti on to hi gh inco me and de voti on to leisure); A lstott , supra no te 13. at 989-90
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pessimistic , paternalistic one is closer to th e truth Il lU SI await th e k st of
experience. Neither can be vindicated ahead of time. and the dominance of
either depends on dynamic cultural effects that are contingen t and
unpredictable.
i\lthough it may be argued that the Americ an experienc e with vl' cl
so
far provides little support for an optimistic vievv. a r:lcli cal clepartun-: "rom
policies may yield greater vindication . AFDC is notorious for its <1 :-;soc im ion
with severe social disorganization. dcspomknc y. and path olog y, but it is h:_trd
to knmv whether the culprit is the cl ement of ·'so mething for no thin g·· :_o.; •; 'tch.
or the preexisting cultural and social malaise ui· the per~ uns \v ho qctcl L l'i~ d
thes e benefits coupled with the stigma of being earmarked as a soci al tailur'--'·
A universal grant might carry very different culwral baggage and could we ll
have less corrosive and demoralizing effects.
In sum, although armchair speculation about the consequences of imagined
tax and transfer programs can be useful , it is important to reme mbe r that
incentives are not behavior. The magnitude, direction, and distribution of
resulting trends simply cannot be predicted ahead of time. HO'-N each person
would actually respond if everyone woke up tomorrow to the prospect of a
yearly check from the government for $15,000 is something we might not wish
to find out. But we can make suqxisingly few definitive predictions until it
actually happens.
The important point for our purposes is that even a rather generou s
unconditional basic income would not inevitably entail a downward spi ral into
economic collapse and social destitution. That program is not inconsistent in
theory with a stable economy, substantial prosperity, and high labor market
participation rates. It is easy to imagine scenarios in which the great majority
of people would continue to work and work hard in the teeth of even a
substantial income guarantee. That is most likely to happen if the economy is
robust enough to offer people of ordinary ability substantial intrinsic and
monetary rewards from work, and most people are inclined to seek those
rewards. In short, the behavioral effects of even a significant program of
economic redistribution could well be fairly modest.

(rej ecting the communitarian claim that "community values require hard worK--): Claus Olk. rut/
Enzplovmem: Asking rhe Wrong Quesrion ?, 42 DISSEC:T 77 ( 1995 ).
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A ltho ugh th e precise beha vio ral effects of 1\FDC on wo rk and childbea ring
19
are a subject of great controversy, sixty yea rs of experie nce with that program
be li e th e predi ct ion that makin g cas h assi s ta nce widely ava ilable fo r th e as king
\viii necessaril y cause dram ati c. ad ve rse changes in be ha v io r. A FDC was not a
universal bene fit. It w as rest ri cted almo st exc lu s iv e ly to s ingl e pa re nt s w ith
childre n. How ever , the program incorporated no require me nt that rec ipi e nts
de monstrate "d esert" by pro vin g their in ab ility to earn a livin g or to help
th e mse lves . Dependenc y. and thu s dese rt , was presumed. A nd alth o ug h
A. FDC ciid grow s teadil y a nd re lentless ly in the fo ur decades a ft e r its
enactme nt before le ve ling otl in the 1980s'"- and even as su min ~ that the
existence of the program it se lf contributed to rhi:; ~ruw th - thc w e l f~ 1rc rolls
always included but a s mall fr act io n of th e potentially e li g ible populati o n. The
reaso n fo r thi s is obv iou s : mo st people dec ided no t to take th e ste ps necessary
to qualify for AF DC. AFD C was avail abl e to lo w inco me Ltmili es w ith
childre n abandoned by or dep rived of the support o f o ne parent. Thus,
quali fy ing for AFDC required becoming a s in g le parent and being poo r. But
most peop le chose either not to be single, or no t to be a parent, o r to avoid
po ve rty . M ore particularly , the g reat majority o f Am eric a n women voluntarily
di squalified them se lves from AFDC by getting mani ed , earning a li v ing, or
relying for the support of their children on private sources of fundin g such as
fath ers. hus bands. or other famil y members. It perhaps be labo rs the obv iou s to
say th at, bec au se mos t people by their own motion took the mse lves out of the
running for th ese benefits, the program was se lf-iimiting and its cost always
modest compared to what it co uld have bee n and compared to some other
1
contemporaneous government be nefits prog rams .'
In sum . not eve ryone
res po nded to the incentives created by AFDC by chang ing be ha v ior.
1

~

Co111pore CH ARLES M URRAY. L OS ING GROUND: A!VI ci< ICAN SOCL\1 . POLI CY . 1950-1 980. at 9 ( 1984)

(arguin g that AFDC rul es made receivin g wel fa re more attr ac ti v~ than workin g ). H'ilil ANDR EW J. CHt: RLIN.
T HE CHi\NGING AMERI CAN FAMILY AND PUBLIC POLICY I . 26 ( 1988) (citing broader economi c and cultural
trends as the domin ant factors in growth of the AFDC program ). wul Da vid T. Ell wood & L awrence H.
Summers. Is Wt.:!(n re Real /\· rile Proble111 ?. 83 Pt JB. INTEREST 57 ( 19861 (tl ncl in g little ev ide nce that soc ial
we lfare pol i c i ~s increased th e unemplo ymen t rate by reducing work in cent i ves ).
211 SAR A. LEVITAN ET AL .• PROGRAMS IN AID OF THE POO R. 70-76 (7 th eel. 1998).

Th e cost o f the

program in creased onl y about S 13 billi on from 1960 to 1993 and enrollment has never exceeded abo ut 14
milli on p~rso n s. /d. at 70-71.
21 See [\'!EMBERS OF HOUS E COWvl. Ot\ WAYS AND M L\t\S . 106TII CONG .. 2000 GREEN BOOK,
8 .'\ CKGROUND MATER IAL AN D D ATA ON PROGRAMS W iTHIN THE JUR ISDI CTI ON OF THE COMMITTEE ON \VA YS
MW MEANS. am i/a ble ar http://www.utcl al l as.edu/-jargo/g ree n2000/co ntents. hunl (last v isited Feb . S. 2003)

Th e pe" k in total expenditures for AFDC occ un ed in 1995 at $3 0.1 billion and dec lined to 521.5 billi on for the
1998 tlsca l year. id. at 397. 404 tbl.7-1 5, wi th enrollment declinin g to ab out seve n million rccipi enl s. 1d at
.1 76 tbl. 7-4 . Meanwhi le, M edicare . for ex ampl e. reac hed a cos t o f

S 132 bill io n in 1999 . id. at I 00 tbl. 2-l. w ith

about 39 mi llion rec ipients. /d. at 98. See also LE VITAN, supra note 20.
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This discussion sugge sts that the prediction that a universal guaranteed
income program is destined to send the economy into a downward spiral of
ruin. inefficiency, and :;ocial chaos cannot be justified a priori and could easily
prove untrue. Yet it is not hard to understand why dire :;ccnarios might
dominate: the idea of a basic income guarantee generate s wi dcspre<!d
uneasiness and indigilation . ancl support for we lfare work requirements i:..;
staunch among the ge ne ral population. It is m o re acce ptable en matte rs of
policy to predict ne::uttiv c e conomic consequences than to expre ss neg ative
emotions, and easier to s~t y ·'It c an ' t work' ' than " I dis a ppro ve.'' Becau se UBI
strikes some as unsavmy r; r c' V <:: n vagur~ly immoral, it must foll ow <hat it will
pro"-e ruinous , disastrou';, or imposs ible to maintain . But it cloesn · t follow that
th e normative and the po '.i t ive will align. /;. UB I might be smt ccinab!e and
economically feasible an d might have few if any detrime ntal effects. T he
benefits of providing the se resources might outweigh the drawbacks-or they
might not. Once again, the actual consequences depend on circumstances and
on numerous continge nt and e ver-changing facts about hu man preferences and
tastes, about the shape of the economy, and about the world we live in. We
can speculate at length but can say little with confidence ahead of time about
what a UBI world would actually look like.

B. Is a Guaranteed Jncoille Fair 7
Leaving aside the possibility that an unconditional income guarantee in
some circumstances might prove more efficient and less expensive overall than
commonly proposed alternatives including mandatory work for welfare, what
is left of the case against the UBI and in favor o f work requirements as the
condition for receiving cash assistance? If we as a society can afford some
kind of UBI, if it s effects on labor markets would be minimal or at le ast
tolerable, and if many people would benefit from it (or would think they do)
even if others pay higher tax e s to foot the bill, what is the basis for resistance'7
One intuition is that, even assuming this rosy pic ture is realistic, a UBI
should be rejected--and work requirements or a work test for public support
imposed-because uncondition a l transfers are somehow unfair. T hey violate
fundamental notions of reciprocity, mutual obligation, and the duty to "do
one's part." They permit nonworkers to "free ride" on workers and allow the
idle to exploit the productive . This "exploitation" or "reciprocity" objection
can be, and has been, stated in various ways. Exhortative and normative
formulations a bound and are ce lebrated in story and parable.
Although
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academics and soc ial thinkers are divided on this Issue, many align wit h
popular views to dismiss uncon ditional public aid as uufair. John E istc! hcts
stated, for example, that un conditional public ass istance "goes against a widely
accepted notion of justice: it is unfai r for able-bod ied peo ple to li ve oJ'f th,:
labor of others. Most workers wo uld. correctly in my opinion, •;ee th e p ;·opo :~a l
2
as a recipe for exp loitation of th e industriou s by th e lazy." ' Deborah Stone
suggests that '·soc ieties depend 0 11 th eir mem bers tO perform work of SOi11 <.'
kind ; in va rying deg rees, people are expected to be self-sut'fici': nt an d to
produce ~t little bit ex tra to track, se! l, or give to others in ord er to im prov•.:: th·.:
condition of society as a whole.'''" Wi lli am Galston speaks of the "sim pk: h::
profound idea of ["rec iprocity] .. that people who receive b•:nt: ii b shmd<i
make cuntribut ions-if they are able." '' Robert Ellickson re f>: rs tu ' ih<.:
traditi ona l informal norm th at an e mpl oyable person has a dut y to be in th·
work.force ... :c(. Stuan White asse rts that " those who wi ll in gly enjoy the
econom ic benefi ts of social coo peration have a correspond ing obligation to
make a produ ctive contribu tion, if th ey are so able, to the cooperc1tive
27
community which provides these benefits," and expresses the fear th~1t
uncond itional benefit s "will lead to the exploitation of productive, tax-paying
citizens by those who, while capable of working, instead choose to live oft
th eir [benefits]."'K Elizabeth Anderson writes disapprovingly of guaranteed
income as "indul g[ing] the tastes of the lazy and irresponsib le at the expense of
9
others who need ass istance. "c
She recommends that ab le-bodi ed adults'
"access to a decen t income ... be conditioned on responsib le performance of
one' s duties in one's job, assuming a job was avail able ."'') Joanne Ci ullci
summarizes the lesso n of th e parable of th e grasshopper and the an t by quoting
the ant' s own words: ''If yo u were fooli sh enough to sing <:~ i I the summer, yo u
must dance supperl ess to bed in wi nter. "" Even Philip pe Van Parij s. the most

~ 2 See discuss ion inji-o pp. 31 -33 (prov iding examples of academi cs who see condiriono/ public aid ao;

unfair J.
~ Jon Elster. Comment 011 ran der Veen ond Van Pari):·;. 15 THEORY & Soc · Y 709. 7 i 9 ( l l)07).
~ DEBOR AH A . STONE, THE: DISABLED STATE 15 ( 1984 ).
25 \Vi l!iam A. Galsto n, \11/wr Abour Reciprocir,· Y. BOSTON REV ., Oct. -Nov. 2000. at 9. n •eri!J/ cd in \,Ill
2

2

Parijs.
26

note 6. at 29.
Robert C. Ellickson. Tile Unrenoble Cosejinan Uncondirionol Rigilrro Sil elre r. 15

Sllf!J'U

HAR V. J.L. & Pl'B .
PoL'Y 17, 2 1 ( 1992).
~ 7 Slllan Whi te, Lil>eml Equaliry. Erploirarion. und rile Case jiH an Uncvndirional Basic lnco!ilc , -! 5 Po !..

STL'D 3 12, 3 17 (1997).
2t-: !d. at 312.
2

~

.\0

Eli zabeth S. And erso n. \VIwrls rh e Poinr of Equalin·~ . 109 ETHICS 287. 328 ( ICJR9) .
/d.

3 1 CiUL.L.\, SIIJ!ru

note 18, at 10 (quoling AESOP ' s FABLES (G. F. To wnse nd trans .. 1924)).
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vigorous proponent ol' a basic income policy, worries endlessly that "the Little
Red Hen was right in turning clown the animals who wanted to share the bread
she made after having ignored all her requests for help in making it."'"
These formulations fine! echoes in popular attitudes as revealed by
empirical work in the field. Voter surveys, focus groups. and data collected by
social psychologists reveal that the categories of the deserving and undeserving
recipients of group resources arc firmly entrenched in public thinking about
redistribution. Most people c.tancl ready to assist others through centralized
public welfare programs . but the willingne:-;s is conditional on the recipient's
blameless inability to achie\ c self-sufficiency despite reasonable, good faith
efforts.'' Persons who depend unnecessarily on collective largesse are not
viewed as entitled to assist~mce. although they may become the objects of
charitable beneficence or pity.
Because they are regarded as violating
generalized norms of conduct to which all are expected to adhere, these
persons elicit moralistic "reactive attitudes," including indignation,
disapproval, and resentment.''

32
V.-\N PARIJS. REAL FRICElXJl\1 fOR AlL .111111D note 6. at 133. For other recent expressions of the
.. c.xploitation objection .. to unconditional public aid in the context of defending work requirements and the
deserving/undeserving distinction in welfare policy, sec. e.g., MICKEY KAUS, THE END OF EQUALITY 137
( 199:2) (noting the undeserving citizcn·.s reliance on welfare as a subject of scorn): LAWRENCE iVIL\D, BEYOND
ENTITLE\IENT: THE SOCIAL 0BL.fC;·\TIO'i OF CiTIZlcNSI liP ( ll)S6 ); LAWRENCE MEAD. THE NEW POLITICS OF
POVERTY: THE NONWORKii\C; PooR 1:\ i\.viERIC-\ 61-65 ( 199:2) (noting that nonworking poor are viewed as
undeserving in the face of a general trend of increased workforce par1icipation); DENNIS T!-IOJv!PSON & AlviY
GL'Ti\1,\NN. DEt~otOCRACY AND DISACiREFtloii:N"I ( 1996)
.1l See MARTIN GILEi\S, WHY ;\xiERICANS H.-\TE WEL.F,\RE: RM'E. MEDIA, ,\ND THE POLITICS OF
.-\i\TIPOVERTY POLICY 2 (1999) (noting that hostility to welfare is not based on opposition to the general
..1>rinciple of govemrnent support for the needy"' but rather on the "perception that most .
[recipients] are
unckserving .. ); DAVID MILLER. PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 76 ( 1999) (deriving such from public opinion
data); Lauren D. Appelbaum, Tlze !nfluence of Perceived Deserving ness on Polin• Decisions Regarding Aid to
the Poor, 22 POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY 419 (2001) (noting that .. [ljhe determination of fault for poverty may
play an important role in discussions around welfare policies," and providing evidence that liberal vs.
conservative views correlate with judgments about how responsible lllOSt poor people are for their own
predicament): Steve Farkas et a\.. The Values We Live Br: Wlwr Amcrimns Want jiwn Welfare Reform 16-17
(Public Agenda llJ96) (providing cbta from a national public survey); Linda J. Skitb & Philip E. Tetlock, Of
Anrs and CrasshOJ!I'ers: The Political Psw-lwlog.1· of Allocating Public A.vsisrance, in PSYCHOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 205, 219 (B. A. !'vlellers & J. Baron eels., 1993)
(reporting that in a study involving the allocation of public assistance to AIDS patients. notions of
responsibility explained most decisions to give aiel): Wax, Rerhin/.:ing Welj(rre Rights, supra note 3, at 271-74.
3
~ See. e.g., MILLER, supro note 33. at 76 (pointing out that the nineteenth-century conflict between "the
deserving and the undeserving poor is still alive and well"); Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, Is Equalitr
Passe" Homo Reciprocans ond rile Furure ofEgo!irariwr Polirics. 23 B. REV. 6, 26 (1998) (observing that in
sun·eys and experiments people have a propensity to punish violators of such norms): see also Skitka &
T etlock. -'"l'ro note 33, at 216.
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Once agam. the concerns of ordinary voters seem to be the same as the
concerns expressed above: that such arrangements will license "exploitation"
and 'tree ri d ing." Although a ll workers would receive benefits under a truly
universal (non-means-tested) guaranteed income program, all nonworkers
would as w e ll. A means-tested but otherwise unconditional program would
allow pe:·sons to c!r:tw benefits by ceasing to be a worker and becoming a
nonworker at will. A:.;surning something like a free or lightly regulated market
for labor. both types of UBI programs would effectively transfer some portion
of the market cct1nings of industrious and pruductive persons to those who
work !es:-; m not :.tt ~t!!.
It is tempting tu de~;cribc this situation a~,
"exploitatative" of workers by nornvorkcrs. \vi th nomvorkers acting as "free
riders" on the efforts or others.
This description might strike some as transparently valid and self-evident.
but It ts not. Although intuitions about which situations are exploitative are
commonplace, formulating exact criteria for identifying exploitative
relationships is notoriously difficult, and that task will not be undertaken
here. Likewise with free riding. Although ordinary persons possess some
notion of who is a free rider and who is not. coming up with a rigorous
definition of free riding demands technical forays into microeconomics ,
bargaining theory, and moral philosophy. Indeed, the accounts of free riding
that most concern law and economics scholars resist easy application to the
case of unconditional basic income. The nature of the resources transferred
through a UBI, and the political setting in which the supposed "free riding"
takes place, present particularly puzzling challenges.
The claim of exploitation by free riders is most familiar in the context of
nonexcludable public goods, where sharing is unavoidable given the nature of
the commodity and the relationship between the persons who supply and enjoy
it. Clean air and clean water are familiar examples. Persons who want to
breathe clean air cannot easily exclude others. The choice to produce and
enjoy a benefit entails supplying it to persons who bear none of the costs. A
somewhat different-and more problematic-situation arises where the "free
·' 5 For extensive discussion. see 8 -\RR.\R ,\ H. FRIED. THE PROGRESSIVF. ASS.•\ULT 0:--i LAISSEZ FAIRE:
ROBERT HALE ,\ND TilE FIRST L\W M\D ECONOMICS fvlOVBIENT 59-62 I 1998) (discussing exploitation in the
economic and labor market sphere): ALAN WERTHEIMER. EXPLOITXno;-.; l 0-12 ( 1996) Iproviding 16 different
and in large part incompatible definitions of exploitation): David P. Bryden. R~defi'ning Ruj>C. 3 BL; FF. CRIC--1.
L REv. 317--+10 (2000) !discussing the difliculties uf identifying exploitative personal and sexual
relationships): Amy Wax. Bmsuining in rlu: Silmhm o( rile Horker: is There {/ Furure ji1r (~11iirorian
Morriug,C:'. S-+ V.'\. L Rr:v. 50') I l ')98) le.;;ploring different notions of cxploit~ttion in marriage and private
relationships).
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rid ing '' is not mandated by ineluctable structural feature s of the s har~d ph ys ical
or social world but is th e byproduc t of an associat ion or transaction th at is
itself optional and thus vo lun tari ly e ntered in to by the persons claiming to be
·'exp loited. '' One such situati on occurs when individual s with div ergent tastes
for le isure and order cohabit-a circum stance that is a commonplace of family
life. Vo lun tary cohabitation can be modeled as a "chicken" game that can
produce an ~quilibrium in whi ch one perso n does most of th e work and others
enjoy la rge net benefits despite little or no investment. Philippe Van Parijs
provides an exa mpl e as follow s:
Some years ago, I spe nt a fev: months with my fami ly in a hou se we
were sharing with my father-in-law. Very soon. one fe atu re of our
daily routine started disturbing rne great!y. I not iced that my fatherin-law was quite sensitive to the fl oor getting dirty, far more sen sitive
at any rate than I was myse lf. As soo n as du st started covering th e
lounge tloor, he wou ld take out th e vacuum cleaner and deal with it,
long before I wou ld start thinking it was necessary. The result. of
course. was th at the tl oor was tidied up for me beyond my wishes,
witho ut my doing anyt hing for it. This bothered me becau se I could
not help feeling it was unfair. .
I had to concede ... such a
situation , if continued-and take n in isolation from other aspects of
th e interaction-was w~fai r.'"
This example diverges from the classic situation of non-excludable public
goods because the player who makes the !ion · s share contribution presumably
cou ld choose to end the association . If he does not, th at mu st be because th e
cohabitation arrangement is Pareto-superior to li ving apart and all players elect
to continue the relationship desp ite the supposed "exploitatio n. " That the
supposed ly exploited individu al gains from the relationsh ip and co uld choose
to wa lk away makes it particularly hard to argue for outs ide intervention or for
placing such deals off limits.

00

Philippe Va n Parijs, Free·Riding Versus f?enr.S/I{{rin g : Should E1·eu Dcn·h/ Ciaurilie r Sllf'f'Orl an

Uncondiriona/ Busic Incom e" , in ETHICS . RATIONALITY, AND ECONOM IC BEH AV IO UR 159, !59 !Farina et al.
eels. 1996) (admitting that his conclusions were ··particularly annoying because of a puzz ling con nection with

an idea which I was beginning to explore at the time and to wh ich I soon beca me co mmitted to the point of
spending a co nsiderable amo unt of tim e advoca ting it in all sorts of circles''-that is. th e un iv ersal basic
income).
Fo r a speci fic game·th eoret ic ex ample of a ·'chicken game.. as play ed within fa milies, see the ··s lob .. and
'·nea t.. examp le in Wax, supra note 35, at 555~59: sec al so Joan Wi lliams. Is Coverrure Dead." Beyond u New
Tlzeorr ofA/iznom·. 82 G EO. L.J. 2227 , 2240 -41 ( 1994) (desc ribin g working coup le "s \\Tangling ove r child care
as a ··chicken" game in which moth ers end up providing mos t of th e care).
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The type of "free ri ding" entailed by an un conditional public benefit
arguab ly differs in importa nt ways both from non-exclu dable public goods an d
from perso ns making unequa l contributions to a mu tuall y benefic ial
arrange ment. \:Vorkers' support of able-bodi ed nonwo rh:ers is ;1e ither an
ineluctable stru ctural feat ure of the production of a va lu able collective good.
nor the byproduct of the d iffe ring preferences and res ulti ng bargai ning
pos itions of parties engaged tn a Pareto-s uperior- th at I S. mutua ll y
be nefic ial-co urse of cleating . Rathe r, it would appear to be a purely optional
featu re of our co mmun al association an d political li fe- an arrangement th:tt \\'C
cou ld freely choose to adopt or not without fac ing up to any structural or
prefere nce -driven hare! choices. In ou r system , cash ass istance is a ccm pictcly
exc ludab le and di visible good . And there is no chi cken ga me bec au se free
ri ding coul d cease \v ithout making the exploitee! "v ict ims'' abso lutt: ly worse
off. The gove rnm ent could simp ly dec line to enact a tax or effec t a tran sfer to
persons who woul d otherwise rece ive benefit s. Perso ns wo ul d keep the money
they earn on the open market, and all would be le ft to fend fo r themse lves.''
The rea l question of in te rest, and the one th at is central to this Arti cle. is a
normative and political one: how should our view of what constitutes ·'free
ridin g, " and our understandin g whether and when "free riding" is unju st or
unfa ir, influence our political choice whether to ad opt an unconditional bas ic
inco me program for alP How mi ght we go about dec iding whether to vo te fo r
or aga inst a program in which workers in some sense "share" their earnin gs
with others who do not work fo r pay7 The answer mu st take in to account that,
once enac ted , such a program wo uld put all citize ns to a stru ctural choice not
wholl y unli ke that facin g Van Parij s's compulsively neat fa ther-in-l aw : a bas ic
income tax and tran sfer reg ime will effectivel y operate to hold some citize ns
hostage to their own des ire to get ahead by forcin g them to contribute to the
37 In Van Parijs 's exampk, one way to avo id the quand ary wou ld be to ca ll off the ch icke n game
altogether. ll1e part ies cou ld part ways by Van Pa rijs electing to take leave of his father- in-law's house or by
hi s fat her-in-bw asking him to go. If th e parti es stopped li ving toget her. bot h woul d lose the be nefi ts of
cohabitat io n. Altern atively, Van Pa rij s co ul d stay and one or both of the parties coul d dec ick willfull v to
ignore their own preferences-w hich would e ffect ive ly alter th e payoffs to trans form the ch icken game o ut of
ex istence. In th e guara nteed income case. however. neither meas ure wou ld b.: necessary. The citize nry cou ld
just refuse to enac t the prog ram.
Although basic income might be Kalcl or-H icks efficient in that the ben et1ts to rec ipients might outweigh
lo sses to taxpaye rs. it is hard to argue that f t·er.mne in soc iety woul d be bett er off with a basic inco me program
th an withou t it. Th at is. it is unli ke ly that a guaranteed income program wou ld be stric tl y Pareto-superi or to its
absence. To be sure . the choice be twee n bas ic in come ancl no publi c we lfare prog ram at all is not ve ry
rea listic. As the foregoing di sc uss ion sugges ts. bas ic income mi ght be more efficie nt th an feasible po li cy
alternatives. But th at does not undermine th e ro int: Expl oitee! taxpayers lose nothing if a basic income
prog ram is never enacted ancl reso urc es are neve r shared with the less fortunate.
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less ambiti ous as the price of generating more earnings for themselves. The
robust, vvidcspread oppos ition to putting the mo::;t industriou s workers in such a
pos iti on ra ises the qu es ti on of where that opposit ion comes and wheth er it
should be pe rmitted to inform our political choices . Are these valu es to be
regarded as the approp ri ate starting point for ck termining what is to be
regarded as fa ir"' Can an analysis that purports to se t forth basic princi ple s of a
just society be valid if it fli es in th e face of deep -seated and common intui tions
abo ut explo itation ''
Can a soc iety be j ust that mandates, or eve n
accommodates. an arrange men t that so many ordinary· people find u n pa l a t ab l e'~
Or shoul d the gcJal of any an al ys is be to ckvelop a fr amework that permi ts a
c;-itique of eve ryda y ztttituc!es with the aim of unm as kin g th em as unju stifi ed
and irratio nal form s of prejudice to be supe;·seclecl by more refined
u nclersta nd ings ·)
These questions are key to ckc idi ng whether co ndition al or unconditional
redistributive sc hemes bes t comport with just soci eties. The remainder of th e
Arti cle undertakes to consider ho w prin ciples of justice developed by li beral
egalita ri an politica l theori sts mi ght deal with th e c hoice betwee n unconditional
benefits and benefits cond itioned on wo rk. Because most theorists considered
here address this specific questi on only briefl y and in pass in g, the an alys is
extrapolates from more ge neral disc uss ions. Th e next Part begins with an
ex pl oration of fundam ental ass umptions that form the starting point fo r
deri ving principles fo r just social arrange ments. It then takes up in more detail
the work of specific comme ntators as app lied to th e parti cular question at hand.
II.

LUCK EG."'. LlTr\R IAN ISM AND THE PROBLE i'vi AT ICS OF W OR K ER DESERT

The work of domin ant theori sts who see k to discover bas ic pri nciples of
justice proceeds from an egalitarian vis ion that sees soc iety' s fundamental aim
as rectifying inequalities. No t al l in equalit ies are suspect or illegitimate. Only
d ifferences that are ·'arb itrary from a mora! point o f view" warrant correc tive
interve nti on. A just syste m wo uld be one that wo uld aim to ensure that the
distribution of resources '·was not propelled by factors du e to [undeservedj
luck, on th e grounds th at luck is morall y arbitrary and ou ght not to influence
one's prospects."'s The most common dev ice for rectifying ill egitimate

·' 8 Sca na Sh illrin. Egali tari anism . Choice-Se nsitivi ty. and Acco mmoda ti on 2 (\-Jar. 2. 20021. m ·oiluh/c w
http://www. law.nyu.ed u/cl pp t/ prog ran t200 1/rcad in gs/sh i tlrin/cga litarian is m.pd f (un pu bl ished d raft. on lik
with aut hor). Se~ also Larry Alexa nder & ivlainton :ichwarzsc hild. l.ibcmlislll. Ncllrmfin·, and Eq11ulin· of
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inequalities 1s a sharing of the costs of misfortune through a system of
collective compensation that holds individuals harmless for luck's ill effects.
On the luck egalittrian view, luck-insensitive choices gene t-,1le no claims for
collective compenscttion. Rather, it is perfectly reasonable for individuals to
bear the costs of their deliberate decisions within an oth erwi se fair context and
it would be unfair to expect others to do so for them.
At first blush. luck egalitarianism would seem to yield Zi simple an swer to
the question of whether a just society would require work fur public assi :;Ltnce
or wouicl guarantee thctt assistance unconditionally.
If factor s outside 'l
person's control prevent him from holding a job or earning a living. then
society ought to compensate that person for the results. But if someo ne
decides to forgo employment or refuses to work towards hi s own support, then
society owes him nothing: he should be charged with the consequences of his
actions.
This simple conclusion gives way to complications that arise from both
empirical and theoretical concerns. The implications of this paradigm are
unclear within a market economy such as ours that appears to be characterized
by residual unemployment. Although economists disagree about how much
4
observed unemployment is "behavioral" rather than "structural," u few believe
that joblessness could be pushed to zero. Assuming a commitment to a luck
egalitarian ethos, how does intransigent structural unemployment bear on the
fairness of imposing work requirements on "able-bodied" poor? Although
structural unemployment is not in any sense jobless workers' "fault," the
implications of its existence for the decision to impose work requirements is
ambiguous. The pressures exerted by welfare work requirements. by sending

\Ve/f(m~ 1·s. Equolin· of" Resources, 16 Pi tiL. & PUB. AFF. SS (1987 ): Andcro;on . .IIIJI W note 29. c1t 290-307
(describing luck egalitarianism ).
_v)
Tl;e litera;urc on luck egalitarianism is enorn1ous and the idea that society owes rcrsons a duty of
compensation for unchosen misfortune has generated endless discussion. Fur a review ot· important work in
the field. see, e.g. , MILLER. SUJ>m note 33; ERIC RAKOWSKI. EQUAL JL ;STI CE ( 1991 ): Daniel iVlarkovits. Hr!\1'
Much Redislri/J/1/ion Should There !Jc "· 112 YALE LJ. (forthcoming Jun e 20m): S:unucl Scheftler, Who! is
Egoli!orioni.l·tn ". 31 PIIIL. PUB. AFc. 5 (2003).
40
Sec. e.g .. Philip Harvey, An Anoll·si.l oflhc Princiral S!rmegies !ho!l!o\'e Influ enced !he Dn·eloJIIIZC/11
o(Amcriuzn EmJII0\'11/CIII and Social Welfizre Lcz11· During !he 201/z Cnzllzrv. 21 BERKELEY J. E\IP. & LA8. L
677. 730-32 (2000) (noting di sagreement over whether joblessness could be signifi cantly reclucccl if "job
seekers demonstrated a greater commitment to finding jobs and performing them aclequatciy." or if more
resources were devoted to retraining and education). For a pessimistic view of the potential efk cts of more
extensive trc1ining. see James Heckman, Doing ir Riglz1: Jo/J Training IIIIi/ Educ'Uiion. 86 PUR. ll'TEREST 86. 86
(1999) (arguing that extensive retraining to raise skill s would be prohibiti vel y expensive and largely
incffecti ve).
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eve ryone scrambling to get j obs . are designed to separate victims of bad lu ck
from those who bear some respo nsibility for their fate. The conclusion that
w ork requirements in the face of structural un e mployment is fundan1enta ll y
unfair assumes that th e only people w ho remain unem ployed under th e
pressure of longstanding work requirements are those who re<tlly cannot find
jobs. But th is conc lusion is not necessarily va lid. First, so me people rnay ha ve
suc h a pronounced work ave rsion that they w ill w ill full y avo id jobs e ven in th·:::
1
face of destitution." Seconcl. the job market is not sta ti c. A n emp lo yme nt
rnmket in wh ich there ure more e mployees than jobs is like a game or 1n:; sica l
c hairs that never ends <mel th at can be played fa st o r s low ly. A person· ~; ch a:lC•.::
of holding a job at any time is not just a function of the nu mber of position:~
and \voulcl-be workers , but a lso of ''how rapidly j obs ' turn over.,.,, tv1ore
turnover means that more peo ple are e mpl oyed (a nd unemployed) at lc<.ht so me
o f the time. The qu es tio n co mes down to how mu c h sharin g , as opposed to
how mu ch " hogging," w ill occur in th e job market. Hig h turnover rates !ec:d to
mo re sharing of existing jobs a mong would-be job holders, with mo re epi sodes
of hiring and job loss punctuated by spells of unemployment. Although
characterized by lower earn in gs and more job instabi lity-which are di stressful
a nd soc ially disruptive- a higher turnover market potentially gives all willing
workers the chance to jo in th e ranks of the productive and to contribute
so mething to self-support, even if they cannot ac hieve full economic
independence. Un der this sce nari o, luck egalitmian fairness would not require
dro ppin g work req uireme nts altoge ther, but rathe r recommends government
subsidies of !ow-wage workers that would ensure eve ry worker and hi s or her
fami ly a tolerable standa rd of li vin g . Indeed, our c urre nt welfare system is
co nverging, ho wever h::dtin gly, towards suc h a system of supported o r
compensated work.u
O n a more theoretical leve l, the problems with the luck egalitarian
choice/chance distincti on that are pertinent to the policy question he re go
deeper.
Holding people responsible for life choices only squares wit h
egali tariani sm if thos-:: deci sio ns proceed from fa ir star1ing points th at in
the mselves sati sfy the demands of the luck egalitarian framework. Since real
peop le differ substanti a ll y in their unchosen endowments-external, mate rial ,
and intrinsic-applying the cho ice/chance parad igm to determine who

.J i
-+ 2

See discussion. infi·o pp. 53-54 (disc uss ing Dworkin's commen ts on th e least aclvantagecl idiers)
Harvey , supra not e 40. at 733 .

'·' Se e Wax. A Reci;m>ca l We!fitre Prog rwn, sup ra note 3. at 506-08 (docume nting pmgrams that pro vid e
income supplements for earnin gs th at fall short of subsistence).
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'·deserves" vv hat in the real world is fraught with diffi culty: every cho ice, an d
hence th e outcome of every choice, is to so me extent the product of unearned
antecede nts and accidental feJ tures o f the world outside the pertin ent agent' s
controL Indeed , th e qu esti on of \Vhet her it is possible to formu late a coherent
notion of individual dc s c r ~ to which ju ~: t arrangements mu st respond i ~;
arguably the m o:;t centr<il to liberal poli tic<d theory , and one th at be<1r•;
44
cri tica lly on th e practical dc:': ign of redistri bu ti ve ::chemes .
John Ra\vl s h a ~: tj~~ \~ n r~u1 HJUs i y intl uent iai on this issue. On the b~! s is of ~; n
o ft-qu oted passage in A Tll eor\ n/.!u.\iice, Raw ls is commonl y held to tah· i. h t:
positio n thJt person:; ::tre ~c:fft::c t i \·:.:l y respon sible for very little of wh at th : y do .
an d hence cle:;ervc no more tln n 1:an be j ustifi ed on grounds unrelated tc'

ind ividua l desert. Ravv ls ib SeiT'. th at "one of the fixed poi nts of our co nsiclcn:: d
j udg ments [i s] that no one deserves his place in the distribut ion of nat iv,:;
endow ments, any more th an one deserves one's initial starting place in
4
society." ' Rawls goes on to de ny that any perso n deserves even "the superior
character that enab les him to make th e effort to cultivate his abi li ties. """
Rather, personal c harac ter ·'de pends in large part upon fortunate family and
17
social circumstances for which [a personj . . . can claim no credit. "- Based on
these remarks, Rawls is ·widely understood to reject any foundation al, pre1
institutional noti on of personal "desert." s Because, for Rawls , all choices are
hopelessly tainted by arbitrary preconditions and uncbose n antecede nts. he
disa vows reliance on a robust cho ice/chance distinction in construc tin g rule s
for distr ib ution of socia l goods.-!'' Rather, hi s met hod is to first decide on othe r
grounds what a j ust soc iety \vo ul d look like. What people deserve is the n what
they can legitim ate ly claim within a fram ework th at sati sfi es principles of
j ustice.

On desert genera ll y, sc:c, e.g .. J OE L F EI:.! BERG , D O ICJG ACJD D ESERV ING : E SSA YS O N T ilE T II EOR Y Of
55 ( 1970) (an al yzing th e: concc:pti on of desert ): M IL LER . sut>ru note :n, at 13 1-55 (a rguing
that there is in fact a so und co ncepti on of desert) : G EORGE S llt:R . D ES ERT 2~ - J 6 ( 19871 (rev iew in g and
-l.i

RE SPONS IB ILITY

criti cizin g Rawls's anti -desert argument ) .
.\S J O HN RA W LS. A TII EO R Y O F J l' ST ICE I 0--1-L1 /d.
.\7

( 1971 ).

"'-

-I~ See, e.g.. Samu el Schcftkr. .!mricu u llli Dn err i11 Liberal Tlrcon . 88 Ci\ 1.. L. R EV. 965 . 966 !2000)

(di sc w;s ing Raw ls' s reject ion of th e idea or ·•prc -inst ituti o n;il .. dese rt as foll ow in g fro m hi s view tha t .. lt lh •: rc
is no independent prin cip le of desert tha t prov ides a nonnati ve standard for the design of soci ai in stitution s
themselves.. ).
-I<J Bu r sec discuss ion infi-o PP- --1-/; --+Y (noting the tension be twee n di savowa l o r desert and Rawi s"s
holding perso ns ,-,;,;pons ible for .. cx pe as ivc tastes" · as wd l as for criminal cond uc t).
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Based on this passage alone, th e dec ision to wo rk or not wo uld appear to be
like an y other th at arises from th e mi x of characterolog ical and beh av ioral
traits th at are give n to us. It is hard to see how Rawls co uld co unte nance any
diffe ren ces in entitlements to ass istance art SIIH! from co ndu ct-b as ed
0
di stinctions be twee n "des ervin g" an d "u nclcse n ing .. i~ld i v iclu al s . ' In contrJst
with Raw ls. oth e r liberal ega litari ans stru gg le to reta in some conce pt o f desert
by try ing to ide nti fy choi ces anci outco mes fo r wh ic h ind ividu als can fai rl y be
1
held respons ibl e.; As with Rawl s, th e foc u:; is on the ch arac teri sti cs and
antecedents that influ e nce choices and th e determ in ants o f rea l- worl d
co nsequ ences or choices . Ronald Dwork in. for t..'.\a mple, d istin gu ishes
be tw een fixe d attri butes and co ndi tio ns of upb rin g ing (s uc h as tal e nts and
abilities deve loped throu gh ea rl y ed ucati on). for which indi vidu als arc
arguabl y blamel ess, and tas tes, prefe rences . and e \crtions. whic h are so caught
up with our identity and our visi on of a wo rth whil e life th at they must be
5
regarded as amenable to influence or co ntro l by the autono mous self c Oth ers,
like G.A. Cohen, view at least some tastes, such as the des ire to perfo rm
certain kinds of work, as endowments for which persons cann ot ri ghtly be held
res ponsible.;' Thi s di vision of opinion among luck ega litarians bears directly
on the qu esti on wheth er society should hole! pe rso ns to work requirements and
ch arge th em with full responsibility for the effort th ey put forth in the labor
market. Specificall y, should they bear the market-based costs of choos ing to
exert no effort at all by refu sing to work in exc hange for government help ?
The strongest luck ega litarian case against an income guarantee would
see m to start from the stark fact of an "inexorabl e 7.ero": leav in g as ide any
" undeserved" diversity in job reward s and preferences, those who dec ide to

50 See di scuss ion inji-a pp. 42-43.
:il See, e.g., RONA LD DWORK IN, SOVER EJG,\1 VIRTU E: T il E THEORY .-\Nll PRACTICE OF EQUALITY 73 - 78
(2000) (maki ng a d isti nc tio n betwee n ··brute luc k .. and .. opti on luL· k .. ): R.-\ KOIVSK I, supra note 39. a l 74
(defend ing an "equal ity of fonu ne" whereby inequalit ies arising t't·om .. variations in people's op ti on luck are
moral ly un object ionable "): Richard J. Arn eson. Libero /i.l.,n. Disfl'ilm ril·c Su!Jjecrivis111. und Equol OpflOrllfnity
Jin· We/fiire. 19 PHI L. & PUB. Arr. 158, 174-83 (I 090) (qaJi ng th at it is a '·commonsense c laim .. that
ind ividu a ls can and shou ld be held so lely res ponsib le for cc n a in cho ices): G.A. Cohen, On rlre Currencr o{
Egulirorian .!usrice . 99 ETHICS 906, 914 ( 1989) ('To the extent that pcopk arc indeed respons ible for thei r
tas tes, the releva nt welfare de ficits do not co mmand the attenti on ol" justi ce ... ): T. M. Scanl o n. Pref"ercnce and
Urgenn· . 72 J. PHI L. 655. 658-60 ( 1975) (argu ing for an object ive view of the grounds for redi s tributi on
indepe nden t of a person· s tastes).
Sc See. e.g .. DWORKIN. SIIJ> m no te 5 1. at R1-83.
;\ l ihnu~ h Dworkin is ambivaklll about social
respo nsibility to co mpen sate for differences in tal e nt , see di sc uss ion inji"ll pp. 53 -54. he ultimat ely holds that
societ ies shou ld str ive to make outcomes .. talent- inse ns it ive .. a nd ··a mbit ion-se ns iti ve ... DWORKIN. supra no te
51, at 89.
53 Cohen . .1/lf lro note 5 1, at 928-29.
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seek work on the market at l ea~t take positive steps towards achieving se lfsupport. Those who fail to take a job. assuming one is av ail ab le, do not. Most
peopl e con make some productive effo rt if they so choose. so the dec ision to
make that effort wou ld appear to be an exa mple of respo nsible cho ice if
anyt hing is.'"
The simpli cit y of this conclu:;ion gives way to complications under further
:-,crutiny. The deci sion to expend e ffort is a function of tra its and tastes li ke
(l•:e rsi on to work, how hard work is fu r us. and what kinds of work we like to
du. T he qual ity of a perso n' s p·.: rfollll~tnce. the kinds of jobs ava il able to him.
<llld the intrinsic anci extrinsic re wards he reaps from employment, will all be
ztffccted by fixed enclow mcnts m inborn. unchoscn "acc iden ts of birth ." Some
people may find it diffic ul t. stress fuL or unp leasant to wo rk for pay in any
capacity or in the jobs the y can obtai n give n their abilities. Other persons may
find it eas ier to wo rk hard , lon g. ur wdl. Some may be industriou s and
conscientious and possess grea t powers of conce ntration. Others may have a
pronounced aversion to work of any kind , may valu e idleness or freed om, may
prefer nonremunerative acti vities. or may suffer terri ble spiritu al and
psychological pain from ha ving to go to work every day. Eve n short of hard
determ in ism, the liberal egalitarian debate shows how much room there is to
argue over whether the factors that influence persons to obtain or maintain paid
employment, or that determine the personal costs of those choices, are ones for
which persons can be held full y respons ible. It seems unfair to hold persons
who find work hard, tedious. unpleasant, and unrewarding to the same
requirements as persons for whom work is pleasant. satisfyin g, interestin g, and
lu crative. Why is soc iety no less respo nsibl e fo r mitigating these differences in
personal costs th an it is for assuaging other unfortunate endowments such as
phy sica l handicaps, personal deficie ncies, and mental affl ictions?
The unfairness of holding diverse workers to the conseq uences of their
work behavior is further exacerba ted by the wildl y erratic nature of the market
ret urns on individual effo rt. One intuition underlying the common hostility to
programs that offer "so mething for nothing"- and which is thought to warra nt
different treatment for workers and nonworkers- is that the former expend at

).J
Heather Mil ne. Deserr. E:j/im oil(/ F.quofir,·. 3 J. API'. PHIL. 235. 236 ( 1986) (argu ing for an ega lit arian
version ot" dese rt theory with an empha sis 0 11 effo rt rath er th an successful contribut ion). Bur see Nien- He
Hsieh. •Vinm! Dnerr. Foim ess ond Legirinwre 1:.\.fh'Cio rion s in rite /V!arker, S J. POL. PHIL. 91. 106-07 (2000)
tsHgges ring th at cffot"t is nor a va lid basis for dese rt in the market context due to a lack of proporti onality
her wee n the effort expended and rhe res ulting frui ts of onc ·s labor).
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leas t some effort wh c: reas th e latter do not. " But th e role of effort in th e
operat ion of labor markets is elu sive at best. And however we choose to define
that clement , the rewards of wo rk bear little relat ion ship to it. Is effort a matter
o f time spent work ing? Persons working very sim ilar hours rou tin ely earn
\v ildly disparate rewards. Does it have to do with tim e spent acquiring skilis to
do thr:c v..-·ork ? T here is no proporti onality there as pc~ rso n s with less educati on
o r tr<tin ing often ea rn more th an th eir more ed ucated counterparts. A lthou gh
so me fo rms o f work that are unpl easant or risky cttrry ~1 salary pre mium, some
of the mos t enjoyab le and in trin sicall y rewardi ng \VO t"l\. is amo ng th e hi ghest
paicl . People choose a line of wo rk in part b e c a ~t s c their tastes and talents
ali o\v Ihem to produce more wi th less effort. Indeed . pegg ing rewards to effo rt
is ve ry inefficient because it creates an incenti ve to c hoose jobs that requi re
uw rc exertion or that ge nerate more disutili ty or unpleJsant ness per uni t of
output. Workers are unli ke ly to be most effecti ve at jobs tha t cost the m more
to do .'"
There are yet other factors bearing on market outcomes th at reveal how
thoroug hl y arbitrary and unchosen elements infe ct the structure of marke t
re wards from beginning to e nd. Worker characteristics and e xertions have
value in the market and produce more or less lucrat ive outco mes, but only to
the extent that they match up with the demands fo r goods and services. B ut
the re seems nothing for which potential providers of goods and services are
less responsible th an whether people want what they have to offer. If two
pers ons of eq ual ta lent prefe r different jobs, it is hard to see how each is
responsible for one earning ten times mo re than the other since ne ither created
th e viciss itudes of consumer de mand or the size of the labor supply available to
meet it. Even if all wo rkers we re otherwise equal in reso urces and upbrin ging,
57
these unchosen differentials would persist.
55 See lvi ilne . sur ra note 54, at 240 (''O nl y in so far as effort is expe nde d in produ cin g the achi eve n1e nt o r
contributi on. or in acqu iring a sl il l. is there the basis of a dese rt -cl aim ... ).
56 S ee. e.g .. FEINB ERG. supra note 44. at 55: MILLER. supra note 3?: . at ISJ-3-+ (follo wing Haye k's point

th<H e ffort rewards res ult in bi zarre consequ ences at times, but still iden ti fying effort as aj{tc rvr in dete rmining
a pcrso n·s rewa rd s).
57 There is a large literat ure on ''job rents" and the di stri but ion of scarcit y- based rewards within market
economi cs. See. e.g., FRIE D. sup ra note 35. at 143-59 (sum marizing the develo pment of rent th eory): DAVID
G.·I UTHiloR. !\!ORALS BY Ac;REEMENT ( 1986) ; VA N PARlJS, REA L FREEDOM FOR AL L. supra note 6. at 90-9 1,
108 - !9 (stating that job rents wo uld exi st even with identi ca ll y skill ed perso ns unde r pe rfectly competiti ve
c:o nditi ons) : see 1tlso James C. Di ck, Hmv to Ju stifv o Dislribu tion o{ Eomings. -+ PHI L & PUB. AFF. 248. 269
I !975 ) (arg ui ng that the large rents in th e current rates of remunerati on fo r worl ers in short supply '·coul d be
dras tical ly reclu cecl without ill effec ts on the supply of labor" ): Barbara Fried, Wilt Clunnherloin ReFisiled:
No : ick ·s .. Ju stice in Trun s(er .. and 1/i e Probielll o( Morke t-Bosed Dis!ri/; f{fi on. 24 PHIL. & PUB . AFF. 226, 242
( ! 905 ) (show ing that a Loc l c~ n ri ght s argument co uld support eith er Chambe rl ain' s fu ll rights to all he was
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A ny defense of the pro pos ition that worke rs dese rve so mething whe reas
nonwo rkers should get nothin g thus runs up again st th e w ildl y erratic nature of
the rewards that markets ass ign to work. T he arb itrarin ess of labor market
returns is part of th e larger prob le m o f "mora l luck. ·· o r th e lac k of co ntrol ove r
co nsequ e nces that fl ow from human actio n ge n e r~tll y . Eve n if cho ices are in
so me se nse a utono mous, the outcom es of o ur dec is io ns are unc hosen and g ive n
because the y are rad ica ll y co ndi tio ned by exte rn a l fac to rs that we ha ve no han d
in se lec ti ng. i\iloreo ve r, m any action s are not tightly li nked to co nseq ue nces .
but in voh·e ris k and gam bl e . If things go so ur for us despi te prudent condu ct
a nd best eilorts, do we so me how "deserve" th e disa ster. suc h that a just soc iety
need not co me to our a iel '! A lthough some be li e' c that we should be he ld
res ponsible for adv erse o utcomes if we co ul d avoid the gamble or insure
again st it , othe rs contest that we shoul d be forced to li ve w ith the consequ e nces
of ri sk- taking, w hether prude nt or imp rude nt, that turn s out badl y .''
T hese observ ati o ns have led some Iibera ! ega li ta rian s to conclude that, at
leas t w ith re spect to m arket outcomes, the di stinction be tween re spo ns ible
cho ices and bad lu ck is inherently unstable. B ecause market compens ation is
fundame ntally heedless of any meaningful di st inct ion betwee n luck and human
age ncy, the structure of returns to labor on the market can make no claim to

paid or ;;oc icty"s claim on surplus value) ; Nien -H e Hsieh. supra note 5-+. at 109 (no ting that ordinary mark et
co mpensat io n results in people ··mo re ofte n than not be[ing] pa id more th:tn they arc sa id to cl cserYe .. ): Juli an
Lamon t. Pmhle111s fo r Eflnrr-Bascd Disrriburion Principles. I~ J. A PP LIED PH IL. ~ 1 5 ( 1995): Er ic !VIack.
Caurhier on Rig/us and Economic Renrs, 9 Soc. P HIL. & PoL ·Y 17 1 ( 1992): Jeff H. Re im an. l he Labor Theon·
of ril e Difli>mlcc Principle. 12 PIIIL. & PUB. AFF. 133. 142 ( 1983 ).
58 The question of how st ring ent ly soc iety shoul d hold persons responsib le for bad outcomes of pa>l
choices bc:u·s direc tl y on th e design of we lfare policy. The path -ckpcndcncy of personal ci rcumstances mean;;
tlwt past reproduct ive and ed uca ti o nal choices may gener::~te in tractable nbs t:1clcs to self-suffi ciency in the
future -obstacles thai do not yie ld to present efforts. The refusa l to otTer aid under these circumstanc es ha s
bee n cri ticized as unduly harsh and co unterproductive because it makes no prov ision for fres h starts and
forg iv eness and undermin es import ant soc ial goals. Compare, e.g .. R OBERT GOOD IN. R teASO NS FOR W ELFARE:
TH E POUTICA L THEORY OF THE WELFARE S"L\TE 295 ( 1933) (suggesting thai soc ial policy shou ld alleviate
so me instances o f suffering of those who brought misfortune upo n themse lves) . Ande rson. supro note 29.
Rohert Good in. Negaring Posiril ·e Deserr Claims , 13 POL. T HEORY 575. 586 ( 1985) (noting that at times
·· needs trump clcsens""). and Shiffl·in , supra note 38 , at 30 (arg uin g th ai wel fare pol icy shoul d esc hew a st rict
"" luck egalitarian.. framewo rk). ll'irh D WORKIN. supra note 5 1, at 287 (ta king the posi tion that people shou ld
not be relie ved of responsibil ity "" fl ow ing from their own choice;;" ·). R ,\KOW SKI. supra note 39. at 73 -37
(argu ing that in equa liti es resulting from poo r choices are morall y unobjectio nable) . and Richard J. Arneson .
Luc/.: Eg alirarianism and Priorirorianism, II 0 ET HICS 339. 349 (2()00) (not ing that a soc ial comm itment to
compe nsalc for· bad choi ces. or even fo r so me forms of bad luck, can unfairl y dra in or eve n ""swallow[] up all
soc ial reso urces""). For :1 recent di sc uss ion of the puzzle surrounding th e ··rnoral lu ck"" that link s act ions to the
o utco mes of r·isky cho ices or gamb les. sec Kasper Lipp ert-Rasmu sse n. Egali rariunis111. Oprion Luc/.: and
Re.\'j)(JIIsibilir\' . Ill ETHICS 548 (200 I). For a discussio n of fre sh starts and seco nd chances within a sys tem
that ackn ow ledges persona l respo nsibility. see Wax. A Reciprocal We/fore Program. supra note 3. at497-500.
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being inherently ju::;t. But if market-based all ocations bear no re lation sh ip to
any coherent notion o f desert-if there is no rhyme or reason to the pattern of
returns to labor- then there may be no reason to honor those pattern s in any
respect even to the ex tent or denying social support to those \v ho r,_-:fu se to
labor at all. Liam Murphy cll1d ;\ndrew Lev in e have gone so far as w de rive
from the market's errati c all()ca ti ons a redu crio ud ubsurdwn on th e i:;sue here:
whet her the government shoulcl require work fo r benefits or should gu,tr,tntee a
li ving to all. For them , th,tr persons do not "deserve" the rew cmls th ey obtctin
from wo:·k !'atal ly undermines the leg itimacy of th e ex pectation th,tr an:.·onc
work or u/1. if the rewards ass ign ,::d to work are not sys tcmaticL~il y :c l,ttc:d to
effort or anyt hiil g ,; Jse fur'' hich indi viduals ca n be held resp onsible. hm\ do<::s
it follow that some work sho uld ge t something and no wo rk should g1:::t
noth in g·)
Le vin e. fo r example. emphas izes that work-based producti vity is 11 0 t just a
function of un ehosc n suppl y and demand , but also of inherited techno log ica l
know-how and collectively maintained infrastructure for which most persons
pay no compensat ion and which are confened on everyone gratis. For Levine ,
this insight makes nonsense of the notion of free riding by some members of
soc iety on others. because free ridin g on un earned benefits is rife: '·free riding
and being free ridden upon are inevitable fac ts of social life.""' Si nce free
riding on others' past and pre se nt contributions is '·an ongoing ven ture,
existing across both space and time, paying one's own way is an unrea lizable
0
goa l.''" !n light of this. li vi ng off income derived from collective reso urces
cannot be se lective ly conde mned unl ess it can be distinguished in princip le
from oth er forms of free riding that are inherent in labor markets and in all
producti ve endeavors. Because such distinctions cannot be maintained, a
u niversa! obligat ion to make a productive contribution to the eo llec ti ve
enterpri se cannot stand as a fundamental precept of social or col lec tive
gove rnan ce. Le vine claim s that " reciprocity is an impossible standard to meet
1
.. . with a degree of specifi city sufficient for justifying income inequaliti es ... r'
Since we can never determine what amount constitutes a "fair" return for any
particular co ntributi on, it follows that we can not pronounce upon the fairnes s
2
of banding ou t compe nsation desp ite the absence of any contribution at all. r'

(10

Andn.::,,· I "c\·inc. Nt ' l\·ouling !}Ton . 7 J. POL. PHIL --+04-,-+! 0 ( 1999).
/d.

(>I
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~ Sec L~,· i nc . su1u·u nolc 59. at -li0- 11 (d iscuss in g Lhc di fficuilics of ascertaining v::l uc:-: with in
trans~ctionsl: sec u/so LE VI~L. surru no te IS. at 29-3 1 (noting that the payotls for conlribuJions d epend o n
6
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Likewise. Liam Murphy also questions the coherence of any "preinstitutional" notion of desert for rewards assigned within markets. ''' That
defect is not cured by the equalization of resources in starting points so long as
people differ in talents and tastes affecting costs of labor supplied and the
demands for what labor produces. Because "[r]eturns to labor arc unjustly
distributed even in competitive markets in which equality of upportunity and
resources is presupposed, .. it makes no sense to say that the rewards thctt attach
to work are "deserved" in any fundamental or nonderivative sense.''! But then
it follows that there c<tn be no basic unfairness or injustice in ~tssigning
resources regardless of whether any work is performed at all. Any objection
that might be made to the confiscation and redistribution of earnings can
readily be parried by poiming to the unearned conditions for market success.
As Murphy states, there is no reason to assume that ''getting some thing for
doing nothing is always more significant morally than getting more than one
deserves for doing something.''''' Rather, "[a]n assumption that the first kind of
undeserved income [redistribution to the voluntarily idle] is more worthy of
redress than the second [undeserved pay for workers] could be based only on
confusion caused by the greater salience of income, all of which is unclescrvec!,
as comparee! to income, some (possibl[y] very great) part of which is
6
uncleserved."r. For Murphy, as for Levine, the lack of any coherent basis for
counting market rewards as deserved must silence any complaint that transfers
from workers to nonworkers are unfair. To put it bluntly, because no reward is
deserved, no reward can be undeserved. Valid principles of limitation on just
allocations of resources generally cannot be grounded in anything like the
relationship of inputs to outputs in the market system. If those limitations
exist, they must derive from elsewhere.

what others do so that there is "no way to coordinate individuals· behaviors that is not significantly
redistt·ibuti ve '').
63 Liam 13. Murphy. Libert\', Equolit\'. Well-Being: Rakowski on Wealth Transfer 'fir.wtion. 51 T ,\X L.
REV. 473,491 (!996) (noting that market outcomes do not justly track contributions to the social good).
64
!d. at 491.
(;) !d.
66

!d. In response to this argument. G.A. Cohen comments:
If Rawls is right that not all effort is deserving, then. we might agree. not ail effort deserves
reward. But why should it follow that dTort deserves no reward at all'' The pt·actical difficulty ot·
telling how much of it merits reward hardly justifies rew~mling it at a rate of 0 percent. as opposed
to at a rate somewhere between 0 percent and I00 percent.

Cohen, supra note 51. at 915. Sec also VAN P,\RJJS, REAL FREEDOM FOR ALL, supm note 6. at 112 (nuting that
a guaranteed basic income is not inco nsistent with greater rewards for more effort. but only with denying any
rewards for no effort).
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WHAT COUNTS AS WORK? THE PUZZLE OF WORK 0 UTSfDE THE MARKET

'{ et ano ther ~;et of vo ices can be heard to di spa rage th e logic of providing
compensation only for labor market work. Fe mini st critics draw s trength from
the argumen t that market-based rewa rd s have not hing to do wi th desert and
thu s can be altered at w ill with out injustice to anyo ne. Indeed, the feminist
contention is that the co llective refusal to reu ll ocate re so urces generated o n
rnarkets to those who ope rate outside it is itse lf unjust. Most feminist w rite rs
in thi s ve in. although ge nera ll y di scl a in !ul of distinction s between the
'"cles::rving'' and "undeserving.'· clo not aspir<: t(J o ffer a gl obal or rigorous
critiqu e of the concept of desert itself. Rath er. their motivati o n is to broade n
the Ccltegory of persons who are regarded as deserv ing of soc iety's approb ation
and materi::tl s upp011.
The common thread is the objection that welfa re work requi rements sli ght
the kinds of domestic and caretaking tasks traditionally performed by women.
Because many nonw orkers with whom th e we lfare system is concerned are
caretakers of young children, critics maintain that welfare work rules threaten
to burden women disproportionately and to discourage the performance of
nonmonet ized domestic functions. Indeed, th e crux of the debate over how the
welfare sys tem should treat "caretaking units''-usually single mothers and
their ch ild re n-centers o n what s ho uld count as work. The oft-heard claim is
that care taking performed without pay is no less socially useful than work
nerformecl fo r wages and should be rewarded. Society should offer collective
~upj)Ort to those who care for others. 07

67

See. e.g., SHIRLEY P. BURGGRAF. T HE FE:VIINI01E ECONO ,v!Y AND ECONOM IC MAN 182-1 83 ( 1997)
(tracing the historical root s of the de valuation o f women ' s reproductive and caretak ing work): ANN
CRITTl'-'DE<-1, TH E PRICE OF MOTH ERHOOD 186 (2001) (argu in g tha t the welfa re state con tributes to the
"femin iza tio n of poveny"): M ARTitA FINE:Vt.·\N, THE NEUTERED MOTIIER. Til E SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER
TWENTI ETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 9 ( 1995) (calling for recognition of caretakin g as work and a major
contribution to soc iety): EVA F. KITTAY, L ov~::·s LAI:lOR: ESSAYS ON WOMEN, EQUALITY. AND DEPENDENCY

10'1 (! 999) (placing imponan ce on the publi c acknowledgment of th e "value of rece i ving care and giving care"
so that th~ burde ns and co~as wou ld be shared): Anderso n. supm note 29. at 323-25 (l oca ting th e prob lem as
confusing the econo my with the market sec tor): An ne L A lstott. No Ex it: Just ice for Caretakers 6 (June 4,
2002) (propo:.;ing an annual gram to carewkers to be used fo r child ca re. persona l education. or retirement
savings) (unpublished manu script. on file with author): Martha C. Nussbaum, Disabled Li1·es: Who Cares:'
N Y. REV. OF BOO KS (200 I ). available ar htLp://www. nybooks. com/art icles/ai1icl e-p review')article_ id 13956

=

(bo ok review or· Kittay arguing that a theory of ju stice must extend its scope to th e fami l y and include ca re as a
primary good). For a cogent critique of the feminist "ethic of ca re. " see WILL KY ~ t LI CKA , CONTEMPORAR Y
PO!.ITIC\ L PHILOSOPHY: AN INTRODUCTION 262-86 ( 1990).
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The principal problem with the assertion that society should support
caretakers and their depende nts is that it threatens to prove too much. Any
recommendation that resources be reserved for these individuals begs the
question of why other persons \Vho volunteer to generate a variety of goods
and services that either appear to create value or require effortful exertion
cannot also lay claim to soci'd support. Consider the example of th e third rate
artist, cleclicated to his craft. w ho labors strenuously at his sc ulptural creations
in his basement studio. What e\actly is he doin g down there'7 Can vve deny
that he ·'works harcrr We know !hat he enjoys his work-that is, that he ge t';
··consumption value" fro m the performance--because he choose~; to scu lpt
rather than to do something more lucrative. But neither consumption value nor
choice distinguish his case from that of many others in the paid economy,
including law profes~;cm; . Y et 1.ve harbor the intuition that we owe him
nothing. But why treat d second-rate single mother differently than a third -rate
vi sua l artist? That no one want; to buy the artist's creations is impm1ant to us.
It counts as good evidence that they are of little value to anyone but the artist
himself. T hat no one wants to pay the mother to raise the child may indicate
something similar, however callous that sounds.
This discussion suggests that those who bemoan society's treatment of
caretaking must supply a theory of compensation or sociai reciprocity that
disposes of demands to subsidize a range of nonmarket activities. What is
needed is nothing less than a comprehensive theory of what work is and of
what society owes to its meinbers based on how they choose to spend their
time. Yet the preceding discu~;sion suggests that such a theory eludes us. Does
work include "[clleaning one' s clients ' shoes, cleaning one's children's shoes,
cleaning one's own shoes, cleaning one's doll's shoes?""o If market measures
of work are too narrow and should not be the test, then what measure should be
put in its place and what criteria should be used? And how are we to
determine the magnitude of any subsidy that is due? Is the answer partial
suppo11, full support, or more? Should the caretaking unit be maintained at
subsistence level or should it be granted something cioser to a middle-class
existence?
That the "unemployed"'--that is, persons outside the market-are rarely
ever completely idle confounds the problem. Few people "[lie] in bed all day
1
and drink[] beer all night." '" Rat her, those without paid jobs "almost always

60
"'

1

VAN PARUS, REAL FREEDOM fOR 1\LL.

SlljJin

note 6, at 97.

.Joseph H. Carcns. Rig/us and Duties in ur1 Egulitorion Societr, 14 POL. THEORY 31,36 ( 1986).
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·work· according to so me legitimate understandi ngs of th e te rm " and many
occup y themselves in part with the very same domestic ta sks that are the
main stay of the traditi onal caretaker's life . T o co nfin e "work" to th e ma rk et
and th e rest to le is ure goes again s t the strong intu it io n th at mu c h th at is clo ne
o ut s id e the market-m os t no tably caring for c hildre n and kee ping hou se- is
not acc urate ly characte ri zed as le isure, but rea ll y is work. Is it important to
this intuiti o n that, a lth oug h a mother e njo ys ·'co nsumpti o n va lu e." th e child
~a i ns some thing too') A !thou g h th e require me nt th at th e pe rfo rme r be nefit
so meo ne o th e r th an him self offers so me promi se ul' a lim itin g p rin c ip le, it
wo uld no t dis qu a li fy many extra-market acti v iti es L.tr afield of caret ak in g for
public sub s idy.
A lth o ug h th e market as a reference point is c la im ed to pro duce too narrow
a meas ure of w hat is soci all y useful , the ab se nce of c lear be nc hmarks o nce
markets are left be hind tempts us to justify th e c laim for subs idy by pointing to
a market fa ilure of so me kind-a reason, for exa mple, why the artist' s pro du ct
is ig no red by woul d-be purchasers despite its va lu e , or why no o ne s te ps
for wa rd to bankroll the moth er-child duo des pite the va lue fo r others or for
soc iety. One possibl e account is grounded in the as sertion th at childrearing
generates mild positive "externalities" that benefit all of society and for which
soci ety should compensate caretakers. As suggested elsewh ere, however, that
rationale arg uably would not justify the gove rnm ent pay in g full fre ig ht for
71
caretakers and the ir children.
Another defe nse looks to the tran sactio nal
7
impedime nts to compensation for care across ge nerati o ns " o r within the
70 LEVINE, Sllf>ra note IS, at 15.
Amy L. Wax. Is There a Caring Crisis ? 16 YA LE J. ON RF.G . 327 . :HI (1999) (rev iew in g S HI RLLoY P.
BURC GRAF. TilE FEM ININE ECONOMY AND ECONOMIC MA N (1997)): .'\ my L. Wax. Caring Enough: Sex Noles.
Work. and Taxing Women, 44 VtLL L. REV. 495, 5 14 ( 1999) (su gges ting that parent s' consumption va lu e in
their children ou tweighs the benefi ts to all of soc iety) : Amy L. Wax. A Recipmcol We/ji1u' Progmm, supm
note 3. at 492. The extern ali ties from chi ldreari ng are grea tl y en hanced in modern weste rn soc ieties by large
public pensio n syste ms. whi ch c une ntly operate on a pay-as-you -go basis_ These pens io ns effect a subsi dy to
the elderly thai is pai d for by oth er peop le's children. See. e.g .. BL;RGGRAF . supm note fi7. at 76 (q ues ti oning
if such a scheme is fair for ch ildren who did not ask to be born ). Noneth eless. most of the benctlt s o f the elTon
parents and oth u caretal-:ers expe nd are e nj oyed by private in dividua ls-that is, th e parents themse lv es and
their offsprin g.
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The argu ment is th at because we all received care as chi ldre n fro m o the rs that enab led us to beco me
funct ioning indepe nd ent ad ults. we now co ll ecti ve ly owe the same to ris ing ge nerations . See. e.g., KITT,\ Y.
supra note 67, at I 07. I07 -09 (arg uing for an ex tended not ion of reciprocity to avoid "ch ronolog ica l
unfairness"): ALAS DAIR 1VI AC INTYRE. DEPENDENT RATI ONAL ANI~·I;\I .S 100 -01 ( 1999) (asse rting th at what we
rec eive in terms of care and ed ucation form s the bas is for what is owed to t'uturc generati ons ). Bur see ROBERT
NOZI CK. ANARCIIY. ST ATE AND UTOPI A 78 -84 ( 1974) (rejectin g co mpen sa ti on for unso ught hene llls):
RAKOWSK I. supra note 39. at ! 53-54 (arguin g that. beca use unasked -for benefi ts produce no o bli ga[ io ns.
soc ie ty owes pa re nts no compensa ti on or g ratitude fo r produc ing the nex t gene rati on).
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pctrc nt-chi lcl unit. for the benefits to children at parents · expe nse. Bu t. once
~t g Jin . these obse rvations can be extended to argue fo r collectivizing almost
unything . V/e reap the benefits o r ail soc ial contri bu ti o ns that ha ve go ne
bc fo t" e us. We are the rec ipi ents of a myriad of val uab le gifts from past
Enforc ing a payback fo r all these
gener:tt iuns and prese nt hu manity.
,_::nl l <t !lc ,~ m e : !ts creates an account ing nightlllare and begs the q uesti o n of why
c't re ta kc ,·s sho uld be sing led out amo ng other t>c nefac tors for a steacl v stream
(,;· r::: cip;\x:;.d return s.
;:·,: m in i st writing on thi :; subject m;tni k.;t s cl whole sale ho stilit v to an

<.:•.: ui! 'j i1J ic approach that sees the a lt e rnati \e~; o f mark ets or market failure as
c;:hctusting the analytic uni ve rse . It rej ect~; the meth od of carefully identify in g
the e ieme nts of value ge nerated by tradit io nally fema le ac ti vities and th en
ass ig ning costs an d bene fi ts to disc rete soc ial actors. Seana Shi ffrin and
E li zd bcth A!lderson, for ex ample . rc l"use ro buy in to a luck egalitari an
i"ramcvvork that worries obsessive ly o ver the choices fo r whi ch indi vidu als can
be held res ponsible and that proceeds with a compul sive acco untin g of th e
benefits and cos ts those choices ge nerate. For these authors, thi s approac h is
mi sg uided in generating harsh policies th at sli ght important soci al goals.
Rather, the central concern should be to identify the soc ial circumstances most
co nd uc ive to human n ouri shin g and to cheri shed va lues of autonomy, di gni ty,
and delibe rati ve integrit y and the n to un de rt ak e to create the desired co nditi ons
w ith any resources at our disposal. For Eli zabeth Anderson, in particul ar, the
paramou nt airn is to spare eve ry pe rso n the hu mili ati o n. sti gma, and
pO\ve rlessness of abject materi al wa nt. Since th e harmful co nsequ e nces of
unmet need are unrelated to how those needs arose or how they wo uld be
priced on the market, it is unnecessary to delve in to the ge nesis of an y person's
dile rn ma. For Anderso n, "[t] he proper ... aim of ega litarian justice is not to
e lim inate the impact of brute luck from human affairs, but to end oppress ion,
which by de finiti on is soc iall y im posecl.'.n Ending opp ress ion does not require
that ··eve ryo ne ge t[] what they morall y deserve .' ' but rat her that steps be take n
to ···cno: ate a com mun it y in which peo pl e stand in relati ons of equ ality to
75
others.-'

,._, 8L.' RCJCI R.-\ F. SllfJUI note 67 . ar 69 -S 1 ( ~ u gg c ~ tin g . bu r d c~c r i b in g the di ffi culties o f. an arrangement
whe reby chil d ren wo uld comrc n,;at c the ir invc ,;ting parent,; 11·ith dividends based o n their su ccess in the
m:t rkct pl acc) .
"l.J. .-\ ncl·..:·r:--o n. sut'ro note 29, ~I t 2 8~ .
!5 Jd ~ ~ ! 2{) 0 . Fo r s imi lar ar:; u mc nts, set: GOOD !:\ . \'UflU l no te 5~ .
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What are the implications of Anderson's vision for the central issue here:
whethe r soc ieties should require work as a condition of assistance') Although
)\nderson does not see the vindication of moral desert as the aim of a jw;t
society and rejects the market-centered premi ses of a luck egalitarian
framework, she nonetheless denies that "in an egalitari an society everyone
·-;omchow could have a right to rece ive goods without anyo ne ha ving <m
7
obligat ion to prod uce them .·· " She asserts th at help in achiev ing basic
"funct ioning:-:· sho ul d be '·co nditional on participati ng in the productive
sy stern·· and that "citizen:; do not owe one another the real freedo m to function
c\S bt.;<:.ch bums .""
Dc:;pit::~ these :;tatements, Anderson do~:·: not appear to
endorse wel fare v;ork requirements as written into current Lm'- Although she
does not exp ress ly advocate full public support for all caretaking units either,
her as,:ertion that "non -wage-earn ing dependent caretakers anc.l childre:·1 ... [do
not] fall outside the purview of society as [aj system of coopcr<ttion'' impli es
that such support should be forthcoming. ~ After noting that society benefits
from traditional feminine activ ities, she states that " no ro le in the productive
systern [should] be assigned suc h inadequate benefits that, given the risks and
requiremen ts of the job, people could be deprived of the social conditions of
7
their freedo m because they have fulfilled its requirements." y In sum, although
Anderson expressly disavows an unconditional basic income guarantee, her
rh etori c suggests she would embrace the functional equi valent for those she
regards as assuming an approved '·role in the productive syste m." She appears
to believe that traditional caretakers play that role.
7

Anderson's approach, like that of other "ethic of care" feminists, is
que:;tion-beggi ng in many respects. As a matter of theory, Anclec;o n fail s to
explain how her rejection of "something for nothing" basic income fits in with
her disavowal of causal responsibility and moral desert as principles governing
the di stribution of resources. She also does not discuss why unconditional
benefits are inconsistent wi th the goals of equal dignity and an "end to
oppression" that she identifi es as central to social policy. She fails to consider,
fo r exam ple, whether a uni versal expectation of work might not operate as a
form of oppression for the least sk illed and poorest endowed citizens, or
whether the absence of an option to reject jobs a worker considers too menial
is degrad ing in itself. Also, Anderson never fully grapples with the issue of
76

Anderson . supra note 29. Jt 32 1.
!d. Cf Goodin. Sllf>ra note 6. at 15 - 18 (discussing the post-proclu ctivi st rej ect ion ol· an expectation of
ranicipa!ionl.
7
~ r\ndcrson su;nu note 29. at .32J.
7
~ !d. at 325.
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what sorts of activiti es qualify as more than ''noth ing" for purposes ot
triggering entitlement to the soc ial minimum. Although, for Anderson.
entitlement arises from ful fillin g a "role in the prod ucti ve system,' ' she offers
no specific criteri a for wh ich acti vities fill that bill. She thi nks that caretaking
is a prime candidate. hut offers no theoretical framework for deal ing with
claims for support ho m other qLwrters . What becomes of the hard-working.
third-rate artist in her unive rs e'~ These issues Anderson leaves unresolved .
IV. CO\iTR. ,-".CL\ R!.-\ N APPRO.\C HES TO CO'JDIT!ON,--\L AND
U>K'ONDIT fONAL BENEFITS

T he conceptual puzz les explored so far compl icate the choice betwee n
prov iding a basic income fo r al l and tyi ng public ass istance to fuifi lling market
work requirements. As noted, the main ch allenge that confronts luck
egalitari ans in tryin g to ground just distributi ons in a conceptually coherent
distinction between choice and chance stems from the difficulties inherent in
identi fy ing choices un tai nted by luck . Yet if responsibility or desert is too
eiusive a gro und for distrib uti on, where should we turn? To help fin esse th is
conundrum and bring more determinacy to the debate, theorists like Rona ld
Dworkin , John Rawl s, and Philippe Van Parij s have adopted a contractarian
approach to the question of 'which outcomes of transactional systems should
remain undisturbed and wh ich should give rise to co llective reallocations. The
contractarian fram ework has bee n desc ribed by David Miller as based on
"claims that valid principles of justice are those that would be agreed on by
people under certain ideal cond iti ons . "~o Those ideal conditi ons are generail y
taken to include hypothetical initial equ ality and parti al ignorance about
su bsequent outcomes, including participants' "personal charac teristi cs" and
1
subsequent "place in soc iety ."" The principles of justice are those that rational
individual s would collect ively adopt to regulate their common practices and
would be able to accept ·'once the veil of ignorance is li fted and peop le are
restored to full know ledge" both of their circumstances and of the ir
"' conceptions of the good. ,,~o
The next Part examines some contractarian approaches for the purpose of
investigating the relationship between theoretical visio ns of a just society and
the claim that public ass istance without work is "unfair" or "unj ust. " In his
Sll

MILLER, supm note 33. at 57.
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central work, A Theory of Jusricc, John Rawls derives basic principles of
organization by imagining the social arrangements rh,tt individuals \v oulcl
choose from an "original position" be hind a ·'ve il of ignorance .. in which
endowments and social position arc unknown. Although the basic libertie s and
resource-based difference principle he derives ctrguably would not force a
categorical choice in all cases betwee n the two soc ial welfare possibilities
under consideration here, Rawls ha s curiously re:.;i stecl this co nc lusi on by
coming out against unconditional basic income in other writings. Ro nald
Dworkin posits a hypothetical insurance mark•.:t in \vhich particip2u~ts c:re
endowed equally and allowed to engage in market crctdes. He askc.; '-:'l"hic:;-,
outcomes we would collectively WLIIT<'llt our~el v es ctgainst if we k_ne \v o ur
talents and tastes but not how the economy would reward them . T he device
sets the stage for asking a version of the quc~;tiun at issue here: vv hether people
would vote ex ante for a basic income arrangement in w hich they were, in
effect, held harmless by the group for voluntary unemploymen t. or '.-vhether
they would prefer to inhabit a society in which those who refu se d to \Vork were
left to their own devices. Like Rawls, Dworkin is inconsistent in h is tre atment
of the issue: although his insurance scheme would not ap pear to rule out the
choice to supply a basic income, his more specific discussion of welfare policy
strongly suggests that a guaranteed basic income is neither required nor even
permitted under his scheme.
Finally , Van Parijs al:-;o begins with a
hypothetical formulation that assigns individual s equal material shares cmd
equal intrinsic endowments, but disparages work requirements from tw o
directions: by pointing to the undeserved .. rents " that accrue to a ll jobholders.
to the detriment of the unemployed, by virtue of th e ineluctable structu re of
any free market; and by identifying as a central goal of social life the
maximization of "real freedom for all ," which he defines as "the greatest
possible opportunity to do whatever [oneJ might want to do.''''
Of these three theorists, only the last, Philippe Van Parijs, unequivocally
embraces a guaranteed income arrangement. To the extent they address the
issue at all, both Dworkin and Rawls cast aspe rsions on the suggestion that a
basic income guarantee is required by, or even consis tent with, principles of
justice. As the discussion below suggests, however, Dworkin's and Rawls's
resistance is in tension with other aspects of their analysi s.
Raw ls 's
contractarian framework, which builds on an express rejection of a primary
concept of desert, is difficult to reconcile with his avowed hostility to the idea
of an unconditional income. Although Dworkin does not disparage desert
83

VAl\ PARIJS , REAL FREEDOM FOR ALL, .w pm note 6. at
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outright and stri ves to maintain a stabl e line be tween choice and brute lu c k, his
rule s for just distribution ultimately rely on a contractarian hypoth etical
insurance device that, despite Dworkin's protes tations to th e co ntrary, need not
ru le o ut a uni versa l a nd unco nditi o nal bas ic income g uarantee. Like man y
o rd in ary vo ters. Rawl s and D wo rkin gi ve in to th e e leme nt al intuition th~tt
·'so met hing for noth in g" cannot poss ibly be " fair" or "ju st,' ' eve n thou gh that
view is d ifficult tu reco nc ile with th e basic comm itments that o therwi se info rm
their fr<tm ewo rks fo r ju st soc ieti es .
A . l?.cni'ls 's Origin ul Position: Stufe rs ofi'Mul ihu ond Skid Rmv Bu111s
A lth o ugh John Raw ls shares Lev ine' s and Murphy's nihilistic viev; o f
dese rt as attached to market re ward s,x" he is less pointed on the ques ti on of th e
efforts indi vidu a ls mu st make in exc hange fo r reso urce allocation s w ithin ju s t
soci eti es . !n A Theory of lusrice, he offers a ge neral de sc ripti o n of society as a
system of rec iprocal cooperation for the commo n good, but does not apply the
idea of reciprocity at the retail leve l to recog ni ze an express obligation to work.
Rath er, th e concept of reciproci ty moti vates Rawls's basic procedure for
deri ving fu ndamenta l principles of ju stice. Rawls asks what rules rational ,
self-interested, and morally autonomous individuals, placed in an "orig inal
position" without knowledge of their endowments and future social pos iti on,
would c hoose to li ve by. He concludes that they would agree to basic li be rti es
for all , fair equality of opportunity, a nd a sys tem of di stribution for primary
goods, o r basic material re so urces , that is governed by the minim ax o r
differen ce principle, which dictates that in eq ualities in resource allocati o n be
permitted only if th e leas t-well-off me mbers o f society ben e fit.
As the economist Edmund Phe lps has noted, Rawl s recognizes th at the
'"socia l surplus ' ge ne rated by th e interaction of people' s diverse tal en ts an d
skills within ... the ... economy ... can be legitimately redistributed , s ince
85
the way a free mark et would di stribute it is morally arbitrary."
But Rawl s
neve r openly states w he ther a po rti o n of the s urplus is "owed only to those
who, being able and w illing, participate and contribute at leas t something to
the eco nomy ' s pie" o r whether those who refuse to contribute would also
8
rec eive something. " In design atin g the category of "the leas t advantaged,''

See supra pp. 3 1-33 .
Ed mund S. Phelps, Subsidi:e \Voges, BOSTO N REV., Oct.- Nov. 2000, at 12- 13. In exte nsive
conversations and corresponcknce with Rawl s, Phelps could not induce Rawl s to "e ndo rse" or to "protest"
ei th er altern3t ive of unconditiona l benefits or publi c aiel com ingent on work. !d. at 13 n.l.
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they remain so.
category by their
and drink[] beer
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mention of how the leas t we ll off go t to be that way and \Vhy
Those wh o can be vie wed as placi ng themselves in this
own choice- who decide , fo r ex am ple , to " lliel in bed all day
ai l night""' in stead of pursuin g gainfu l employment-appear

no less entitled to be rnade better off as th e pri ce fo r ineq uali ty than those \Vho

suffer deprivatio ns through no f<,u! t of theit· own.

In other writings. however. Rawls equivoc ate s on the qu es tion of who
iJelongs in the ·' te<;st ad \·anUtged" catego ry. In A f-(o ntion ConceiJiion of
Equolitr, he states thar the catego ry o f the wurst-o n· includes '·th e overL:p
betvveen those who are k ast l"clVOred by eac h of th e thret.: main kind~' of
contingenci es ii nc!udingj
. perso us whu:'e fan1il y <~nd c kt ~; s or i g in ~; are more
dis advantaged than others. whose natltr<ll endowment:; have pe rmitted th em to
fare less well , and whose fortune and luck have been relatively less favo rabl e
."'' At least one commentator has suggested that, alt hough A Tlze01y of
Jus tice defines the least advantaged '·so lel y in terms of their current economic
conditions," Rawls's later formulation is a "moralistic . desert -based account"
that focuses on the causal antecedents of desti tu tion and restricts the category
to those who would be conventionally regarded as deserving victims because
not personally res ponsible fur their fate .'y However, Rawls does not follow up
on the implications of thi s arguably narrower formulation nor expand on its
implications for the permi ssible design of soci al we lfare program s.
Although Rawls' s dominant formu!Jtion in A Theo n of" Ju stice fails to
make express distinctions amon g categories o f the most deprived, he has
addressed the question whether a just society should expec t wo rk from the able
bodied in a di fferent conte xt. His position is stated in his answer to an
obj ection advanced by the economist Richard Musgrave that Rawls' s
nonwelfarist principle for distribution , which looks to '·prirnary goods" rather
than to subjective well-being or utility as the measure of just allocation, entails
the inequitable treatment of persons with similar native capacities but different
preferences for work. Musgrav e argued that by leaving individual s free to
choose what jobs they will take and how bard they \v itl work , and by taxing
only monetary income to effect res ource all oc ati ons, Rawls ' s social order

~7
~X
258-59
::iY

Carcns. SliJi ra note 69. at ~6.
John Ra wls, A Kalllian Concepriun ofElfll"lill" ( 1975). reJninred in J0 11 :-:
(Samuel Freeman eel .. 1999).
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favors those ·'among inc!ivicluais with equal earnings ability ... with a high
preference for leisure:·'"' That is. the hardest ·workers earn more money anci
pay more taxe:;, while persons 1vho work little and choose to consume leisure
keep more value tor themselves.
~

\)I

In response to this critique. Raw!:; propo•;,.:':s to add leisure to the list of
"primary good/' that art~ to be distributed in acccrclance with the difference::
principJc. t-Ie explains:
might be included
in the [prlrnary goods] index a~-: l~~i~~urc. -rhu:~c \vho ~1rc un\villing to
\\/Ork \vou!cl ha\/C a sr_ancLtrd '.vorking t.L:ty· uf extra ieisure, and this

e;,t,·a leisure its·::lf would be stipulated as equivalent to the index of
pnmary goods of the least advantaged. So those who surf all day off
Malibu must find a way to support themselves and would not be
entitled to nublic funds. This merelv indicates ... that if necessarv
9
the list of p~·imary goods can in principle be expanded "
~

In Political Liberolism, Rawls repeats the suggestion that "twenty-four
9
hours less a standard working clay might be included in the index as leisure.'' '
He adds that ''[t]hose vvho were unwilling to work under conditions where

90 R.A. Musgrave, il/uximin. Uncaruinrr. und rl1e Leisure Trwlc-OfT S~ Q.J. EcoN. 625. 629, 632 1197-+1
!providing further that .. [w[hile a person's welfare clcpcnJs lln his consumption of both goods and leisure. the
nature of things is such that reJistribution can he expedited through the transi'cr of goods or income only .. ) .
.'iee u/so Richard J. Arneson. !'roJ>crtr Rig/us in Pcr.1nns. 9 So c. PHIL.. & PoL· Y 20 I. 215-16 (I ')92)
(concurring with ~mel further developing i'vlusgravc·s ohjeL·tion).
<JI This critique is the llip side of the \\'ell-known ubjcctinn that using subjective metrics like welfare ur
wcll-hcing rather tlun objective n1casurcs of resources as

th~ currency

of egalitarian justice threatens tu

.. c1dave the talented .. by crediting the happy and well-endowed with the advantages they enjoy. thereby
forcing them to work to subsidize the talentkss and miserable. See, e.g .. DWORKIN. SIIJ>ro note 51. at 90. 8999 (objecting to the ··slavery of the talented .. ); RAKOWSKI. SIIJ!W note 39. at 120-21. 128 (criticizing Dworkin's
hypothetical insurance scheme as still leading to the. enslavement of talent): VAN PARIJS, REAL FREEDOM FOR
ALL. mpm note 6. at 65 (objecting to any requirement forcing one to have less leisure in consequence of more
native talent): Richard J. Arneson, EquolitY wu/ Equal Of'f'Orrunit\'.fi>r \Ve/fare. 56 PHIL. STUD. 77, 90 ( 1989)
(divorcing the expensive preference ol· a wlcntcd person's taste for personal liberty from the class of voluntary
expensive preferences). For a defense of enslaving the talented. sec !:larry, supra note 10. at 271-72. Rawls
avoids this problem by rejecting a wclfarisl approach to redistribution and using objectively measured
.. prima1·y goods ... rather than subjective utility. as the benchmark of well-being and the currency of allocation.
But in avoiding forcing ··those with greater talents to work for the less favored" Rawls gives a leg up to

.. recluses. saints. and (nonconsulting) scholars who eam but little and hence will not have to contribute
greatly ... Musgrave, supru note 90. at 6~2. Musgrave·s alternative proposal returns to a welfarist approach: he
suggests using lump-sum taxation w equalize some combination of .. goods and leisure potentials, .. based on
unrealized ability to work and enjoy. /d For a similar suggestion. sec Daniel N. Shaviro. !nequo!in·. Weolrli.
ill IIi Enrlo11·1nenr. 53 TAX L. REV. 397. -~ 12-16 (2000) (proposing a tax based on endowments).
~ 2 John Rawls, T11e Priorin· oji?iglir und Idem of rile Good, 17 PHIL. & Plill. AFF. 251. 257 n.7 ( 1988).
'!.1 .IOI·IC: RAWLS. POLITICAL LiBERi\LISi\1 181-82 n.9 ( 1993 ).

Etv!OR Y LAW .JOURN i\L

I Vnl. 5::!

there is much work that needs to be done (1 assume that positi o ns and jobs are
not sca rce or rationed) would have ext ra leisure stipulated as equal to the index
of the least advantaged."')" Alt houg h Rawls doe::; not e laborate further. his
comments ::;eem to suggest that emp loyable person s who refuse to work at al l,
by arrogat in g to themselves '·ext ra" primary goods in the form of a full day' s
wort h of le isure, s hould be rega rded as e ngag ing in a form of '·se lf-help· · th at
lifts them abo ve the leas t advantaged, thu s disqualifying th e m fr o m any furth e r
mandatory public assistance. That s uch persons may st ill be finan c ially poor to
the po in t of starvation does not make them cand i date~ for the bottom rung
category, an d thus docs not entitle them to impro vement of the ir lot und e r the
clille rence principle. It is ope n to them to track some o r all of their extra e ight
hours of leisure for th e material goods that would re li eve th e ir destitution.
Rawl s's remarks a lso s uggest that. if relinquishing thi s ext ra le is ure in favor of
paid emp loyment wo uld still leave someone unable to " make e nd s meet"
becau se he earned too little to s urvive, he would then qualify as among the
leas t ad va ntaged and lay claim to more resources from ot hers. By implication,
that c laim could be made only by those un able to better their situati o n by
workin g harder, either beca use they were already putting in a reasonabl e wo rk
effort o r were unable to work very much or at all.
If this gloss on Rawls is accurate, then his answer to Mu sgrave suggests
that a just soc iety could require the able-bodied to work- and \vork "fulltime''- for public assistance and could fairly refuse to provide basic income to
voluntary idle rs. But Raw ls's reco mmendation to add le isure to the lis t of
pr imary goods fits un eas il y w ith o th er elements of hi s sc he me. FirsL eve n if
in c ludin g le isure on th e li st makes se nse-if only because, assum in g a system
of free occupational choice (to whic h Rawls and o ther li be ra l theorists seem
committed), individual s can appropriate more benefits to th emselves at will
simply by choosing to be unemployed-it is uncl ear why Rawls distinguish es
between those who exceed the six teen-hour standard all otme nt of leis ure
through vo luntary idleness and those who are relegated to excess ive leisure
throug h in vo luntary un emp loyment.
Assuming material resources are
othe rw ise equal (as between, for exa mple, the willfully idle beach bum and the
skid row bum w ho tries and fai ls to get a job), it is not obvious w hy the latter
would be counted among the least advantaged and the fo rmer s hould not.
Rawls's dominant framework, which defines the least advantaged solely in
terms of reso urces possessed and not how those reso urces are acquired or lost,
and w hich denies any role to fault, desert, or agency, provides no clear basis
~.J

!d. at 182 n.9.
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for distingui shing between these cases. Both persons have paltry material
resources and abundant lei sure time. Incleecl, they arc equivalent on everything
90
except happiness or preference satisfaction.
The beach bum enjoys greater
subjective welfare or we ll-being, since , despite his poverty-and unlike the
involuntarily jobless skid ro w burn-he is doing what he wants to do. But why
should it matter th~lt the beach bum likes it that way and ind eed eschews
alternatives. whereas the skid rmv bum is miserable and would embrace the
very option-employment- - th e first person despises? To distinguish these
individual s llll the basi s ot· individual preference satisfaction indulges th e very
w e ifari st. or s ubjectivist. 1n c ~ t.~me of well-being that Rawls is at pains tu reject.
Another way of und e rs t ~mding Rawls's suggestion that leisure be incluclccl
in the index of primary goods is that it serves as a device for IT -importing
fundamentally desert-based considerations into a framework that expressly
disavows reliance on any underived or pre-institutional notion of de sert. By
denying assi stance to those who refuse to work, designating leisure as a
primary good has the effect of making work-directed effort something for
which individuals can take credit and upon which distributive decisions should
be based. This analytic move suggests that, notwithstanding Raw Is ' s view that
desert is incoherent unless established through idealized consensus , he is
curiously dissatisfied with a distributional result that wanders too far afield of
ordinary notions of deservingness.
Because Rawls balks at treating the
voluntary , well-endowed idler the same as the involuntarily unemployed, he
comes up with a jerry-rigged solution-adding leisure to primary goods while
simultaneously (and implicitly) discounting the value of exce ss wzchosen
leisure-that effectively incorporates a perfectionist, Calvinist work ethic into
his liberal scheme.
Are there alternative ways to derive a work requirement from the basic
elements of Rawls's frame work without adding leisure to primary goods? One
possibility is that the difference principle itself might dictate the result if
universal work for the able-bodied could be expected to generate more material
96
resources available for distribution to the least advantaged than alternatives.
90

Another possi bil ity is that the existence of the opportunity to engage in gainful employment might be
counted in itse lf as a ··reso urce bcn e rtt .. that would rut the beach bum ahead of the skid row bum and make the
former more adv antaged. Rall'ls hints at this possibility in the footnote in Politico/ Li/Jeru/i.\'111 in whi ch he
expressly diqinguishes between those who are ::~t leisure from choice, and those who are inv oluntarily
unempl oyed. Se e id.
96 See DWCJIU.:E\. Sllf'ro note 'i I. :tt ~31) (suggesting that. when choosing between a program under which
'·onl y th ose \\h o allen1 pt tn worh: receive welfare"' and one in which "everyone who does not work. for
whatever re~"ons . rec eives beneilrs."· the former might bettet· vindicate Rawls·s difference prin ciple "'because
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But. as already noted, whether work requirements would maximize wealth in
all circumstances is unclear: the burdens ancl expense of administering such a
system, and the perverse incentives on rec ipients to prove themselves exempt,
might ear into the benefits of expecting work from ewryone. If this did not
happen, however, the difference principie n1ight rule out a basic guaranteed
income, since that program would then gen,.:rale fewer resources to give to the
least well-off. That proscription would not be ~t matter of basic principle, but
rather of economic contingency.
T hei·e Jre other ways of analyzing the difference principle that might yield
the opposite result. Sorne peuple n1ay be :) zJ indolent or so vvork averse that
they will stubbornly refuse to get a j ob despite complete destitution and the
threat of losing government help . Within the context of a public welfare
sysrem that offers aid only to the ·'deserving,·· these persons place themselves
among the least-advantaged by choice. But if we take Rawls at his word on
desert, choice or chance should not matter. Moreover, that some person's
work aversion makes their poverty "worth it" to them is inelevant to their
degree of disadvantage and their eligibility for special solicitude within
Rawls's scheme. If a work-for-welfare regime would indeed generate such a
group of truly destitute individuals impervious to expectations and incentives,
then it can be argued that a basic income scheme is mandated by the difference
principle because it would make this group better off (since at least they would
have basic resources). That is, because some especially recalcitrant persons
wo uld be worse off under work-for-benefits than with an uncondition al basic
income program, we ought to elect the latter even if the work disincentives it
generates reduces the sum total of wealth.n

An approach that counts poor work-refuseniks among the least advantaged,
although at odds with Rawls's suggestion that leisure should count as a
primary good, is arguably more consistent with his discussion of the difference
principle in A Theory of Justice.~ A definition of the least advantaged that
8

the worst-off group in any society would be bcuer oil if its economic system provided incemivcs to work fm
all who can work'").
'!7 This appears to be what Dworkin is getting at in his brief remarks on how Rawls's difference principle
would regard the alternatives or· unconditional welfare bendlts and bcnctlts conditioned on work. He stales
somewhat cryptically that "'some people ... would su strongly prefer· idleness that they would be financially
better off under a scheme that did not punish that choice.·· DWURKIN. supra note 51. at 331. He explains
t"urthcr that "'[ijt might be that no group in the second program [guaranteed income] is as badly off as the
stipulated worst-off group in the first one [work-for-welfare]. in which case the difference principl e would
recommend the second program." !d.
9
~ R·\ wr.s. supra note 45.
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looks to resource endow ment \as op posed to preference sati sfaction) and that i:-.:
heed less of fauit. causati on. or performance wouid see m m e11taii d
responsibility to improve th e lut of the most work-averse if at all poss ibk . But
that res ult thro ws in to sharp relief the tension between Raw ls's commitmen t to
equalizing reso urces in the forrn of pi·imary goods- a commitment th~tc s~: l f
con scious ly refu ses to c o m pen::-:~tk "expensive tast:.::s'' and that in:..;ish thai:
tastes be satisfied ou t o!· the :~Ltncb rd aJtotment--and a difference princip k:
that, regard less of desert. •:~rt"e c: tivcly holds the least-advantaged har m ~c·::-:: fc)r
preference-driven c hoices .'l '' Cr;u n tlng persons \vho are poor b:~cau~~~: th~:: y
refu se to \VOrk JS antung tl >~: le:Js l ~~d , ·antaged is tantarTloun t to c -:_ -!l~np l-:n :;~ ttin g
then1 for the1r av ersio n tc \\'Ork ~lnd their taste for leis ure . It i ~-~ \.1 furrn r:'!
compensation for expe n::-;i\ e tastes . Yet those who stand above the k~;::t
ad vantaged and choose L) \v· urk les:;- or spend mor;.;-for s i mil~tr pn.:f:.: renc::based reas ons are entitled to r:o co mpen sation or relief from th::: financia l
consequences of their decisions. Th us, Rawl s looks both ways on preference driven choices.
Yet even if the category o f the leas t adv antaged should not be deemed to
include all persons who make themselves poor by avoiding work, there is st ill
an argument to be made that a guaranteed income is better for the leastadvantaged, including perhaps some of th e least-able working poor, than aid
conditioned on work. Low-skilled employees may not be worse offfinonciollv
than they would be with basic income alone, but the y co uld well be fc:r less
happy and less free . What Rawl s ignores is that people who take jobs under the
constraint of work-for-welfare co uld arguably be regarded as amon g the most
wretched of the earth. Many "bottom rung" workers labor at miserable.
tedious, mind-num bing, or degrnding jobs. Basic income wo uld enabic the
most dejected an d oppressed worke rs to quit or work Jess. G iving t h c~;e
person s "something fo r nothin g" is a plausible and effective way of allevi ating
one possible source of their misery , which is work. A just society committed

'N Rawl s defends himse lf against the objec tion from so me quarters that th e use of primary gonds 'IS the
currency of distributiv e justi ce docs not del c;w ug /1 to accommod ate those with expe nsive tastes by statin g th:tt
"as moral persons citi ze ns ha' e some part in formin g and cu lti vat ing their fin al ends and prdercn,:cs" · and hy
den ying "that c iti zens· preferences arc beyo nd their control as propens iti es or cra vings .
.·· .John Rawb.
Social UnifY and PrimwT Goods . in U T JLIT A RI Ai' ISi\·1 AND BEYOND I59, 168 -69 (A martya Sen & fk rn ard
Wil li ams eels., 1982). But. as G.A . Cohen notes. Raw ls's ·'piclllre of the indi vidual as responsibly guid ing his
own taste formation is hard to reco ncile with c laims Rawl s elsewhere uses in a fundame ntal way:· in cluding
the "skepticism which he ex presses about ext ra rew ard for ex tra effort." Coh en, S llf>ril note 51. at 9 1-L s~c
uisu KYi\ILICKA . SllfHU note 67 . at 75 (noling the tension betwee n Rawls· s view tlwt " we ~1re respon,ihlc fur
the costs of our cho ices· an<.l ihe fa il ure of th e di fferen ce pri nciple to "mak e ~illY ... dist inct ion hct wc~n
chose n and unchose n inequa lit ies"·).
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to a difference principle might therefore recognize ~m obligcltion to enhance the
well-being of abject "wage slaves'' as the price uf uth<.:rs being better off.
Rawls's framework cannot easily accommodate an argument of this kind.
which is grounded in a notion of well-being that i'> -~ubjective rather than
objective and resource-based. That some pr:opk do h'ttcful work or hate the
jobs they do wuulcl get little weight within hi s clistributi Vl~ scheme except.
perhaps, at the e.'\tremes of jobs that are wholly in c un~i-;tent with dignity and
self-respect.
The question is not wlwth e r some pct-'->lltlS in society are
unhappy. but whether they have fewer prim~uy
th~m the rest.
But a
worker who suffers a deficiency in primdry
,_,tn a lw ays be-: he tpec! by cl
material transfer to supplement the resources he ;-::·ocure:-; through his own
efforts. If a job does not pay enough to achieve a minim~tlly decent stand ard of
living, then assistance should take the form of cold cash or supplementation of
earnings (such as our system currently provides thruugh welfare-plus-work, the
Earned Income Tax Credit, wage supplements , and various other forms of
assistance for workers).
Alternatively. we should put our efforts into
improving working conditions. But the way to go is to throw money at the
problem, not to relieve able-bodied persons of the expectation of labor. On this
view, alleviating disadvantage never requires excusing the refusal to make any
effort at all, and thus would appear not to mandate a guaranteed basic income
as a matter of fundamental justice.
In sum, it is difficult to establish whether Rawls ' s theory of justice would
mandate work for the able-bodied, or would permit or require unconditional
benefits for all. On the one hand, Rawls's disparagement of desert as a basis
for resource distribution would appear to require societies to make the idle
poor less poor, regardless of why they are poor. A guaranteed income is the
best way to clo this. On the other hand, Raw ls himself has rejected this
position by suggesting that leisure be considered a "primary good" with which
the voluntarily idle must be considered well-enclowecl. A guaran teed income
then becomes unnecessary to, or even inconsistent vvith. Rawls's scheme.

100 But perhaps no (legal) job within a market economy that pays enough for minimal self-support ought
to be regarded as so distressing. degrading. or intolerable that it automatically places the person who peri'orms
il among the least well off. See. e.g .. PHELPS. supra note 17. at ! 1-15 (listing the intellectual and social
benefits of work); Phelps. supra note 85, at 13 (positioning factclry workers as better off than the surfer;.
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f-J . Dvvorkin 's Hypothetico/ lnsumnce Sche111e

Anot her framework that mi ght yield a ch o ice betw ee n conditional and
un co nd itional we lfare is Ronald Dwork in ·s scheme fo r eqalitarian di stributi ve
10 1
justice.
To de ri ve principles that operate in a just sociecy, Dworkin imagines
a desert island on whi ch all inhabit:llltS receive initia l equa l shares of found
material reso urces. T hi s eq uali ty for ms th e startin g po int for an auct ion, whi ch
is des igned to mimi c a fre e 1narl--:et. in whi ch c iti;ens use th e ir ini tia l
end ow ments to bid for reso urces and th e prod ucts created with them . In usin g
th is device to defe nd th e ju s ti c~..~ of marl\.et o utco mes w ithi n a fram cwori-.: or
·:~q u ai opportunity, Dworl--:in as serts tlEit the re source all ocation that resu lts
l·rorn the aucti on over time villllicttes eq uality '·ove r entire live s" beca use it
ensures that peo ple will " pay th e: price of th e life th ey ha ve dec ided to lead.
10
measured in what others give up in orde r that they can do so .'. ' Honoring
choices-includin g m arket -ba s·~d dec isio ns -and the consequences of such
choices is "equ ality-m ai ntaining .. becau se the res ults of vo luntary transaction s
reflect the value and cos t of exc hanged co mmod ities and servi ces to other
perso ns. It fo ll ows that the outcomes of chosen ri sks and ga mbl es, including
the risks taken throu gh trade and eco nomic enterprise, should be left
undi sturbed. Dworkin ex plains that "the possibility of loss was part of the life
[market participants] chose . . . it was the fair price of the possibility of
., JOJ
gam.
Ju stice is thu s consi stent wit h holding pc:ople to results of voluntary acti ons
from ideal ized co nditi ons that m irn ic fai r startin g points. But what are those
ideal co nditions and what startin g po ints are fair ? A key problem for Dworkin
is th at real life differs fro m his hypothetical: actual people clo not begin life
w ith eq ual mate rial shares, nor do they possess identical intrinsic endow ments.
We come to the market with differe nt attributes, talents, desires, aversio ns,
ambiti ons, and preferences.
Dworkin cannot avoid identifying which
antecedents of choice mu st be equali zed to charge people fairl y with the
consequences of their action s and to make good on th e claim that market
transactions are fairly ''equality maintaining."
In attempting to get at th e co nditi ons that would be eq ui valent to fa ir
starting points, Dworkin distin gui shes between "option luck" and "brute luck."
·'Option luck is a matter of how de liberate an cl calculated gambles turn out101

See OWOR KJ:-J , supra note 51, at 65-7 1.

102

!d. a t 74.
!d. at 74-75.
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whether someone gains or loses through accepting ''n isolated risk he or she
should have anticipated and might have declined .-- il" " Brute luck is a matter of
how risks fall out that me not in [some] sense deliberate gambles."'"' Brute
luck appears to be a category reserved for evcnb th a t cannot be influenced or
'l' ' ";r',~rl' 'nv
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to swallow the other. On the one hand , ~tli mi s fortun,~s oth e r than pure
accidents uf birth or defects in upbringing czm in snn :e :-;':n:-;e be regarded as
cau sally linked to volitional acts, hovvever improb:\bl y . ir:clirc:ctly, or tenuously.
(Even being hit by a meteorite is the " res u lt'' of
1: :; ourse lves in the vvrong
;
'
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that would befall us "no matter what" seems too narn>'ii.
On the o ther h;:md,
that cl gambk knowingly made turns out badly can. in >;unle sense , be p:;garded
as a matter of brute luck too, in that the gambler cannot fix the gamble's actual
]] I)
outcome.
Assum.ing that the line between brute and option luck can be made
reasonably precise, Dworkin suggests that the outcomes of exchanges are just
if some way can be found to compensate for differential results clue to brute
luck. Only differences clue to unavoidable risks or misfortunes qualify for
collective warrant But Dworkin does not see society as duty-bound to hold
persons bZtnnless for all types of bad brute luck: The pos:;;ibility of anticipating
and insuring against some unavoidable risks effec tively transforms some brute
luck into option luck,
Dworkin cannot avoid identifying which attributes or conditions must be
equ a l or equalized to make good on the claim that transactions are "equality
maintaining" and to charge people fairly with the consequences of their

!().j

/d. at 73.

]().)

/d.

Sec id. at 73-74 (citing ~xampks such as being hit by a meteorite).
Sec. e.g., R,\KOWSKI, supra not<; 39, at 75 (noting that past voluntary decisions can make the ultimate
difference in th~ occurrence of bad brute luck situations): Richard .l. ,\rne:;on. Egolirori(/ni.lln ond rile
U/1(/e.\cr\'ing Poor. 5 .1. POL. PHIL. 327, 331-33 ( 1997): Cohen, .IUJ>m note 51. at 911 (noting the grey area
between fault and bad luck): Lippert-Rasmussen, supra note 58. at 549-57 (attempting to distinguish between
differential option and differential brute luck).
!OS Sec RAKOWSKI, SUJ>ru note 39. at 75-77.
9
lll
Moreover, whether a misfonune is avoidable-and a matter of option luck rather than brute luck-is
sensitive to descriptive formulation and to state of knowkdgc. There are ways of describing a risk that makes
it seem unavoidable (''the risk of a tlood destroying my business .. ) or potentially avoidable by making a
different choice ("a 20'/c- chance of a tlood destroying a business located in this tlood plain").
110
See Lippen-Rasmussen, supra note 58, at 573-74 (discussing "regulative" control over outcomes).
101
'
1117
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act iv ities in th e wo rld. He devo tes co ns id e rab le energy to the issu e o f \v hi c h
spec ifi c attributes of persons are can d idates for effec tive equali~;:d ti un.
Pa rtic ul arl y important is Dworkin' s treatm e nt of the factors that make fo r
.
I
.
Il l
occ upatto na or econormc success.
Like Ra w ls, he ack nmvle d ges th at
te nden c ies to persevere and work hard are hi ghly intlu encecl by in nate
e nd owme nts and ge net ic accidents o f birth o 'er w hi c h pers o n:; ex e rcise li tt le
co ntrol. B ut he also in s ists that ta lents a nd th e e1b ility t \) ex plo it th::: m are
d ifficult to dis entangle from ambi tion an cl other el ements of o ur ide n tity <h at
:, ~:-,: in ex trica bl y caug ht up w ith our v ~liu c~ . p la ns. and co ncept ion s of the goqd
11
liL: . ' T his lead s him to assimilat e ::;orn e dete rmin ants o f j o b succ,:s,; :u;d
\: ~trn i ng po we r to tastes and preference ~ and to re si st a full -bl o vm com rnitm e nt
tu soc ial correctio n for their effects. in the e nd. he s ugges ts that proper rega rd
for a principled distinction between brute lu ck and o p tion lu ck arg uab ly
recommends a system th at "leave[s l each person with the income he woul d
have had if, counterfactu a ll y, all ta le nts fo r production had bee n equal. " b ut
does not disturb differences trace able to occ upational choice , " ambitio n,'' and
" indu stry." N o nethel ess, as explained more full y below , D workin avo ids
co ncluding that a just soc iety mu st hold all persons harml ess for perceived lack
of talent. Indeed, Dworkin 's ambivalence about co llecti ve co mpensation fo r
ta lent differentials find s ex pressio n in hi s reliance o n a hypothetica l in surance
sc hem e , wh ich e mploys as the ultimate test of justice th e degree to which the
gro up wo uld co ll ec ti vely agree to compensate its members for part icular
shortcom ings.
He concludes, in effect, that co mpensat ion wou ld be
111
fo rthcom ing only for extreme lack o f talent.
Although th e line Dworkin draws betwee n natura l tal ent a nd effort-based
11
att ributes can be questioned, -l hi s position would seem to bode ili fo r an y
c laim th at an un condition al guaranteed in co me for the able-bodied wou ld be

111

Sa DwoRKIN , supru no te 5 1, at 92 (.. We want ILl tine! some way to disti ng uish fair from unfair
differen ces in wealth generated by differences in occ upati on."").
11 2
See id. a t 9 1 (' "Talents are nuttured a nd devel oped. not d iscove red full -b lown. and people c hoose
wh ich takn ts to deve lo p in response to their be li efs about what so t1 of person it is best to be ... ).
113
Se~ inji·a pp. 48 -50 (discus sion of hypo th et ical insmance paradi g m).
Il-l See. e.g., Coh en. sup ra note 51, at 92 8-29 (noting that beh ind etlo tt-bascd attribu tes are unchose n
p references ); see also R AKOWSKI , supra no te 39. at 11 0 ( .. It is impo n ant ... not to o vers ta te the c xtl' nt to
which fortitude. co nce ntrat ion, pe rse veran ce, a nd whatever othe r auributes comp ri se the mo re amorph ous
quality of effort are c harac teristi cs w ithin a pe rso n\ control. The abilities with which peop le a re born .
frequentl y affect ... th eir cons equ e nt desire- and over time their capac ity-to strive and succeed ... ). Fo r a
genera l c ritique of Dwork.in "s approach. see Symposium 011 Ronald D11·or/.:in ·s Sorereig11 Vinue . I 13 ETHICS 5
(2002 ).
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consistent with justice. let alone required by it. Dworkin 's discussion of
:1ttributes that inform earning power suggests that "[lja z ine s~ or an Jversion to
a cenain type of work cannot furnish title to the rew<trds of another' s
11
exert ions ... " The consequence s of the decision not to tak e a job (assuming
one i:; ava ilable ) w oul d see m to be as close to the core of opt ion luck as one
cou id get.
On the other hand. there are aspects of Dworkin' s l·r,un e,vu rk for ju sti ce
tl"lt creme t;-cJuhlc fm the pos ition that no forms of opt ion lu ck should be
cancl icLttcs for cu llccri, ..., compe nsation. To clea! with un equal cndmvmt~nts
like 11<tturc!l tal·.:nt :wd to sidestep the need definiti,·e ly tu cl<t.ss ify such
an ri bu te:-.: ac; "bru tt._·.. ur ··uption.. luck, Dworkin ckve lop.-; :. 1 hypotheti Cd I
in : ; ur<lnce scheme th:;t recognizes a social obligation to cornpensJte for
cletic i e ncie ~ only to th e ex tent that idealized perso ns ignor,mt of their future
pos it ion in soc iety wo uld ag ree to in sure again st them . as ~ uming eve ryo ne had
to p ~t y the cost of that in surance. As elaborated more full y below , the
operation of that scheme potentially undermines his position. grounded in first
principles, that holding people harmless for the costs of their voluntary
choices- including the choice not to work-is incon sistent with a just regim e.
Indeed. Dworkin ' s express views on specific questions of welfare policy ,
although perhaps mandated by an absolutist position that holding peopl e
harmless for differential option luck is unjust because it vio lates principles of
equ,llity '·over whole li ves.'' cannot easi ly be sq uared with his insurance-based
analys is. An uncon dit ional basic income-and the correspondi ng re laxa ti on of
an y un ive rsal expectation of work for the able- bodied- ma y be more
cons istent with Dworkin 's in surance framework. In genera l. the conclusions
that e merge from hypothetical collective decisi on making do not necessarily
respect a principled line between brute and option lu ck : as ever; Dworkin
ac kn owledges. some form s of brute luck will not be in sured against. But
Dworkin seems less willing to recognize that some forms of option luck
(including , as suggested below, the results of some decisions to be idle) may be
held harmless by ideal deci sionmakers, at least in some circumstances.
Conced ing that some personal characteristics that influence market success
wou ld at least be candidates fo r eq ualization throu gh resource reallocation,
Dworkin tries to get at what form s of redistribution would be just by imagining
II )
Dworkin's suggestion thai comp ensati on for option luck violates principles of equality over lifet imes
impli es that government warrants again st option lu ck~includin g, arguably , a hasic income guarantee thai
c!'kCiive ly cushions decisions to work k ss hard ~are not merely permissive, but mi ght he 1·ukd out as unjusr.
! If• RAK OWSK I, SIIJ>m note 39. at lOS (d isc uss ing Dworkin's positi on).

I
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wh ich cond iti ons rari o1w l actors wo uld in sure them se lves ageti nst ex ante i!"
they were cogni zant of the wor kings of markets. the ge neral oc cup alion~tl
stru ctu re, ~tnd th eir own talents, ambition s, ~tnd preferences, but were ig norant
11 7
o!" the pos ition and eco nomic fortun e th ese woui cl yie ld in th e re,tl -\vorlcl.
He
:; ugge sts that the test of whether justi ce rq uircs or permits the group ttl
t:ompeiisatc those who do poo rl y in th e market is '" heth•:r pe rson :: operctti:lg
unde1· idc:Lil co ndition~; wou ld coll ecti\·ely choose to purch~i'; e in surance aga ins t
thche uutc omcs . A dec ision to insure \VO ul cl req uire eve ryon e to p<t y
'·premi tl!lls" . out o r th e reso urces th ey generated through th i~i r m~t rkd activity
11
1
r·· ,., ... ,. ,. ·,h~· 1'l''·t of Clll11pCt1S' 'ti.I1 (T pe1·•on·· \" 1l"
c· 111T, ,· th,, il.l " ' ".'' 'l. -'\'<"'' 1t
·' 1 h . •
hyputh<: t! c<tl recog niz e ~ that th e bill fur hold in g pcup k klrmles..; lor ce rta in
deficie ncies or fo rms of bad luck must be jXtid by ew~ryone. includi iig the
pcrS£.1!lS who potent iall y stand to benefit fro m th at commitment prior to their
quali fy in g for compen sat ion. Thus. wh at ac tors i!l the hypot het ica l would
choose willultim:ltely be influ enced by th e prem iu ms th ey wou ld be willing to
pay in li ght of their expected insurance c!iviclc ncl we ighted by the probability of
the eli gible event.. Dworkin ultimately concludes th at, beca use th e cost of a
more ge nerous system of coverage and redistribution w ill outweigh the
benefits for most peopl e, the hypothetical clec isionm ake rs will elect to cover no
more than the inability to earn up to a decent minimum amount and will
11
imp leme nt that decis ion through a progressive income tax sc he rne. 'J
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The ins uran ce hypothetical in vites us to ask th e part icul ar questio n at issue
here: whether a just soc iety wo uld require th e ab le-bocli ecl to work as <1
co nditi on of rece iving pub lic aiel , or would pro vi de an unco nditi ona l basic
mcome. The test would be whether rati onal actors with ord inary prudenc e.
ignorant of th eir earning power and future occupati onal prospec ts . would vote
co llecti ve ly to cover themselves agai nst th e consequ ences of choos ing not to
wo rk fo r pay. At first glance, the an swer seems obvi ous . Our ordinary

11 7
I)WOR Kh , Sllf >m note 51, at 94 ("\The hypoth eti ca l dee i sionnta~er\ \.;null's the pmj eL'ted inc ume
structure but is . . ra Ji c~tl l y uncertain what in come leve l his cm n talents l\'O u!d permit him to occupy. "! .
IlK In surance co uld be: pro vided "against l'ailing to have an oppo rt unity tu earn \\ ' h:~ t cve r k1·el of incumc .
wit hin the projected struc ture, the: po licyholder names . in whi ch case the insurance co mpany wi ll pay the
pul ic yho lck r the Jillerenec betwee n that co verage level and the income he does in !'act have an uppu rtunit y tu
ea rn." Althuug h "[ pjrem iums wi ll va ry with th e level u!' cove r~tge ch osen . .. the prem iums mu st "be the same
fur eve ryone at any part ic ul ar coverage level. "' Then the ques ti on hccomcs ··t h!ovv· much or such insura nce
would the ... \pa rti ci pan ts]. o n ave rage . bu y, at what spec ifi ed level of inco me cc>v·e rage . and at what cos t·>··
II'! ld at 97-99 (s tressing tha t the " lower the inco me lev·d chosen as the covered ris~, ... th e lllllrc likel y th at
its bu rden can be fu lfi lled th rough the insurance sche me and tha t tlwsc earning abuv·e thai Jev·cJ v,·i[ J not he'
c.\Cc'-' ivc ly pe nalized by pay ing hi gher pre mi ums fo r vv·hat they already !Ja,·e ).
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understa nding of insuran ce: is that it is available only aga in st con ditions that
represe nt risks ·'beyond one's contro l. " That would rul e out th e possibility or
vot in g to warrant people ag ~!inst a n eve nt-volunt ary une mp loy ment- that
isn't rea ll y a ·'r isk'' at a ll. but res ults from a deliberate dec ision that, by
hypot hes is. is wi thin each pc r:;on·s po wer to make or not Indeed. in hi s
d isc uss ion of welfare po!icy D'.vorki n docs as k a var iati o n on this question. and
answers it as one mig ht c:\pect. :u In addressi ng the iss ue of whic h labo r
market ri sks \vo ul cl be in surr2ci z1.ga ins t vvithin hi s hyp ot het ical wor ld. Dwork in
leaves open the poss ibility of insurance for some forms of inl'Oiu:zi,'lr\'
un emp loy me nt. He di smi ss::; •; \vith littk d isc uss io n the poss ibi lir.y that hi ~;
fra mev.<o rk would yi e ld ~t pledge to hold peopl e harmless for dec iding not to
work or not to work eno ug h to ach ieve cl certain leve l of income . "
That
pos ition com ports w ith D\vorkin's s uggestion th at o ption lu ck outcom es of
del iberate cho ices s hould neve r be gro und s for soc ial co mpensation, w he reas
brute lu ck warrants co mpe nsat io n to an ex tent determin ed by the opera ti o n of
I' '
the insuranc e paradigm. -1

1

In predicting hew hypotheti c al actors wo uld dec id e w hi ch circumstances
g ive ri se to compensable claims against the g roup , however, Dworkin
ultim ately p laces pivotal reliance on the proj ected costliness of group
compensation for particul ar shortfa lls. On thi s crite ri o n, Dworkin concludes
that there are some form s of "brute" bad luck-s uch as mild deficienci es in
native talent- for w hi ch just socie ties wo uld no t c hoose to compensate its
citi zens. Dworkin s uggests that shortcomin gs in native e ndow me nt that detrac t
from earnin g power o n the market s hould be compensab le o nl y in e x tre me
cases beca use more extens ive coverage would almos t certainl y be a bacl buy
for eve ryon e . Becau se med ioc re abi lity is quite co mmonp lace, the chance of
receiving co mpensation will be high, and the costs of paying compensation to
123
those e ntitl ed to it would consume enormous resources.
But that means that
124
"the cos t of the premium will be extre mely high as w ell ," and will eat up a
large porti o n of the earn in gs of those better-endowed perso ns not in the

120
See id. at 333 (ask in g ··what un empl oy ment insurance peopl e with a represe ntati ve mi xture of the
tastes anc.J ambiti ons most Amer ican s have ... wou ld buy if they had th e wealth that is average among us anc.J
were act in g prudent ly") .
12 1
See id. at 33 5-36 (s ta ting that ··any afforc.Jab k poli cy woul d stipul ate th at th e beneticia ry . .. see k
empl oyment .. . [a nd would I termin ate il' it is proved that he had been offered and dec lined a job"').
122 See Y.-\i\ P.-\RIJS. REAL FRE.EDO' I FOR ALL. supm note 6. at 65-72 (desc ri bin g Dwo rkin's views).
12
'
DWORK IN. .l'llpro note 5 l. at 06 (not in g that ve ry few will hav e maximum earnin g power and thus th e
funds necessary to make up the difference for eve ryone else will be extrem ely high).
12-l fd
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position to collect.'" Because more generous coverage would entail, at most, a
·'very large chance of a very small gain," '' (' rational actors \vould not choose to
redistribute resources beyond what is necessary to provide a decent ·'tloor" or
minimum level of support.
Citing the moral hazard inherent in such an arrangement. Dworkin insists it
follows inexorably from his analysis th~tt none of us would vote from the
hypothetical ex ante position to guarante·~ everyone a decent share of resources
regardless of willingness to work. But mor<1l hazard comes into the equation
here as going to the cost of holding indivi d uals h;trmless. Dworkin obviously
relies on the prediction that , because perso ns could self-qu~dify for this form of
compensation ond, arguably , opt out of P''ying positive premiums by Ltiling to
12
generate any income whatsoever, i the working population \voulcl have to
devote too many resources to paying the premiums to bankroll the insured
event. Workers would have to pay oppressive taxes and governments would
slight other worthy projects so that able-bodied persons could choose to stop
.
I 'S
workmg. To decide that voluntary unemployment v.:oulcl not be made an insurable
event within Dworkin's paradigm requires us to conclude that persons would
not commit themselves to paying the taxes necessary to make the system work
if offered the option under hypothetical conditions of partial ignorance about
their individual economic fate. We must conclude that rationally prudent
persons would not vote for an unconditional basic income sufficient to support

125
The relatively small number of people who fell above the (substantial) kvcl of earning power
guaranteed by the insurance rule would have to work that much harder and longer just to keep up the premium
payments (which would be collcctccl as taxes on earnings to fund compensatory payments to others who were
not so talented).
126
DwoRKIN. supra note 51. at 97.
127
Presumably everyone would have to devote some portion of their original allotment of resources. or
returns from investing !heir allotment. or some portion of their earnings. to paying these premiums. but mosl
persons who elected to take advantage of the option to be unemployed would necessarily be unable to pay their
share directly. Altematively. the requirement that everyone pay. by necessarily requiring that everyone work
to raise the premiums, would seem to ncgalc tile very possibility of any voluntary unemployment
compensation whatsoever.
The problem with this conclusion is that it proves too much: The requirement that all persons actually
pay the same premium on every type of insurance regardless of \\·hether they qualify for a payout or not would
seem to rule out insurance against forms of brute luck (such as profound handicaps) that obviate work
aliogether for the very persons who are the targeted beneficiaries. It would rule out insurance for involuntary
unemployment as well. It is unlikely that Dworkin would agree with this result. But then there is no reason
not to consider making insurance available for a lack of resources that is self-imposed.
12 S '"ce DWORKII'\, supm note 51. at IOL 335-40 !discussing !he ··morai hazard"' involved in
unemployment insurance).
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dl rhos•: who elected to be idl e or to wo rk less hard than necessary to ach ieve
bas ic self suffic iency . But if this conclusion is ground ed in cost co ncerns. it is
ope n to question.
As ex plained earlier. the fi sca l and distributi onal
conseqw.:nces of offeri ng a bas ic inco me th at makes it feasibl e to work less or
not at ~ill i:.; ultimately an empirical qu estion. What happens depends on how
peop le \\ ill ac tuall y react if o ffered a minimum inco me guarantee . Thi s is a
fun ct ion of co ntin ge nt fact s Jbout human psyc hol ogy, cultural norm s and
values. th e :;tate of the econ omy, and marke ts fur labor. ,'\ny prediction that
this form uf ins urance \\' ill not be chosen by hypoth etical actors becau se. g ive n
the pd r~tnicf e r:. ·.vithin which free markets uper<ttc. it will s1mpl y prove too
cos tl y --~ t prL
'diction upon which Dworkin must ultimatel y rely- is not
grou nclcd in an y principled distinctions betwee n opti on luck and brute luck,
cho ice <Jncl chance. or endowme nts versus tastes. and indeed has nothing to do
w ith those categori es . Rath er, it is ultimately based on projections abou t realwo rld behavior unde r a syste m of allocation that, because it permits se lfAs such. it is vuln erable to a
qualificati on. generates moral ha za rd.
demonstrat ion that the magnitude and costs of the moral hazard will not be as
large as feared. A nd if they are not so large, th en optin g for in surance against
the choice not to work or to work less might not be such a bad be t afte r all.

Thi s obse rvation points to a deeper tensio n in Dworkin' s analysis and
hi ghli ghts the pote ntial di sco nnect betwee n the res ults yie lded by the
hypot heti ca l insurance devi ce and the egalitarian assumptions fro m which he
see ks to deri ve just princi ples of resource di stributi on. On th e on e hand.
Dworkin seems to rul e insurance for option luck off limits ahead of time on the
ground that tax in g everyone to pay for the poor outcomes of some people's
voluntary choices is unfair and disturbs equa lity as between persons "over
entire li ves .'' On the other hand, in considering which social welfare policies
just soc ieties should adopt, Dworkin does not reject in surance against willful
un empl oyment (tantamount to a guaranteed income) out of hand as violating
eq uality principles. Rather, he relies on the conclu sio n th at this type of
guarantee wi ll never be made on grounds of cost. But, as noted above, it is not
clear what those costs will be. Although Dworkin resorts to the insurance
paradigm as an alternative dev ice for sorting out borderline cases of brute and
opti on luck and for identifying which brute lu ck outcomes just soc ieties should
compe nsate . his analysis ends up begging the question of why equality
princip les sho uld stand in the way of insurance for all types of lu ck or even for
th'~ de liberate expression of preferences. Dworkin never makes clear why the
hypothetical insurance inquiry shoul d not operate as a universal cri terio n for
soc ial responsibility-that is, why the consen sus of imparti al rational actors
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sho uld not be the sole and ultimate test of whether soc ial compensation sh,tll
be due for contingenc ies of any kind.
If hypothet ical decisicn1liu kers
co llectively decide to buy th emse lves the freedom not to \V Ork when and if
th ey choose-and are wi llin g and able to pa y for th e privilege-wh y alic)\v
equ ality principles to stand in the way'>
Dwo rkin's in suran ce dev ice wea kens hi s initial categori cal pos iti on th ~tt
npt ion luck can neve r permit gro up compen satory action in th e inte:·,_':;t:-:
of JUSt ice because th ere are good reaso ns why hypot het ica l insurers m'' Y ,;k :~ t
111 ex tcncl protection aga in st the co nsequences of at least so me kinds of ch :Jic:•:s .
/\ !though Dw·orkin sugges ts that justice requires governmen ts to hold p•: r-;o:h
harmless only for brute mi sfortunes for which no privctte in suranc:: is ct va ii ctb! e
or can feasibly be obtained, in su rance in the real world is not confined to b r ut~
luck. Private in surance and governmen t ass istance are availetble ag ai!lSl
outcomes that reflect differential "option luck," including bad bu si11 <:ss
dec isions (as vvith bankruptcy protection), des truction of property continge nt
on calculated choices (as w ith insurance for property located in !loocl zo nes)
and self-intlicted health ri sks and injuries (as with medical insurance). But if
the latter eventualities can be covered through private markets or real-world
political choices, why not by idealized collectives? As already noted, the link
betwee n human dec isio ns and their outcomes is highly variable. Since
ordinary commercial in surance routinely covers choices that turn out badly.
thi s suggests that insuring against more or less controll ab le ri sks is not always
prohibitive or infeasible on grounds of cost.
ft~ !l e d

Thu s, the explanation for why hypothetical insure rs will not cover opti on
luck-and would never cove r voluntary unempl oyment- cannot be th <l t :'uch
insurance will necessarily prove cripplingly expe nsive . Although moral
ha zard can render some form s of insurance prohibitive ly costly, that is not
always the case because moral hazard is not all or nothing, but is often a matter
of deg ree . Just as instances of unalloyed brute luck are few and far betw ee n,
so ri sks of events over which beneficiaries ha ve no control whatsoe ver are th e
exception rather th an the rule. And eve n when insureds have a high degree of
co ntrol over the insurable event, the effects of mora l hazard may be se lflimiting. The fact that we could make some choices that wou lcl impose large
cos ts on others does not mean that we will make th em because negati ve
consequences that are not fully compensable restrai n us. People can choose
whether to smoke or not. Yet many people will not smoke regardless of
whether health insurance covers lung cancer becau se the benefits of health
coverage do not make up for th e unpleasantness of dying yo ung from a rapidly
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fata l disease . As al read y noted, AFDC was hi sto ri call y ava ilable to an yo ne
who tool\: the steps necessary to become a poor sin g le pare nt. Althou g h the
AFDC ro lls ::::rnv over the dec ades, the numbe rs never exceeded a small
minority of f:1~n iliesJ ''' Lil,::ew ise, a uni ve rsal insurance fun d to co ver the cos ts
of pa id parent<li k;\ vt~ hardl y loo!,::s like " rea l" insura nce beca use peo ple can
0
eas ily self-qualit y Cur be ne rits by e lect in g to rcproc! uce ." Yet s uc h a prog ram
is unlike ly to raise <. he birth ra te because fac tors ot he r than j ob be nefits loon;
13
f<tr lmge r in the ck,:ision w hether to have a ch il cl . ;
In the same vein. the costs of cove ring vo !u nt<try nonwo rk m ay be selflimiting if mo;;t p,.::,; p k:·s rewards fro m working a n~ large eno ugh and most
people value those n:w:mls. As already noted, th at cou ld occ ur if most jobs in
th e eco nomy offe red compensation we ll ab ove the s ubsistence leve l, and b::tsic
income was set no htgher thiln that. In th ose ci rc ums tances, the answer to the
qu esti o n whether the re will be too m any free lo aders and not eno ug h "suckers·'
to keep the syste m arloat is '· pro babl y no t. " Th e s tate 's coe rc ive power to tax,
in combination w ith the rewa rds ava ilable o n the market, w ill lure (o r bri be)
large numbers of peop le in to the "suc ke r" ro le by m aking an offer they ca n't
refuse: to transfer some of the ir earnings to others as the pri ce of getting ahead .
T hat deal may be ga lli ng, bu t it nee d not be ruin o us. Whethe r a stable and
reaso nabl y prosperou s equilibrium will emerge de pe nd s o n many contin gent
social fac ts. N o defi ni tive answer can be gleaned from th e hypothe tica l
pa rad igm Dworkin has dev ised.

12

~ Sec di sc ussion Sllf'W p. 17 (sei Li ng o ut fac tors lim il ing .. self-qu ali fi ca ti o n·· fo r A FDC ) .
Sci!. e.g .. R ICIIARD .'\. EPST EIN. FOR BIDDEN GROUN DS: TilE CASE AGA INST E MPLOYME.'T
OI SC RI~IINATin'l L\WS .136-37 I I 992) (assert ing I ha t a n ins uran ce scheme cove ring preg na ncy woul d not he
sustain<1bk as it wo uld lead tu a ris e in costs in excess o f bcnd l ts). Rur see Sa mue l Iss ac h<u·off & E lyse
Rose nblum. Wo!!len IIIli! rhc \Vorkf'loce: Acconunodaring rhe Demands n.f PregnontT. 94 COL. L. R EV. 2 154.
22 14 ( 1994) !propos ing su ch a soc ia l in su rance sc he me) .
13 1 Coun tries with ge nerous paid parenta l leave po li c ies have amon g the lowest b inh rates in th e world.
See. e.g .. U.S. Bureau of the Census. IDIJ Su111!narv Dcl!lograf'liic Dora/("· Del!lug rap!Jic !ndicoro rs: 2000 and
2025 ( list ing Sweden · s birth rare ar 1.5 ch ildre n per wo man , Netherlands s a t 1.6 , Germa ny·s at 1.4. a nd lta ly ·s
a t 1.2). ur h ttp://www.ce nsus .go v/ipc/ww w/ id bnew. html (last v is ited Oct. 30. 2002): U.S. Bu rea u of the
Census . Report WP/!JS . World Po pu lat io n Pro ti le: I 998 (U.S . Go vernme nt Prin ti ng O ffi ce . WasiL D .C. 1999 )
(repo11ing that suc h European cou nt ries have a decl ini ng birth rate, far lowe r than less-deve loped coun tries and
lower than even the rep laceme nt rate necessa ry to s ustai n popul ati o n lev els ), at htt p://w ww .census.gov/
ipc/www/wp98.ht ml (last visited Oc t. 30. 2002 ). Nevertheless , so me Euro pea n countries a re instituting
pare mal preference po lic ies in an ancmpt to offset the d ec line in birth rates. See, e.g. Kajsa Sunds trom . Con
Gnt·cm!nenis Influence Popu/orion Grmvr!J ?. OECD O BSERVER. Dec. 4. 200 I. at h ttp://www.oecd obscrver
org/news/full story.php/aid/563/Can_go vc rn m.:nts_ intluence_popu lati o n_g row lh_ . html (last visited O c t. 30.
2002) (disc uss in g Swede n ·s use o f ge ne rous parental bcncilts and improv ed chil dca re to raise th e birth ra te):
U.S. Orllce of Pe rso nne l iv!anagcme nt. Report to C o ngre ss on Paid Parenta l Leave . No v. 21. 200 1. t il
http ://w w\\. Opm.gov/oca/le:l\ e/ I-ITi'vi L/Pare nta iReport.ht m (last v isited Oct. 30. 2002).
!;O
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As noted, this suggestion that it might sometimes oe feasibie to w arram
collective ly against some choices and their consequences simply highli g hts the
instability of the categories of brute and option luck and undermines the
suggestion implicit in Dworkin's analysis that justice requires compensation
for brute luck only (and then only to a limited extent). If justice consists of
allocations that would be chosen ex ante by actors using the hypothetical
insurance scheme. then compensation for some types of option luck may
sometimes be what justice requires.
lncleecl. it is unclear why insurance
choices macle in the hypothetical situation should not be the all-purpo~;e
criterion for whether society should compensate people for bad outcomes of
any kjncl. whether from hrute or option luck. Since most human decisions.
whether prudent or reckless, involve g<tmbles, there seen1s to be no reason why
hypothetical actors would categorically rule out protecting themselves against
choices that go sour or carry costs. With its ultimate reliance on the bottomline criterion of rational actors' willingness to wager and pay, Dworkin's
hypothetical decision-making scheme opens the door, at least potentially. to
1
insurance against outcomes of all sorts of luck, option as well as brute. "
Dworkin's insurance device thus undermines the suggestion that failed option
luck never permits collective compensation in the interests of justice.
1

''

With respect to the choice between work requirements and guaranteed
income, hypothetical insurers might choose to warrant society's members
against the risk of having to work at dead-end, burdensome jobs-a risk that
would turn out to be particularly onerous for the lazy and untalented. Even
more boldly, the group might wish to secure to its members the possibility of
1 4
playing the footloose Bohemian or the dreamy surfer off Malibu. '
Once

IJ 2 See. e.g .. GOODIN. SUJ>m note 58, at 300 (arguing that failure to extend compensation in some cases
where deliberately chosen courses of action lead to hac! outcomes .. would constitute a morally improper ..
decision); Anderson, SliJiru note 29, at 309 (criticizing Dworkin·s option and brute luck distinction and
hypothetical insurance scheme): Goodin. supru note 58. at 585 (making an expectations argument in which
unlucky risk-takers may not deserve to suffer as much as they do): Shiffrin, SUJ>ro note 38, at 4 (concluding
that ··measures of accommodation·· in which society absorbs some of the costs of others" free choices would
help achieve and maintain a ··full, meaningful freedom'" and would foster tolerance of disparate lite choices).
1.13 Indeed, one of Dworkin's reasons for adopting this device appears to be to relieve him of having to
decide which form of luck talent clitlerences represent. See DWORKIN . .wpro note 51. at 77; discussion. supru
text accompanying note 77.
134 It can be argued that Dworkin constructs his hypothetical paradigm in a way that excludes the
possibility of a collective choice to support the involuntarily unemployed through a basic income guarantee: he
establishes that the hypothetical actors know their personal talents and pret'erences , but ;u·e unaware only of the
market value of those characteristics. See id. at 94. It would violate the terms of his paradigm to permit
decisionmakers to be ignorant of whether they arc leisure-loving or work-averse. But if everyone knew
whether· he would personally prefer playing the beach bum to making a killing on Wall Street, everyone would
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aga in, the o bjection th a t thi s \v ill b a nkrupt th e system-that in s urance aga ins t
these options would not be a " good bet"-cann ot form the basis for a
ca tego ri ca l opposition to thi s ru le of allocation nor to its ope rat io n within a ju st
soc iety. We might rati ona lly a nd imp a rti all y c hoose to guara ntee a bas ic
in co me or give up on a pe rfect io ni st wo rk ethic if that com m itm e nt d oes not
prove roo expe ns ive o r req ui re us to s ac ri fice too rn Jn y o th e r m a teria l goJ IS.
The mo re afflu e nt a soc iety, the mo re iike ly th a t th ese as pira ti o ns ca n be me r. "'
It m ig ht be obj ec ted tha t pe r m itting col lective pro tect io n aga in st a n
e xagge rated love o f le isu re or aver:;ion tu wo rk pro ves ton mu c h: if society
e lects to co mpensat e fo r th e:-;c ··ex Jx nsivc tastes. " why not a ll ot h<:rs'! If we
hol d ha rm less for th e des ire to be free of work. on w hat bas is do we de ny
resou rces to indulge the who le ra nge o r other des ires'! But th e point o f the
insu rance hypothe tic al is that it re li eves us of the nee d to co m e up w ith a
p rinc ip led way to distin g ui s h <tmo ng des ires a nd choices other rhan on the
basis of how much money indulg ing rhose cho ices will cost, as th a t is assessed
ahead of time unde r a ra nge of poss ibl e co nd iti o ns. Dec is io nm a ke rs mu st
re ac h a co nse ns us that looks to th e valu e o f op ti ons to the gro up's members
a nd the predicted burde ns com pe nsa tion wi ll im pose. T he choice-based
sat isfac ti o n of preferences th at are judged more va lu a bl e and prove less costly
w ill be th e ones the group will elect to guarantee. Alth ough this formulation
ra ises aw kward question s abo ut h ow the judgme nts o f va lu e will be made , the
po in t st ill h old s th at the me re fac t of moral h azard is not a n a priori bar to
insu rance unl ess w e s mu gg le in the no rm a ti ve ass um pti o n that bankrollin g
ce rta in c ho ices reall y is inun orol o r unfa ir. But if o ur aim is to dete rmin e
w he th e r co llec ti ve support for th e vo lunta ril y idl e is co ns iste nt o r incons is te nt
w ith princ iples of justice, the conc lu s io n should no t be ass umed .
T hi s analysis sugges ts th at a h ypotheti cal fra me w ork th a t attempts to
d e te rmin e what impartial ratio na l actors would in s ure th e mselves again st
co ll ec ti ve ly yields no categori ca l a nswer to our qu es ti o n whe ther suspending

k now whether the insurance rule wou ld favo r h im over ot he rs. T ha t knowledg e would pres um ably negate the
clemen t o r impart iality that is key to the va lidi ty o r the hypo thetica l d ev ice , thus tainting a ny d ec isio n
regard ing basic inco me. But Dwo rkin 's cond itio n th at we know o ur prefe re nces, incl ud ing o ur pre fe re nces
regard ing work. j ust begs the q ues ti o n of why \\' C should no! be ke pt in the dark about o ur actu al tas tes,
regard less of whe th er we h a ve some ro le in sha ping o r indu lgi ng them. Th e que sti o n comes dow n, on ce aga in,
to wh y we wo ul d on prin ciple ru le o ut co ll ect ive compe nsatio n fo r choices that some peopl e, g ive n the ir
make up and prefere nces. mig ht w ish to make.
t:l:i See LEV INE. SUf!rCI note I 8, at 3 1 (sugges tin g that wh ether j ustice req uires the o ffer of a guaranteed
inco me may de pe nd on level of affl ue nce); VAN PMW S, RE AL FR EEDOM FOR ALL , supra no te 6, at 84 (pos iting
that in so me aftlue nt, health y, d ive rse, aclvancecl ind ustri al soci eties of today , a susta in ab le basic in co me ca n
be qui te substantial and eve n exceed what is co ns idered necessary fo r the bare necess ities).

I
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work requirements and guaranteeing basic support fo r everyone constitutes
objectionable free riding in the absence of some prior judgment about the
intrin sic fairness of thi s arrangement. In D\v orkin 's case . that prior judgment
depends on his broader generalizat ion that holding person s to the consequ ences
of avoidable choices (includi ng the choice not to sup po rt onc:;eif by working at
available jobs) i S ··eq ualit y prese rving
-vv ithin a world that allo ws
compensation for brute luc k diffe re ntial s through an income wx sc heme. In
effec t, Dworkin's hypoth etic<tl in surance constru ct ca nn ot help but cycle back
on <t set uf empirical as~u mpti o n~ thctt vary with circum st<litr>:-; an d undermine
the qu est for principkd conc lusions. Unlcc;s \\ 'C <tssu :ne
the guaranteed
inco rnc option is intrin sica lly unfair. the upshot depe nds only e n whether th ere
would be too few work c' rs and too many idl e r ~, which doc~; not seem to be a
matter of fairness at all but rath er of vvh,tt happens whe n individual s act from
self-interest under prevailin g eco nomic condit ions. Th e response is highl y
contingent, which is not the form we hope a fundame ntal principle of
a! locative justice will take. Arg uabl y, then , th e answe r to the question posed in
this Art icle for Dworkin- like the answer for Rawls-is ''it depends.' '

'h'"

C. Von Parijs: Un eorned Assets and ''Real Freedo111for / \!1"
Philippe Van Parijs has written extensively in defen se of a guaranteed basic
1
income and in opposition to conditional forms of clistribution. " ' Van Parijs
begins by identifying "real freedom" as a fundam e ntal good of liberal
soc ieti es . Defined as ''the greatest possible opportuni ty to do wha te ver [one J
137
might wa nt to do," ''rea l freedom" is concern ed not onl y with ''the freedom
to purchase or consume," but more broadl y with "freedom to li ve as one might
1
li ke to live." " Borrowing contrac tarian cle ments from Dworkin and Rawl s,
Van Parijs suggests that th e most desirable society is one that not only secures
basic rights and self-ownersh ip, but also that ·'leximins" real freedom- that is,
that maximizes the minimum amount of real fre edom enjoyed by persons with
the fewest advantages. T he arrangement within a cap itali st system that will
best accomplish thi s obj ecti ve-that is, that will give th e least advantaged
more real options th an any others- is one that provides the highest sustainable
139
basic income for alL
In sum, the imperati ve to maxirnize the minimum
1-' 6 S~e. e.g., VA!\ PA RIJS, REAL FREEDOI.-1 FOR ALL. .IIIJlm note 6; Philippe Van Parijs, Th e Second
J'durriu ge of' JusTice ond Fj)icienC\', in ARC;U JNG FOR BASIC li'iCG:\ IE 2 !5. 227-3 -+ (Phi lippe Van P~u-ij s ed.,
1992).
In V.'\N Pi\RIJS. RF.·\1. FR EED0\1 FOR ALL . .111pm note 6. at 25.
1.1 S
M at 30.
t.1~ !d. at 25 ("'A ba:; ic in come sec ure' to those] with the leas t oppo nuniri e' _ [a set of[ opponunities
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:.unou nt of .. real freedom·· mandates a basic income that
.: huice to make some degree of labor-kisure tradeoff.

lVul. :-12

allow ~;

everyone the

Van Parijs undertakes to defend basic income against the stanclarcl charge
tk1t ~:!locating wealth regardless of work violates principles of reciprocity and

lice1iscs the exploitation of productive persons by idlers. Recalling Dworkin's
.. de :en island .. hypothetical, Van Parij s a:;sigw; to eac h person a pm-r~lLt :;hare
uf [he initial set of undeveloped, external rnaterie1l resources used to generate
\\Cctlth within a capitalist economy. ln addition. e(lCh person is entitled to a
sh;Jn: of i n tr~tstructure and know-how generated by the colkctive e ffort:.; o f
g:: : n,:r<ttiuns , which are the necessary conditions or any present creati on uf
v·; calt h thruugh personal effort or investrnent. Finally. \/ an Parijs \vid:-.?n s thr~
basi s for redistribution even further by identifying jobs as a scarce resourc e
'.vithin capitalist societies. Because there arc not enough desirable jobs to go
ctrouncl. even persons with identical talents may enjoy different packages of
"tctsks and benefits." Those lucky enough to snag the best jobs will earn
undeserved "job rents." These can be legitim::Heiy taxed away and distributed
10
among persons with less attractive positions or with no jobs at all. "
Unconditional redistribution thus does not exploit those who engage in
productive work because no worker can generate wealth without making use of
resources that are earmarked for others. Working people are not entitled to
keep the full product of their efforts , but rather owe compensation to those who
cede th eir shares of collective resources . Granting everyone credit for
.. unearned shares"-inclucling a po11ion of undeveloped natural resources , the
collective products of previous generations· cooperative efforts , and wealth
reflecting a pro-rata share of "job rents"-justifies the transfer of an amount
sufficient to support basic subsistence and secure leximin real freedom.

that are no "nailer than those enjoyed by the person with lea-;r opportunities under :my other feasible
~trr:mgcmcnt.'').

See. e.g .. Robert J. Van Dcr Veen. Reo/ Freedom Versus !lecirrocirY: Compering \liel\s on rhe .!usrice
Bmic /nco111e. 46 PoL. Snm. 140. 152 ( 1998) (explaining Van Parijs·s position that .. ltlhc
opportunity to earn and to enjoy non-pecuniary benellts. by holding a job. now becomes a scarce and
unequally distributed cxtcmal asset .. ). ..Thus, in the real world. equal talent is consistent with an unequal
d istribution of job assets, hence with a distribution of employment at different wages and different durations.
in which some have highly agreeable and remunerative work to do:· while others have .. part-time_ badly paid.
and disagreeable jobs ... !d. See also Scheftler. SIIJJra note 48. at 984-86 (expounding on the '·holistic" idea of
building on antecedent collective resources); Michael Howard. Liberal and Marxist Justifications for Basic
lncomc 14 (paper presented to the First Congress of the U.S. Basic lncorne Guarantee Network. CUNY
Gradu:1te Center. New York) (March 8-9, 2002) (on tile with author) ("1l1e key point is that . although some
wealth and income is due to bbor. some results from the appropriation of external assets which. from the
st:tndpoint clfjustiee. are common, and thus those who appropriate une::rnecl wealth o we compensation to those
who cion·t. which compensation can take the form of unconditional basic income ... ).
!-lil

oi Uncondirionu/
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Like Dworkin, Van Parijs embraces th e concept of ··tuck in variance ."
wh ich holds that indiviclu ai ou tco mes should be inse nsit ive to aspects of talent
th at individua ls cannot control, but se nsiti ve to amb itions that persons may
choose to harbor, cu ltivate. and pursue.
He accepts that persons are
res po nsible for-becau se th ey can shape and control- their tastes and
pre fere nces, and he di savows an y soc ial dut y to com pensate fo r inequa lities
res ul ti ng fro m differe nces in as pirati ons and occupat io nal cho ices . ,L\ 1th ough
he accepts th at tal ents and othe r innate endowments arc umkservecL he
n o n e th '~ less ad voc:ttcs on Iy a Ii mit eel social oblig ation to com rx~n-;a tt: fo;·
1 1
unlucky attributes ' T hi s limited ob ligat ion to make up for b<td lw:k in
endow ments is key to Van Parij s's project. since minimi zin g the duty to hold
peop le harmless for ineq uali ties in fixed attributes such as talents fre es up
reso urces fo r a per capita basic income that achieve s iex imin ·'real fre edom for
all., .
Severa l aspects of Van Parij s's defen se of guaranteed tn come are
pro bl ematic. First Van Parij s's program for expand ing "real freedom for all" is
selective and inconsistent in the way it deals wi th different tastes, preferences .
and aspirations-especially th ose that influence success on the job market and
determine choices for consumption , work, and le isure. This inconsistency is
revealed in Van Parij s' s disc uss ion of ''Lazy" and ''Crazy.'' whom he de scribes
1
as " iden tically talented but rather differently disposed cha racte rs." .Jc As Van
Parij s ex plains. "Crazy is keen to earn a high income and works a lot for that

I-l l Borrow ing fro m an idea tirst elaborated by Bruce Ackerman. Va n Par ijs endorses "a cri ter ion of
j usti ce in matters of interna l endowments" tha t relics o n peop le's freedom to choose among conceptions o r the
good life and thus w assign certain all ri butes more or less va lu e. r\ ccord ing ro hi s test of --und ominatecl
div ersity, .. on ly if no one wou ld prefer a particu lar bundle of allributes to any available al tcm ativ•c is
co mpensation clue. since then those attr ibutes cou ld not be said to fulfi ll any r e ~rso n abk cunccption of the good
life. In sum. if no one would choose a pa rti cula r se t of traits , th ose Jrai ts arc sa id to be "dominated" in all
respec ts. And, as Van Parijs exp lains, such dominance is rare: "[ A I bli nd and deaf sp~ i S iic mav still have ni ce r
hair than some or be better than others at arithmctic. which wou ld be J ee med sufficient to mai;e for a more
fav ourable encl o\\'ment by at leas t one person. give n her concept ion of th e good life... V ..\~ P .-\RIJS. RE .\1_
FREEDO\t FOR A LL. supra note 6. at 73. In sum. if so meone has an endowment that anyone else \\·ould envy.
that person is not entitl ed to be held harm kss for the ir misfortun es in any oth er respec t.
The log ic be hind choosin g th is strict criteri on of "do min ance .. is that. sin ce each perso n is in so me se nse
" res ponsible" for hi s or her concep tion of the good life, the poss ibi li ly thai so meo ne (perso n A) cou ld prefe r 'rn
attri bute possessed by another (perso n B) (a ncl. by ex tensi on . that person B could ha ve chosen to va lue it as
much as ;\. even if he in fact does not), neg at es any claim B might hav e to co mpensat ion for that characlcri sli c.
A de li cit is not a misfortun ate worthy of co mpensation unl ess everyon e rega rd s it as such: the fact that sc,me
do not shows that its statu s as a mi sfortu ne is a subjective matter of taste. Thus. eve n if so me Ira its arc pari of
th e endowmen t that is given to us, ou r judgment of the des irab ility ol· ou r endowme nt s is. in an important
se nse. "optio nal " and thu s not compe nsable.
l-Ie !d.
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pu rpose . Lazv IS far k ss exc ited by the pros pect of a hi gh income anc! has
14
de ci ded to take it easy ... ' In suggesti ng th at a guaranteed income ex pand s
'·real freedom·· (or potential opt ions) for both Crazy an c! Lazy-a nd thu s is
even-hanclec! in th is respect- Van Parij s non ethe le ss dismi sses C ra7y" s
co mplaint th~H thi s ex pan sion comes at hi s expe nse by notin g th at C razy shoul d
14
be "he ld re:;punsihk: fm [h isj tastes'' " T hese tastes inclu de the desire to work
harde r and earn more. However. Van Parij s readil y acknowl edges that the
same "expcn~i\c t~tste .. arg um ent is ava ilabl e again st Lazy' s objection to a
1 10
world with out ha ~ i c incomc. Or. as Brian Barry exp lai ns:
If we c:.:n :e ll peop le with expen sive t~t stes that they might have had
chea p lct\ tcs . ami we regard th at as a suffici ent reas on for dcny i1lg
them ~1ddi ti cln ~tl !\:so urces, why ca nn ot we tell Lazies tha t th ey mi ght
have bee n Cr·az ics. and th at that is a sufficient reason fo r not c u·i ng
whether or not they can satis fy their taste for leisure'' Wh y ca nn ot
, .
.
.
. IJ I,
we say t l1at rctS urc rs an cxpens rve tas te'.1
By definin g real freedom as preserving the option of do ing whatever one
might want to do (w hether or not one harbors th e desire to do it) , and by
definin g th e goal of a liberal society as providing the maximal amoun t of
sust ai nable "real freedom for all ,'' Van Parij s cu shions the harshest
consequences of preferrin g lei s u~·e over hard work and cons umption , thereby
selecti vely suspencli ng res pon sibility fo r one kind of "expensive taste. ,: th e
taste for leisure. Although bas ic income appears to give both Lazies an cl
Crazies an "identical'' option set, its practical effect is to protect Laz ies from
the consequences of their prefere nces and to tax Craz ies for theirs.
Because the goal of evenhandedness as between Lazies an d C razie s is
elusi ve or eve n imposs ible, a principle of neutrality to wa rds different choice
se ts or conceptions of t'Le good life cannot stand as a stable and indepe ndent
147
justification for a program of un condi tional benefits. B ut even if we accept
that ex pandin g options (ra ther th an achi eving preference-dependant results) is
desirable in vindicat ing neutrality towards ideas of the good, basic income
does not necessarily advance that goal.
It is far from clear that an
1-l~

l-1-l
145

/d.
/d. at 93.

See id. at 9-l 1··1La<:y! cannot usefull y po in t out that it is up to Crazy 10 adopt the same easy- going
lifesty le ~to; h i m s~ l r ancl hence that he ca nnot claim to be trea ted unfai rl y at an y level o f the gran t. For under
the assumpt ion or equal ta len ts. Crazy can use exactl y the sam e argument . . : ·(footnote l'm ittcd)).
146
Barry. Sllf'ru note 10. at 263.
14 7
For an cl::horation of the argumen t that basic inco mr; secures neutral ity towa rd s conce pti ons of the
good li fe. se e Lt: V!:\ E. Sllf 'F<l :Hllc 18. at 18-20.
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unconditional income guarantee w ill in fact expand th e potential choices for
different ways of life available to all. Unconditional benefits that permi t more
work-leisure tradeoffs could well curtail possibilities fo r realizing higher kv els
of income by workin g hard er-a cho ice that some persons might value.'"' ft
mi ght make av ailable some opt ions (s urviving by workin g !c .~s or not ai all).
but onl y at the price of e limin atin g others (ge ttin g mu ch richer bv wurking
h<mlc r).

f-inally , however, the problem goes deeper than th e in,tbili ty to justify b~lsic
in co me as a neutral polic y that i ~ equally hospitabl e to different wa:ys of liic.
Rath er, the key is th e challenge of fending off the objection that basic inc umr:
vio lates reciprocitv or is exploitat ive because it ~iv es somethinc: to peopl e whu
1
fai l to contribute t;) th e social product. ~~ Van P~rij s's cli sc u s sic~n rcvcai s tha t it
is as difficult for basic income defe nders to refute th e ex pl oitation objection on
the basis of commonl y held ass umptions as it is for bas ic income opponents to
defend the objection. Critics of basic income cling to the intuition that. eve n
denyin g workers' full entitleme nt to the value th e market ass igns to th eir la bor.
nonworkers can make no c laim to support from society " in the absence of any
1
ret urn to society." "' On thi s view, the abstract assignment of passive credit for
shares of preexisting resources fails to satisfy the bedrock obligation to
co ntribute to the "economic benefits of social cooperation." Rather. this
obligation can be satisfied on ly through some type of active part1c1pati on.
15 1
exe rtion. or exercise of human agency.
Pro-rata shares of material resources
plu s "job rents" thus cannot substitute for affirmati ve contribution throu gh
1
wo rk .''' Van Parij s himself worries endlessl y over thi s objection , ' ' but neve r
11
·'

See. e.g., Barry. Slll>m note 10. at 264:

[T[ axation required to pay for th e basic income is virtually ce rtain to forec lose other cornbinati olh
of income and leisure obtainab le und er a sys tem in which bene fits arc co nditional on vvillingn e"
to work. Anybody who chooses to work a lot will almost certainly find that the net income
derived from a given effort will be less [when basic income is provi clccl[. Thus so me gain and
so me Jose, according to th eir relativ e tastes for income and lei sure. Th e imp licati on is thc rcfn re
that we cannot say that one situati o n has more real freedom in it tha n the ot her.
t-l'l See. e.g., Eu gene V. To ri sky. Jr .. Von Purijs. Rmrls. and Unconditional Basic Income . 53 A0ii\ LY SIS
289. 296 ( 1993 ) (desc ri bi ng a ··minimal cost o f me mbership in soc iety"'); Va n Der Vcc n. su1>m note 1-+0:
Whi te. s1111ro note 27. at 3 I 7-20 (s tatin g the explo it ation objection).
150
Sa Tori sky, supra note 149, at 296.
1 1
:\
White, su1HD note 27. at 3 IS. See ulso Va n Der Vecn, supra note I-+0. at I 55 1discussing White).
152
See. e.g. , White, supm note 27. at 320 (arguing that natural reso urce shares ancljob rents arc stru clllrDI
elements that "clo not originate fro m the efforts of social cooperation; they arc. so w spe ak. the pre-existin g
material on which social cooperators (o ;· non-co operating hermits) go to work""): see olso Gijs Van Dons elaar.
The Benefits of Anoth er"s Pains: Parasiti sm. Scarcity, Basic In come 170-74 11997) (unpublished thesi s.
Univ ersit y of Amsterdam) (o n Iil c with auth or) (c harac terizin g compensat ion ex trac ted for nth crs" use o l·
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definitively refutes it. Rather, he simply rejects its bas ic assumption-that
reciprocity by definition demands a personal effort to create wealth and cannot
be vindicated by passi vel y ass1gnmg credit fo r va lued resources that " no one
1
alive createcl. '· '"
Ulti mately. \fan Par ij s·s endorse n1ent of credit for scarce resource shares.
like his opponents · r\~j e cr i on of th at idea. reli es on intuitive notions of fairnes s
that resi st demon '.;tration through reaso ned arguments from common starting
po ints. The cliffi cu ities inheren t in bridg ing the ga p between th ese positions is
ev ident in cli scu s·; ions of the idea of reciprocity gcner<!ll y, in the confu sion
surrou ndin g the conce pt of exploi ta ti on. an d in the absence of any precise
accou nt of what rec iproc ity entail s for indi vidual obl igati on despite the
repeated embrace Df thar abstract conce pt as a starting point for liberai social
organization. On the one hand , the log ic of lu ck invari ance, holi sm, and eq ual
initial shares-which recognizes th at labor does not "deserve" any particul ar
quantity of the market returns it enjoys- is un assailable. On the other hand,
deep-seated moral sentiments and a revulsion against freeloading are at odds
wi th these insights and uneasil y resist their implications. As the foll ow ing
section explains, the tension between the conclusions derived from the rational
analysis of markets and market-based desert on the one hand, and the generally
hostile reactions of ord inary people to "something for nothing" on the other, is

shar.::s in inert resources "' an .. ahusc: of ri ghts .. ). Bur see Karl Widerq uist. Rcciprociry a nd rile Gua mnrad
!neon: e . 27 POL. & Suc·y 387 . 389 ( 1999) (questi oning whether critics of guaranteed in come can square their
pos iti on with th e defense of c1 .. renti e1· class· and a :;ystcm th at permits .. th e owner of a significant amo unt of
assets ... [to] dc ri,·c a pcnnan.:nt inco me from it without expend ing any persona l effort .. ).
The argument that rej ec ting gu arant eed income is inconsistent wit h letting persons li ve off accumulated
assets is easil y refuted in the case of non-inh erited wealth: whatev er else its value. leisure is also a
co nsumpti on good. and a pe rso n mi ght choose to wo rk , invest. and save m one point in his li fe so as to
purchase le isure for an oth er. Liv ing o ff inh erited wea lth may be more probl emati c. Ho wever, soci eties might
!>till choose to res pect th e co nsumpti on choices of persons who des ire to make a gift of eamed wealth-and
uninten"Lipted leisure---to their ch ilclrcn. even th ough that dec ision will be in ten sio n with recog nizing
eve ryone 's (in clud ing the heir" >) obli gati on to contribu te actively to the soc ial produ ct. TI1at ten sion find s
.:;.; press ion in ambivalent fee lin gs towards th e id le rich, who are often condemned as '"parasites... For a
di scussion ol· attitudes towa rds the idl e poor and idl e rich, see, e. g .. Wax, R ethinking We f/(Lre Rights , supm
note J, at 2S I n. 75 .
153 See Van Parijs. Sll f iW note 36: Philippe Van Parij s, Reciproc iry and rile Jusrijicario n of 011
Unmndiriona/ Basic fncomc!-Reph ·ro Sruarr \Vliire , 45 POL. STUD. 327 ( 1997): see also VAN PARIJ S, REAL
FREEDOM FOR All ., Sl!Ji ro note 6. at I 02 - 13 (discu ss in g pro -rata shares of materia l resources and "'job rents"" ).
15
~ Karl Widcrq uist. Who Exploi ts Who'' 3 (paper present ed at CUNY Basic Income Conference) (M arch
S-9 . 2002 ) (on fik with auth o r). For rece nt wide -ranging criticJI co mmentary on Van PJrijs's arguments, see
ANDR EW RE EVE & J\1"\D REW W tLLI A~ I S . REAL Li B E RTc\R I A!"\ I S~·I ASS ESSED: POLITICAL T HEORY AFTER V,\N
P-\RIJ S (2003).
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no t s urprising . Po li tical th eo ry and po litica l psych o logy eme rge from very
diffe rent proce:;s::::;, which can be expec ted to g iv e di vr2rge nt res ults.
'v' . SOCL\L CONTR ACT VS . EVOLUTION: T HE L ii:) f'A RlTY OF T H EORY
AN D P RACT! Ct:

Attempts to clerive from sorne van atiOn on (h e li h•.:i·al co ntract<l ri an
per:"pccti vc a dchniti\.re ans \ver to th e questinn \v h ~:: i_ h e r prov idi _ng public
:- ~U{Ypo rt "vi th no :;irings attached or i 111pos i ng \\- ~_;r k r~~ q u i:·~: nh~nts for aid is
eithe.r con>~i:-;te~·It •. vi th or requi red by basic principles uf just ice y i ~ ld equ ivocal
re~;u lts. A lthc :; gh rhe wo rk of liberal th eori sts oft .crs vcdu:1ble in sig hts into this
question. a defin itive answer re m ains e lu sive. T he co nc !u:;io n that tran s ferri ng
eam ings hom wo rkers to ab le-bod ied n o mv orkec~ ; i ~; '' unfair," '·unju st, '' or
exp loitative i:: difficu lt to de rive from the build ing blocks for ju st liberal
soc iet ies. S pecific1 ll y, liberal egalitaria ns start from a base line of assignme nt
of equal ini tial reso urce shares , skepticism abo ut dr.;s ert, a commitm e nt to lu ck
in variance that e ntails the o bligation to ho ld persons harmless for unearned
mi sfonu ne, and an ambi vale nce about the status of personal antecedents and
attribute:; (i ncludi ng deficient upbringing, lack of tal ent, and e ven un produ ctive
tempc:ram ent) th at does not c learl y yield a bedroc k ob ligatio n to work for a
li v ing.
Rat her, the theoretical commitments of egal itaria n theo ri sts like
Dworkin , Rawl s, and Anderson would appear to permit, or e ven require,
unco nditio nal suppo rt for all. On the other ha nd , those vvriters ul timately
e ndorse a pe rfectionist work ethic that reflects the c;ame psycho logy of fa irness
do minant in the po li tical are na. After criti c izing in hi s we ll-know n A The 01y
of Jusrice a premarket notion of dese rt and defi nin g there a class of the
disadvantaged that takes no overt acco unt o f perso nal res ponsibility or
antecedents of di stress, Rawls e lse where atte mpts to ru le out an unconditional
income for the leust advantaged-or for anyone- - by addin g le isure, albeit
prov isionall y, to the list of primary goods. Ro nald Dwo rk in defe nds a robust
d ist inction betwee n unavo idable bad lu ck (w hi ch is at leas t potent iall y
compe nsable) and choices for whi ch we are respons ible (w hi c h are not), w ith
th e later appearing to cover the dec ision w hether or not to work at available
j obs . But the inhe rent instabi lity of these categorie s leads him to fall back on a
hypothetica l in suran ce mechanism fo r identifyi ng th e consequences ag ainst
w hich ratio nal actors would coilective ly hole! themselves harmless . Yet that
device does not by its own terms alway s rule o ut insurance again st the
outcomes of adverse cho ices, including th e choice not to work at all. E li zabeth
A nderson rejec ts the luck egalitarian fram ework in fa vor of a society
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co mmitted to providin g for basic needs and securing basic dig nity for al l.
Althou gh she embraces an ethi c of care and disparages th e market a~ an
exc lu sive measure of producti vi ty and worth, she staun chly e nclors(:s the
pos iti on th at co ll ec ti ve ass istance mu st remain co nditional on each pe:·:;on
making so me (undefined) co ntribu tion to the soc ial product. For these \vriters.
as well as for basic inco me aclvoc ttes such as Phi lippe Van Pa rij s. argumenh
in fa vor of placing co ndition s on th e red istributi on of reso urces te nd to
smuggle in uncl erivcd. fo undmi ona l, morali stic ass umptions that rest 011 th<..'ir
own intrin sic appea l. lf th ese com mitme nts are indeed sui generis. tio..::y mu :'t
e ither command our asse nt or fail.
Th e tensio n between theory and political psychology finc.ls specific
ex pression in un certain ties surrounding th e characteri stics possessed by
idea li zed decisio nm ake rs who determine the rul es of our fut ure ex istence.
Dworkin 's hypotheti ca l insurers, for example, are bloodless c rea rur,~s who
harbor no resentment towards free riders, layabouts, or feckl ess Malibu sur fe rs
seek ing to share resources with hard workers.
Dwork in 's pru de nt
dec isionmakers are not endowed with reacti ve attitudes or moral se ntiments ,
and they have no permi ss ion to indul ge their notions of dese rt by giving free
reign to high dudgeon or righteous indignation towards slacke rs. Good
evidence exists th at fealty to elemental norms of cooperati on, and the
spontaneo us te ndenc y to punish and reward th ose who honor or defy them. are
155
Yet th ose impul ses are bani shed
a commonplace of hum an ps yc hology .
from th e scene. These omission s should not surprise us. Contractari an
theorists do not seek to discove r principles of justice th at simply re iterate
ordinary attitudes and impulses, but rather to identify the mora l and pol itical
views th at can be justified by buildin g ideas of justice from th e ground up.
Since the entire exerc ise proceeds from the ass umption th at "a po litic al theory
need not or should not track the familiar structure of our persona l moralit y and
15
ethics," " th ere is no guarantee that what most people believe abo ut justi ce w ill
co rres pond to th e rul es adopted in hypothetical circum stances . Rath e r, the
point of the analysis wo uld appear to be to distance ourselves from pre va iling
opinions ancl to sit in judgment upon them by testing their va lidity agai!!st a
structure that rests on a few (selt·-ev ident) elements . Becau se an analysis that
" incorporate[s] common opinion" ca nnot be ex pected to "ex pos[e] the
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See e.g .. Fch r & Gacht er. Alimistic Punislunenr in Hum ans. S llfJW note 8. at 139 (contend in g that
negati ve emo ti ons propel puni shm ent of free riders); Sigmund et a!., supra note 8. at 87 (e xpl aini ng the
success of altrui st ic be hav ior over se lfish beh avior in group experiments as a fun ction of Darwin ian thcn ry).
156
0\\'0RK I'i. Sllf'W note 5 I , at 297 (d iscussing G.A. Cohen's views).

I

65

SOiVIF:THING FOR NOTHING
157

inadequacies of common opinion," the temptation is to leave basic intuitions
and emotions-including emotional responses that inform the very notions of
rairness we wish to scrutinil.e-out of the equation altogether.
Yet how strong a claim to validity do resulting principles of justice possess
if they fly in the f<tc1.' or precepts and norms-such as the norm against the type
of free riding that <tppropriates the effortful contributions of others-that are
widclv shared across eras and cultures and so intuitivelv seductive that thev
confound the logic of sophisticated thinkers? As Rawls himself has recognized
in expounding on hi'; notion of "reflective equilibrium." rules for the operation
of just ,;ocieties cannut stand in complete isolation or OtJposition to "certain
fu ndamental ideas seen as implicit in the public political culture of a
democratic society .. '
Rawls's paradigm of the original position charges
future citizens ·with the task of outlining a fundamental framework for society's
governance behind a veil of ignorance. He suggests that if the principles that
emerge from behind the veil run contrary to "reactive attitudes" or intuitive
convictions that "we take provisionally as fixed points." then we should not
15
accept those principles uncritically. 'J
Rather we should engage in the
follmving deliberative process:
0

0

0

1

By going back and forth, sometimes altering the conditions of the
contractual circumstances, at others withdrawing our judgments and
conforming them to principle, I assume that eventually we shall find
a description of the initial situation that both expresses reasonable
conditions and yields principles which match our considered
10
judgments duly pruned and adjustecl. "

The potential dissonance between Rawls's seemingly inclusive and
nonjuclgmental definition of the least advantaged entitled to solicitude under
the difference principle, and a strong, intuitive norm against collective support
of the "undeserving poor," poses the type of dilemma to which the doctrine of
reflective equilibrium would appear designed to respond. But how would
Rawls decide to reconcile this tension? Does the process of reflective
deliberation that Rawls describes point to a definitive answer to the question
here clescribecl'7
Or is the answer that there is no one answer-that

tv11LLLR. Sl!j)rO note 33. at 52.
RAWLS. Slif!W note 93. at 13. Sec ul.1o KYrviLIC:KA. supra note 67. at 66-67 (noting Rawls's view that
the principles of justice derived from the original position should be scrutinized to sec if they "match our
c·onsidcrccl convictions l'fiuslicc or extend them in an acceptable way"" quoting RAWLS, supm 45. at 19).
lsY R ,I\ILS . .IIIJJro 45. at 20.
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fundame nta l ju stic e ca n be squ ared w it h offering ''something fo r nothi ng" or
with less generous aiTange ments')
An a lternati ve that sidesteps th e th o rn y difficulties of apply ing the c once pt
of re fl ective eq uilibriu m loo ks to Raw ls's framework for the ori ginal po sitio n.
and ask s what ki nds of attitudes the hypothetica l denizen s of that rea lm are
pern, it ted to possess . It is gene ra ll y acc epted that our j uclg ments from behind
the ve il sho uld be ·'impartia\''- th a t is. th ey sho uld be un affe c ted b y o ur
.
. no ran ce
parocn' u. ;' ano' se j c1 1sn' pe rso na j conc ,~m ~; . 11>1 T, 'ne requireme
nts o t- Ig
J bou t ind i\' iclual circ urns tan ccs and of co nsens us a mong all partic ip ant s u r~~
d e ~'ig rc ecl to :;afeg uard th is imparti a li ty ~mel pro t<
::ct deliberati ons from the tai nt
of narrow self- inte rest. But that stil l leaves the q uestion of wh ic h eleme nts of
hu man psychology sho ul d be allowed to ope rate co nsistent with that c onstrai nt.
S peci fi ca ily, wh ic h common hum an emotions and attitudes are creat ures
162
behind the ve il of ig norance ail owed to possess'?
On th e o ne hand, if we
want to sit in judgme nt on po puiar views of justice for the purpose of
con stru cting our ideal o f justi ce . we might be well-advised to factor o ut
une laborated norm s and moralistic sentiments and indeed to ba ni sh emo ti o na l
re sponses e ntirely. O n the other hand , it is hard to believe that Raw ls' s
"refiecti ve equilibrium" would reco mmend purging all intuitions, reactio ns ,
and fee lings about fa irness , if on ly because it is hard to see how a soc iety
arrayed aga inst all such responses co uld stand . But even if we want our fin a l
vision of the just soc iety to refl ec t sympathi es and understandings th at are
deepl y fe lt and w ide ly shared, ho w clo we dec ide which reac ti o ns shoul d be
indul ged? Specificall y, should hypothetical rm ional actors be permitted to
harbo r and act upo n the k inds of " m orali stic sentime nts" and " reactiv e
atti tudes'' that ex press a n abhorre nce of free ridin g?
O ne way to approach the qu estio n might be to observe tha t judg me nts
about the fairnes s of "something for nothin g" take the fo rm of ge neral,
uni versali zed standards fo r conduc t--standards th at, at least as stated , apply
across the board and de mand adhe rence from all. If such attitudes tran sce nd
immedi ate self-in terest and express catego ric a l, exceptio nl es s v iews of

161 Sa MILLER, supra note 33 . at 57 (obse rving !ha t R" wb 's adherence Io a form o f con lract" rian
reasoni ng requires qualit ies such as impart ial it y so th:ll no unreaso nable burd ens will be created ): BaiTy. supro
note 10. at 262 (d isc us sing imp"11iali ty as an id ea l ofjus ti ce).
162 CJ [\'IiLLE R. S!lf'rrl note 33 , at 55 (sugges tin g that the "beli efs about justi ce .. . th:1t dese rve tu be
inciudc' cl as ·cons idered judgments ... are th ose un affe cted by ··our em oti ons or by ou r perso nal interests" ). Th e
suggesti on here in , holl-cvc r. is that not al l emotions vindi ca te personal interes ts al one, and thus so me might be
a va lid basis for just rul es.
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accep table behavior, th at \voulc! appear to satisfy the test of impartiali ty rhat i s
esse ntial to the integrity of the dec ision-makin g process behind the veil or in a
1
hypothe tical situation. "' f-\ lte rnatively, a key factor might be whether \Ve can
show that the reacti ons at issue are innate e lements of h um an psychology or
common th reads in diverse cu ltures-that we bri ng the m w ith us as human
beings rather than as contin::~e nt or mall ea ble products of particuh:r soc ial
•
J(,_J
settmg s.
T hese queri es tie into a iong:s tanding debate about w hether our morcd lives
are best organi zed aro lln d norms derived from abs tract reas o ning \·i\L iwut
guidanc e from natu ra l en~otions , or whether moral sentiments
:u be
primary . r,, That debate is di rectly pertinent to how we go about judging the
fai rn ess o f wcwk expectations with in contractarian frameworks . As already
noted, there is evidence that basic ideas about desert are deeply entrenched and
widely shared elements of hu man psyc hology and cu lture. The que stion of
w ho deserves p ubl ic assistance ou t of poo led collective reso urces, if framed
with sufficient gene ral ity, e li c its a re markable consens us . Not many take iss ue
w ith the proposition that indiv iduals should strive towards se lf support if
possible and should be g iven he lp only if unabl e to sustain themsel ves despite
1
reaso nable efforts. "" A lth o ugh there is disagree me nt about what efforts are
reasonable, those who see k or receive group help in violation of the agreedu pon conditions almost a iways risk coll ect ive d isapproval as free ri ders .
1

How these bas ic paradigms fo r determining desert and e ntitleme nt ought to
f ig ure in any contractarian ana lys is will in part de pe nd on o ur v ie ws of the
origins of the consens us and on where these attitudes come from . S uppose, for
example, that we credit an evo lut ionary account, w hic h suggests that h um an
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See, e.g .. GtLENS. supra no te 33 : MILLER. suJml note 33: Barry . supra note 10 (emph as izing

i mparti ality).
1 4
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See Wax, !?crhin kin g We/jim· Rig/us, supm note 3, at 266-6tl (rev iew ing support for the view that

so rnc momli sti c atti tudes mi ght have C\'o l ved ~• s innate i'eatures o f ou r psychology or as common eicm•: nts in
con vergent c ult ural evo lut ion): see also RUUI N. supra note

8 (arguin g for evol utio nary origi ns o f

;m, r~:l i s t ic

human se nt iments); ELLI OT SOBER & D AV ID SLOAN W ILSON, U NTO OTHE RS 150-5 I ( I Y98) (suggesting that
abhorrence o f free riding m ay be a key fea ture o f successful culwres and soc ial groups) .
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Compare D AV ID 1-i Uo-IE. A TREATISE OF 1-i Uo-IAN NATURE 5 I 7 (L.A. Se lby- Bigge eel .. I 978) (t heo ri zi ng

that any co ncept of abstract reason actu GI! y ste m s from preceding "passio ns" such that '·[alii morality depends
upon ou r sentiments"). ll'ith IMMANUEL K i\NT, TilE METAPHYSI CS OF M ORALS 376 (iVl ary Grc_c! or trans.. 199 \)
("[ Ni o moral principle is bas et.! . . on anyjeding \\hatsoever . . .' ') .
166 Sec, e.g., Gil.ENS. supra note 33 , at 62-64; fi'IILLER, supm note 33, at I 76; Bowles & Clinti s, Sll f >UI tlllte
34: Ga lston, SIIJ!ra note 25: Wa x. Rethinking We/ji1re Ri;;hts. supm note 3, at 270-73 ; Stuart White. Sociu!
l?ights anti the Sociol Conrrocr- l'oliticul TheorY anti rile New We!firre Polirics. 30 BRtT J. PoL. Set. 51.!7 . 50S
(2000).
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soc ieties that minimized shirkin g enjoye d greater stab ility and reproductive
and material success. Social disapproval of freeloading , and the tendency to
di sdain and punish tho se who violated cooperati ve norms, helped enforce
167
behaviors that may have conferred a n adaptive advcmtage .
By showing wh y
it might ha ve been advantageou s fo r g roups tu suppress freeloading behav iors.
thi s story s ho ws how the te nd e nc y to reac t nega li\·e !y to variou s forms of free
ridin g may have become firml y roo ted in hum an c ulture and psyc holog y .
If these habits of thinkin g are indeed widespread and robust features of
o rgan ized human societies, this may help e \p L\in why o rdin<try notion s of
''d esc rv ingn css' ' that fuel demands for "wor~ fur welhtre'' may be hard to
reason with. Jt is difficult to arg ue persons uut o t· th e position that work
requirements are "only fair" eve n vv hen they accep t basic propositions and
ins ig hts that point in a differe nt direc tion. Th e arguments that a ll productio n
builds on unearned antecedents, that everyone be nefits from unrec iprocatecl
gifts, that components of productive valu e ca nnot be re lated in any coherent
way to market reward s, and that paid labor is not th e o nl y form of contribution ,
often fail to make headway again st allegiance to the morol duty to be selfsufficient if possible, and against moml condemnation of unnecessary
dependency on others.
The evolutionary account can potentially shed light on why our intmt10ns
about free riding, exploitati o n, and deservingn ess appea r fundamental and
res ist derivation from the ass umpti o ns that Iiberal theo ri sts take as their starting
points. If we cannot get there from here , perhaps it is because contractarian
hypoth eticals fail to capture the co ndition s that gave ri se to the bas ic s tructure
of our moral sentiments. Evolutionary force s operate through the re petition of
dynamic processes that pi t individuals or groups w ith disparate behavioral
strategies against one another in round after round of competition . These
forces, which play themselves o ut over time and often yield counterintuitive
16
re sults, are best captured by dynamic, iterative mocle ls. s The logic of

167 For such an evol utionary accoun t. see Bow les & Ginti s. supra note 35: Wax. A Reciprocal We/j(u·e
Program , supra note 3, at 478 -79; Wax Rerhinking \Ve/f(tre Rigllfs. SUfJW note 3, at 266-68: see a/sa SOBER &
WILSON, supra note 164; DAVID SLOAN WILSON, DARW IN' S CATHEDR AL 156 (2002) (suggest ing that religion
deve loped universally to curb free-ridin g).
16R See Wax, Rerhinking Welfare Righr.1·, .\'1/pm note .3. at 263-7-l (detailing Sugde n' s multi-round, mutu al
in surance game and applying its prin cip les to grour members who hav e access to labo r markets); see ulso
RU BIN, sut>m note 8, at 11-13 (discussing dynamic game theoreti c models of evo lutionary development):
ROBERT SUGDEN. THE ECONOM ICS OF RI GHTS. CO-OPER,\TION, r\ ND WELFA RE 8-9 ( 1986) (describing
repetitive games to illustrate the evolutionary crea ti on of "spontaneous order"). For a co mprehensive review
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evo lutionary development is fundamentally at oclcl s with th e static , on e-shot
thought experiments th at liberal theorists favor. The method of choice fo r
mimicking evolutionary forces is game theory, not a sin gle, iclealized, anal yti c
exerci se conducted by rati onal ac tors placed behind a ve il of ignorance or in an
origiml or hypotheti ca l pos itio n or on a pri stin e desert island . There is no
reason to beli eve th at the logic ofju sti ce that e merges from th e hum an rnin d ·s
evo luti on ove r tim e and und er inte nse competiti ve press ure would coinci de
11
with th e basic prin ciples that iss ue from contrac tari an co nstru cts. "' T hi s is
espec iall y so becctuse th e psyc ho logy that informs our noti ons of justi ce was
forge d under conditi ons tha t are ve ry different from th ose that prevail today .
Our se ntiments evol ved tu hold together voluntary coo perative structures of
mu tual support under con di tions of great ri sk and scarcity. Small- scale
coo perative form s of soc ial orga ni zation domin ated human soci eties for eo ns.
long before strong ce ntrali zed gove rnm ents and large political units came upon
17
the scene . n Yet th e ex istence of such centrali zed gove rnme nts is prec ise ly
what th eori sts take for gr::m ted in con structing th e ideal sce narios from which
they deri ve modern liberal theori es of justice .
An account from evolved psychology suggests that any analytic fram ework
th at leaves certain rn oral sentiments completely aside may do violence to the
bas ic intuitions that mos t people bring to moral judgments. On the other hand,
the consensus on th ese iss ues is far from complete. Theori sts such as Robert
Goodin and Philippe Van Parij s, who are pass ionate believers in basic income,
depl ore the applicati on of conve ntional notions of deservingness in th e realm
171
of public welfare. That th ese thinkers and other bas ic income advocates have
managed to ove rcome any impulse to deplore free ridin g and unnecessary
dependency su g:ges ts that these norms, ho wever w idespreacl, are not
ineluctable. They may be amenable to modification through the emergence of
counter-norms and new cultural conventions or by the simple use of reason .

of work on co tn put c·r si mu la tion' of hum an soc i al interac ti o ns. see Jonath an Ra uch, Seeing A ro und Comers.
A TLANTIC l'vlONTIIL Y, Ap r. 2002.
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Fo r discussio ns o f the rc l ali o nshi p betwee n mo ral and po l iti ca l th eory and evolut io nary psyc hology.

see RI CHA RD A LEX,\NDER . T i lE B IOLOGY OF MORAL SYSTE,'v!S ( 1987); RUil iN, supra note 8 and sources cited
therein . at 72 -75; M ichae l Ruse , Mora/in· and Commitmellf, in EVOLUTION AN D THE C AP.-\CITY FOR
CO,'vli"vi!HIENT ( Randolph M. Nesse cd., 2000); PETER SI NGER, A D ARWIN IAN L EFr: POLI"fi CS. E VOLUTION AND
COOPERAT IOF\ (2002 ).
I /O

See CHRISTOPHER BOEHl\!, HI ERARC HY IN THE FOR EST: T HE EVOLlJTIOi\ OF EGALITARIAN BE HAV IOR

(I 999) (des cribing organi zati on of ancient hunter-gatherer groups); R UB IN. sup ra no te 8, at 94-117 (desc ri bing
small hunter-gatherer soci eti es and emerge nce of larger politi cal unit s ove r th e co urse of human history) .
17 1

For aclclitional work advocat ing bas ic inco me, see references in Wax, Rethinking Welj(u·e Rights . .wpm

note 3, at 262 n. l 7.
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Indeed. t'vVO insights offer hope in persuading political actors to tame or
restrain the1r customary reactions.
First, as noted above, there may be
compelling practical or prudential justifications for abandoning workconditioned welfare programs in favor of a simple basic income guarantee.
\Vithin affluent capitalist ec onomies, basic income might ad vance importan t
social objectives more effectively and at less cost than alternati ves that are
more politically popular. fi' those factors are properly emphas ized . opposition
might erode to some cxknt. Second, a deeper understanding on th e pcu·t ot'
voters of the origins of up posilion to basic income and of why Ihcrt opposition
rnay b~ obsolete Inight ~-d
rn~Lkc :;_;cine headviay against entrenchc \:1 ~Jtlitu de s.
Because the condition :~ that g~1.ve rise to reat·ti'-/r:_ attitudes again ~:;t fr::~eloa de rs 1n
the past have abated to some ex te nt, those attitucks may serve a less irnportant
social function today. Unlike primitive nations , modern western societies do
not face extreme scarcity and can tolerate some degree of shirking. Also, the
rise of centralized governments with efficient and effective taxing power bas
obviated the need to reiy on reciprocal norms to maintain group cooperation
and effect redistribution for emergencies. The power to tax ancl spe nd
effectively holds workers hostage to their desire to get ahead, superseding the
172
need for coordination conventions in the informal context.
In sum, the
realization that strong norms against free riding are no longer necessary and
may indeed be counterproductive, coupled with insights into the genesis of
these attitudes, may help vvean many enlightened citizens away from hostility
to "something for nothing. " That at least some individuals can be ~;wayecl by
these understandings sugges ts that we should not give in too readily to the
popular tendency to divide the poor into the deserving and undeserving. to
classify some dependencies as free riding, and to react negatively to persons
who violate norms of self-heip.
_l

It is possible, however, that reason never will succeed completely in
overcoming the elemental aversions and objections that inform our political
Iife. Despite its practical advantages, an arrangement that just "feels" unfair to
many ordinary people may always meet resistance in the voti ng booth and fall
short of commanding popular support. Even if abandoning work requirements
as the centerpiece of social redistribution would work well in practice and
make life better for some or all of the least advantaged, it does not follow that
such a policy would be adopted or would gain voter support. Basic income
may always have an uphill road in the political arena.
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For more on this point, sec Wax, Rerlrinl.:ing We!firrc Riglr/.1·. supra note~. at 288-97.

